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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON THE MINIMUM WAGE, IMMIGRATION, AND
PRIVATIZATION
SEPTEMBER 2019
DORUK CENGIZ
B.A., BOGAZICI UNIVERSITY
M.Sc., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Arindrajit Dube
This dissertation empirically examines effects of the minimum wage, immi-
gration, and privatization; three of the most crucial policies that impact work-
ers worldwide using recent advances in statistics and econometrics to provide
causally interpretable results, and to reconcile controversies in the literature.
In the first chapter, titled “Seeing Beyond the Trees: Using machine learn-
ing to estimate the impact of minimum wages on affected individuals”, I iden-
tify minimum wage workers prior to estimating its effects using machine learning
tools, and provide highly representative demographically-based groups that cap-
ture as much as 73.4% of all likely minimum wage workers. I find that there is a
very clear increase in average wages of workers in these groups following a mini-
mum wage increase, validating my approach to constructing these groups. I find
scant evidence of employment loss or a decline in fringe benefits in response to the
v
policy change. I show that the results are robust for a variety of methods to con-
struct the counterfactuals including a data-driven interactive fixed effects model.
Importantly, when I consider specifications that indicate a disemployment effect
for teens similar to some of the literature, I find no adverse employment effect on
affected non-teens, —suggesting that the current controversy is largely limited to
teens, a small and a shrinking share of the minimum wage workers. Finally, I pro-
pose a falsification test that reveals whether an estimated minimum wage effect is
confounded by shocks to unaffected individuals which further reconciles conflict-
ing evidence in the literature.
In the second chapter, titled “Is It Merely A Labor Supply Shock? Impacts of
Syrian Migrants on Local Economies in Turkey” co-authored with Hasan Tekgüç,
we use a large and geographically varying inflow of over 2.5 million Syrian mi-
grants in Turkey between 2012 and 2015 to study the effect of migration on local
economies. We do not find adverse employment or wage effects for native-born
Turkish workers overall, or those without a high school degree. These results are
robust to a range of strategies to construct reliable control groups. On the other
hand, we find evidence for a number of channels indicating demand side effects
of migration that help offset the impact of a labor supply shock. Turkish work-
ers’ participation in the formal sector rose in response to the migration, consistent
with complementarity of migrants and native born workers. In addition, migra-
tion led to an increase in residential building construction, with the number of new
dwelling units increasing by more than 33%. Finally, we show that Syrian migra-
tion brought in capital and entrepreneurs to the host regions, spurring new busi-
ness creation: the migration led to a more than 24% increase in new companies,
reflecting an increase in both Syrian-founded and non-Syrian founded companies.
Our findings suggest that migration-induced increases in regional demand and
vi
capital supply enable local labor markets to absorb inflow of migrant labor, and
prevent sizable wage decline or job loss for native workers.
In the third chapter, titled “When Does Privatization Process Begin? Total Ef-
fects of Privatization in Turkey”, I examine effects of privatization process as a
whole in Turkey. I find that the privatization has resulted in a 65% decline in firm-
level workforce, an 18 percentage point increase in the profit-margin, and statisti-
cally no change in real sales. In addition, I show that the privatization is a process
that starts before the date of sale of the firm. Therefore, overlooking the down-
sizing of the firm before the sale severely biases the results, which appears to be
the underlying cause behind conflicting findings in the literature. I conclude that
privatization results in an income transfer from wage-earners to profit-earners.
vii
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CHAPTER 1
SEEING BEYOND THE TREES:
USING MACHINE LEARNING TO ESTIMATE
THE IMPACT OF MINIMUM WAGES ON AFFECTED
INDIVIDUALS
1.1 Introduction
The minimum wage policy aims to help those at the lowest end of the wage
distribution. Whether it achieves this aim or makes things worse for the most
vulnerable segments of a society by destroying jobs continues to be debated (Al-
legretto et al., forthcoming; Cengiz et al., 2018; Jardim et al., 2017; Neumark, Salas
and Wascher, 2014; Reich, Allegretto and Godoey, 2017). One challenge in convinc-
ingly answering this question comes from the difficulty in precisely identifying the
workers who are affected by the policy. This has led many researchers to focus on
specific demographic groups or industries, such as teens, young individuals with
no high school degree, or the restaurant sector (Addison, Blackburn and Cotti,
2013; Allegretto, Dube and Reich, 2011; Card, Katz and Krueger, 1994; Clemens
and Wither, 2016; Dube, Lester and Reich, 2010; Neumark and Wascher, 1992). Al-
though substantial portions of these groups are, in fact, working for low wages,
these approaches miss the majority of workers affected by the minimum wage.
This raises a fundamental question: how representative are the existing estimates
of how minimum wages affect employment?
In this paper, we use machine learning tools to predict which individuals were
likely affected by minimum wage increases, and then estimate the effect of mini-
mum wages on the affected groups of workers using a variety of estimation meth-
1
ods. We make three contributions to the literature: First, we build a demographic-
based prediction model to capture potential minimum wage workers. The model
provides us with predicted probabilities for how likely an individual is to be mini-
mum wage worker. We validate that this model can successfully construct a group
containing more than 73 percent of minimum wage workers. Armed with this, we
are able to provide a much more complete set of estimates of how minimum wage
policies affect the employment, wages, and fringe benefits of low-wage workers.
Second, we capture the effects on the affected non-teen (20-64), and prime age (25-
55) individuals who are more likely to live in poor households than teens, and
tend to be the intended beneficiaries. These groups were largely missing in the
minimum wage studies because too few of these workers earn near the minimum
wage, making any estimates for these groups under-powered. This gap, how-
ever, causes a tension between what is usually analyzed (minimum wage effects
on teens) and what is argued (effects of the policy on affected workers largely com-
posed of adults) (Belman, Wolfson and Nawakitphaitoon, 2015; Manning, 2016).
Our prediction model enables us to identify affected non-teens, and prime age in-
dividuals, thus filling the gap. Third, we show that the predicted probabilities can
be used as a powerful falsification test. Namely, we additionally construct a group
whose members are highly unlikely to be affected by the minimum wage. This
allows us to assess whether particular research designs are likely credible, in that
the putative employment changes are occurring for those actually affected by the
policy. We show that this falsification test helps reconcile several disagreements
in the existing minimum wage literature about whether minimum wages reduce
overall employment.
In the first part of the paper, we use machine learning (ML) methods and demo-
graphic information to predict which individuals are likely to be minimum wage
workers in the Current Population Survey (CPS) data between 1996 and 2017. This
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is a prediction exercise, and we use three main tree-based learning tools: deci-
sion trees, random forests and gradient tree boosting. A key advantage of the ML
tools over the more familiar linear or logistic regressions is that they do not require
the researcher to pre-specify the functional form of the prediction model, which
is instead determined in a data-driven way. Using individual’s demographic and
educational characteristics, we predict their probability of having an hourly wage
less than 125% of the statutory minimum wage. Our preferred (gradient boosting)
approach is able to successfully classify workers better than other models. When
compared to commonly used demographic groups in the literature (such as teens,
or high school or less under the age of 30), the boosting can form groups with
a similar number of (correctly classified) minimum wage workers while substan-
tially reducing the number of (mis-classified) non-minimum wage workers. The
gains in precision (i.e., the correctly classified share) for a given level of recall (i.e.,
share of minimum wage workers included in the group) is sizable when we limit
attention to non-teen workers—a group that is of particular interest to policymak-
ers.
Next, we define two treatment groups—a “baseline group” designed to include
many minimum wage workers and a “high impact” group that likely captures
lower-skilled workers. We construct these groups using the predicted probabili-
ties, and validate using the estimated effect of the policy on the average wage of
the group—which we interpret as an indicator for the size of the “bite.” Various
methods we use to determine the groups point towards similar results, and sug-
gests a “high impact” group which includes 39.1% of all minimum wage workers
with 56.7% of its members are correctly classified; and a “baseline” group which
includes 73.4% of all minimum wage workers with 36.2% of its members are cor-
rectly classified.
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Both of the groups achieve considerable improvements in terms of the precision-
recall trade-off compared to the commonly used demographic samples. For in-
stance, while the precision value of the high impact group is similar to that of the
teen sample (the precision of the teen sample is 0.661 as opposed to 0.567 in the
high impact group), it contains many more minimum wage workers (the recall
rate of the teen sample is 0.219 as compared to 0.391 in the high impact group).
When we consider other commonly employed demographic groups used in the
minimum wage literature, the one composed of individuals younger than 30 with
high school or less education (“HSL, Age<30”) achieve a similar recall (0.351), but
with a much lower precision of 0.418 (as compared to 0.567 for the high impact
group). On the other hand, the baseline group places a higher importance on the
recall, and contains more than twice as many minimum wage workers as the “HSL,
Age<30” sample, while still keeping the precision relatively high. Thus, the base-
line group construction enables us to examine the effects of the minimum wage on
a large majority of the minimum wage workers while still observing a clear bite of
the policy.
In the second part of the paper, we estimate the impact of minimum wages on
the compensation and employment levels of affected workers, using a variety of
approaches to constructing counterfactuals. Our preferred approach is an interac-
tive fixed effects estimator along the lines of Bai (2009), which offers a data-driven
way to control for unobserved heterogeneity (Totty, 2017; Jardim et al., 2017). Us-
ing this approach, we find that while a strong and statistically significant wage
effect is observable, there is scant evidence of employment loss for either the high
impact or the baseline groups. The employment elasticities with respect to own
wage are 0.022 and 0.298, respectively; and the 95% confidence intervals reject the
elasticities smaller (larger) than -0.445 (0.488) and -0.324 (0.921). These bounds are
highly informative, and we can rule out many well-known estimates in the liter-
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ature. We assess the robustness of the conclusion using alternative specifications
augmented with interactive fixed effects as well as commonly used specifications
in the literature. All of them yield positive and statistically significant wage effects
for the groups. However, we reject the null hypothesis of zero employment elastic-
ity with respect to the minimum wage in none of the cases, except for the canonical
two-way (state and time period) fixed effects model. Furthermore, dividing the
groups into demographic subgroups reveal that the wage effect is experienced by
all the selected subgroups and the size of the effect is highly correlated with the
corresponding average predicted probability. On the other hand, the employment
effect is always very close to zero and displays essentially no correlation with the
wage effects. Similarly, the estimated employment elasticities with respect to own
wage are always considerably smaller than -1 in magnitude, indicating that the
total earnings of workers increase with the minimum wage in all subgroups. .
The discrepancy in employment estimates between our preferred IFE specifi-
cation and the canonical two-way fixed effects (TWFE) specification is similar to
what others have found in the literature (e.g., Totty (2017)). However, our pre-
dictive model allows us to approach the issue from a novel angle: importantly,
we find that the discrepancy between the TWFE and IFE estimates mostly dis-
appears if we focus on the affected non-teens. Both models indicate no negative
employment effect in the case of non-teens and the confidence intervals largely
agree—suggesting that extrapolating the canonical model estimates for teens to
non-teens is unwarranted.1 Moreover, our findings shed an important light on the
ongoing controversy on how best to control for unobserved heterogeneity (Alle-
gretto et al., forthcoming; Neumark and Wascher, 2017; Totty, 2017). The finding
of a disemployment effect of the minimum wage with the two-way fixed effects
1This is of practical and policy relevance. For example, the 2014 Congressional Budget Office
report specifically took teen elasticities as a starting point for estimating the impact on adults.
5
model appears to be quite specific to teens—who constitute a small and shrinking
share of minimum wage workers. Outside of teens, the degree of disparity in the
estimates for the affected workers is muted across the models, which all suggest no
disemployment effect on affected workforce—including for our high impact non-
teen workers. The relative similarity of the estimates across models for non-teen
workers is quite encouraging, and allows us to make progress by going beyond
the controversies on teen elasticities (Manning, 2016).
In addition to the wage and employment effects, we also examine the impact
of minimum wage on probability of having own-employment-based health insur-
ance. We find that the change in this outcome in the aftermath of a minimum
wage increase is statistically indistinguishable from zero for both the baseline and
the high impact groups. Put differently, the findings suggest that employers do
not respond to mandatory cash wage increases by decreasing non-cash benefits. 2
The third part of the paper proposes a falsification test using the predicted prob-
abilities. The test is based on the assumption that the effects of the minimum wage
should be more pronounced for groups that are likely to be minimum wage work-
ers, and close to zero for those highly unlikely to work for low wages (i.e., groups
with few “compliers” whose wages are affected by the policy). This allows us
to assess whether a particular research design rejects the true null hypothesis of
no effect on unaffected individuals. First, and reassuringly, we confirm that in our
preferred specification, none of the outcomes change in this “no impact group” fol-
2Our findings contradicts Clemens, Kahn and Meer (2018)’s claim that the minimum wage in-
creases in the U.S. cause a decline in likelihood of having employment-based health benefits for
those in very-low-paying occupations. In Online Appendix E, we show that, in fact, their model
specifications find no change in the likelihood of having own-employment-based health benefits
for the group, coinciding with our results. The argued negative effect is due to the fact that the
authors define having employment-based health insurance in a way that includes those having it
only as dependents. Their finding is entirely because of a decline in the share of individuals with
employment-based health insurance as dependents, which they interpret as a result of the mini-
mum wage. However, we show that the interpretation is questionable since it is highly unlikely
that the policyholders are affected by the minimum wage.
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lowing a minimum wage increase. We also use this falsification test to re-examine
the findings in Meer and West (2015), who find a sizable negative effect of the min-
imum wage on aggregate employment. Critics (Dube, 2017; Schmitt, 2014) have
argued that the employment losses often appear to happen in high wage sectors,
but Meer and West have responded that there are low-wage workers in high wage
sectors, and the sectoral composition is not necessarily informative. We use our
predicted probabilities to shed light on this controversy. The expectation is that
when we decompose their estimate, the no impact group should have a negligible
contribution to the final result, and the disemployment effect should be concen-
trated in the high impact and the baseline groups. When we examine Meer and
West (2015)’s model specifications, we find the opposite to be true. Their find-
ing of a negative employment effect of the minimum wage is wholly driven by
individuals who are highly unlikely to be minimum wage workers. In contrast,
individuals likely to be minimum wage workers—who actually received a wage
increase—saw no reduction in employment using Meer and West’s specifications.
This suggests that the negative employment findings in Meer and West likely re-
flect confounding employment shocks to high wage workers. Our ability to accu-
rately identify minimum wage workers from the policy intervention allows us to
assess the reliability of particular research designs.
Although there is a thick literature on the minimum wage, there are only a
handful of studies that examine large segments of affected workers in the U.S.3
This paper is most related to Cengiz et al. (2018) and Meer and West (2015) in terms
of assessing the overall impact of the policy on employment outcomes. While Meer
and West (2015) examines the impact of minimum wages on the total number of
jobs in a state, Cengiz et al. (2018) proposes using the frequency distribution of
3See Belman and Wolfson (2014) for a thorough literature review on the subject.
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wages and restricting attention to the jobs within a few dollars of the new min-
imum wage. That paper shows the benefits of using such localized comparison
over using aggregate employment. On the other hand, the approach proposed in
this paper, answering the question of “who”, has several advantages. Most impor-
tantly, a demographic based approach can be used to study outcomes other than
employment, such as health benefits. In addition, it can address concerns related to
labor-labor substitution, and guard against shocks to the wage distribution, which
may be of concerns in specific case studies. For these reasons, the two approaches
complement each other in painting a more complete picture.
Methodologically, our use of a demographics-based predictive model for min-
imum wage workers is closely related to Card and Krueger (1995). In examining
the 1988 California minimum wage increase, Card and Krueger (1995) uses a linear
prediction model to sort individuals living in the state in 1987 according to their
likelihood of having hourly wages between the old and new minimum wage ($3.35
and $4.25). Then, they designate the top 10% of the observations with highest pre-
dicted probabilities as the “high probability group”, and estimate the wage and
employment effects. In Appendix B, we show that an analogous prediction model
adapted to our case performs relatively well, though worse than the state-of-the-
art machine learning tools. At the same time, the Card and Krueger (1995) model is
based on subjective judgments about predictors and the functional form, includes
complicated multi-way interactions. The machine learning-based approach pro-
posed here does not rely on such judgments, determines the prediction model in a
data-driven way, and can provide a much better guarantee against overfitting and
specification hunting.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we
briefly present the relevant literature, and benefits of answering the question of
“who are potential minimum wage workers” prior to estimating effects of the pol-
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icy. Section 3 describes the data sets employed. Section 4 explains how we con-
struct the high impact, baseline, and no impact groups. Section 5 examines the
effects of the minimum wage on the affected population’s wages, employment
and own-employment-based health insurance coverage rates. Section 6 illustrates
the proposed falsification test based on the predicted probabilities. Section 7 con-
cludes.
1.2 Predicting Minimum Wage Workers
There is a vast literature on effects of the minimum wage in the U.S. The de-
bate usually revolves around the question “what does the minimum wage do”,
particularly in terms of employment. Scholars reach conflicting conclusions using
different empirical methodologies. On the other hand, the question “who are min-
imum wage workers” attracted considerably less interest, even though researchers
always implicitly answer the “who” question in picking the estimation sample
(Belman, Wolfson and Nawakitphaitoon, 2015).
We divide the way researchers have answered the question into two categories.
Studies in the first category answer the question “which demographic groups are
likely to be minimum wage workers”. These studies tend to place a larger weight
on the share of minimum wage workers in the sample than the share of mini-
mum wage workers captured by the sample. As a result, effects of the policy on
small demographic groups that usually work for low wages are examined. These
groups are often teens (Allegretto et al., forthcoming; Card, 1992; Neumark and
Wascher, 1992; Neumark, Salas and Wascher, 2014; Totty, 2017), younger work-
ers with lower educational credentials (Clemens and Wither, 2016; Clemens and
Strain, 2017; Manning, 2016; Sabia, Burkhauser and Hansen, 2012), and individuals
with no high school education (Addison and Blackburn, 1999; Addison, Blackburn
and Cotti, 2011).
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The main advantage of examining effects on groups that are likely to work
for low wages is that the program effect of the minimum wage, namely the wage
effect, or the “bite” of the policy can clearly be observed. This is an important fea-
ture, because the verification of the program effect is necessary for making causal
arguments about secondary effects of the policy, such as the employment effect
(Lemieux, 2017). Nonetheless, these groups constitute small shares of all mini-
mum wage workers. Hence, there is a discrepancy between the argument (effects
of the minimum wage on affected population) and the object examined (small de-
mographic groups). In other words, the generalizability of the findings to all min-
imum wage workers is a serious concern for these studies. The discrepancy is
particularly significant when the outcome of interest is the teen employment rate.
4 This is because teens are less likely to be in the target group than non-teen adult
minimum wage workers (Lundstrom, 2016). Compared to affected non-teens, only
a relatively small share of teens live in poor households and they are not house-
holders. According to the 2016 American Community Survey, 18.4% of teens of age
16 or older are poor. In addition, 74.4% of them are “children” of household heads.
On the other hand, non-teen individuals that we designate as highly affected or
affected in section 1.4 are more likely to live in poor households. 31.6% (23.8%)
of highly affected (affected) non-teens live in poor households. In addition, only
28.3% (24.3%) of highly affected (affected) non-teens are coded as “child” in the
data set.
As the group size is increased to alleviate the generalizability concerns, the
sample includes substantially more non-minimum wage workers, as shown be-
4According to Belman and Wolfson (2014), between 2001 and early 2013, 30 studies examined
employment effects of the minimum wage on a demographic group, and 17 of them had teen
employment rate as the dependent variable. According to Table 1 in Neumark (2017), this share
is 12/13 among studies that examined minimum wage effects on unskilled employment between
2010 and 2016.
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low in section 1.4. This blurs the effects and might lead results to be biased if the
research design confounds unrelated shocks on non-minimum wage workers with
minimum wage effects.
Studies in the second category answer the following question: “Which jobs
are minimum wage jobs?” Minimum wage effects on jobs in low-wage indus-
tries/occupations (Allegretto et al., forthcoming; Clemens, Kahn and Meer, 2018;
Dube, Naidu and Reich, 2007; Dube, Lester and Reich, 2010; Giuliano, 2013), or
jobs below a certain wage level are examined (Cengiz et al., 2018; Jardim et al.,
2017; Meer and West, 2015).5 The generalizability concerns apply for studies that
examine the impact on certain industries/occupations as well. They generally miss
the majority of minimum wage workers. To overcome this issue, recent studies ex-
amine how the policy affects jobs below a certain wage level (the threshold is $15
in Cengiz et al. (2018) or $19 in Jardim et al. (2017)). In these studies, all mini-
mum wage workers are, by construction, captured by the sample. At the same
time, unless the wage threshold is not very high, the program effect might still be
observable.
Nonetheless, the “which jobs” question of the second category is different from
the “which demographic groups” question of the first category in one crucial way.
The point of view has shifted from individuals to jobs. Samples constructed with
the “jobs” perspective lead the researcher to examine effects of the policy on jobs,
not individuals. Thus, for these studies, it is not necessarily the case that the af-
fected jobs are held by individuals with similar characteristics before and after the
policy was implemented. In other words, even if the research design is flawless,
additional analysis is usually needed to uncover the effects of the policy on more
5Some studies individually answer the questions and separately analyze effects on certain jobs
and demographic groups, thus appears in both categories.
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vulnerable segments of society, and to address concerns related to labor-labor sub-
stitution.6
Our primary contribution is rigorously answering the “who” question before
examining the impact of the policy. For this purpose, we build a prediction model
using recent machine learning tools. Compared to more familiar prediction tools,
such as logistic regression, the primary benefit of the machine learning tools is that
they build prediction models in a data-driven way. The data determines the pre-
dictors to be used, and the functional form they enter into the model. There is very
little room for specification hunting.7 In constructing the prediction model, we
use only demographic and educational characteristics of individuals for predic-
tors. As a result of this choice, the model yields demographically based samples.
In this sense, this paper belongs to the first category.8
We show that there are two major gains to be had by answering the “who”
question. First, we obtain samples that capture the majority of minimum wage
6This is usually done by answering a combination of these two questions. Answer to one of
the questions is improved by simultaneously answering the other one. Then, scholars intersect
the samples obtained from these answers. For instance, Cengiz et al. (2018) examined changes
in the total number of low-wage jobs by selected demographic groups. Similarly, for example,
Giuliano (2013) examined the demographic compositional effects of a minimum wage increase in
the restaurant industry.
7Nonetheless, it is always possible to construct a prediction model using the OLS or logis-
tic/probit regression that performs well. However, this potentially requires many trials and sub-
jective judgments. In examining the 1988 California minimum wage increase, Card and Krueger
(1995) builds a linear model that includes up to third degree interactions to predict how likely an
individual to have an hourly wage between $3.35 and $4.25 (old and new minimum wage). The
authors do not detail the rationale behind the specific functional form they employ in the predic-
tion model, though, as we show in appendix B, the model performs fairly well. Its predictions are
only slightly worse than the models proposed by state-of-the-art machine learning tools.
8The full set of predictors and how they are coded are reported in appendix A. In the prediction
model, we do not use variables related to past employment status or occupation/industry in the
CPS-ORG. They are sometimes missing even if the individual is currently in the labor force and
looking for job. We prefer to keep these observations in the sample, as they potentially carry infor-
mation about labor supply effects of the policy. In our preferred prediction model, we do not use
state of residence or year information either. This choice is primarily to be able to build samples
that are comparable and consistent across time and space. In the appendix, we report the perfor-
mance of the model that includes state of residence as a predictor, and show the results obtained
using the latter model. They are qualitatively very similar to our main results.
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workers. This allows us to produce generalizable results. The discrepancy between
the argument and the object examined substantially shrinks. Second, compared to
the commonly used samples, our proposed samples contain the same number of
minimum wage workers and have considerably fewer non-minimum wage work-
ers. This enables us to observe the program effect more clearly. Put succinctly,
rigorously answering the “who” question allows us to depict a more complete and
informative picture of the effects of the minimum wage.
1.3 Data
The primary data set we employ throughout the analysis is the Current Popu-
lation Survey (CPS). We use alternative categories of the data in constructing our
main variables.9
We use the 1996-2017 CPS Outgoing Rotation Group (CPS-ORG) sample for the
hourly wage variable. This is a subset of the Basic Monthly CPS, a monthly survey
of approximately 60,000 households in the U.S. The CPS-ORG includes only the
fourth and eighth sample months, when usual hourly wages are asked. The vari-
able is of primary importance for the prediction as well as for the estimation; thus
we rely on its accuracy. For this reason, we exclude observations with imputed
wages. We also use a range of demographic variables in the data set in predicting
individual’s likelihood of having a wage close to the minimum. These variables
indicate individual’s age, race, ethnicity, gender, education, marital status, citizen-
ship/nativity status, and rural status of the residency.
In examining potential secondary effects of the minimum wage, we employ
the 1996-2017 CPS Basic Monthly (CPS-Basic) for the employment indicator, and
the CPS Annual Social and Economic Characteristics (CPS-ASEC) in constructing
9The full set of variables and the data sources are detailed in appendix A.
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own-employment-based health insurance related variables. The CPS-ASEC allows
us to find individuals with employment-based health insurance coverage, and to
distinguish the policyholders and their dependents. Since the relevant survey
questions in the CPS-ASEC are related to the previous calender year, we adjust
the year variable accordingly.
We obtain the minimum wage data from Vaghul and Zipperer (2016) and state-
level sources. The authors provide daily minimum wage data until 2016. We ex-
tend it until the end of the fourth quarter of 2017, and calculate the average mini-
mum wage at the state-by-quarter level. When we use only the annual variation (in
regressions using the CPS-ASEC), we calculate the annual mean of the minimum
wage.
1.4 Individuals Affected by Minimum Wage Changes
The first question we aim to answer is a prediction question and can be refor-
mulated as how likely an individual is to be a minimum wage worker. To predict
each observation’s likelihood of being directly affected by the minimum wage, we
define a binary outcome variable that takes on the value of 1 if the worker earns
a positive hourly wage less than 125% of the statutory minimum wage. Thus, we
define these workers as minimum wage workers. Otherwise, the outcome variable
is zero.10
To build the prediction model and assess its power, we divide the data into
three mutually exclusive samples: training, test and left-out. In the training sam-
ple, we construct the prediction model using demographic predictors specified in
10We would like to emphasize that the value we pick for classification is primarily for descriptive
purposes. We do not designate individuals affected by the minimum wage solely based on the
predicted probabilities that are liable to change as the definition changes. In addition, in Appendix
B, we show that using alternative definitions in determining minimum wage workers produces
virtually the same ordering of observations according to predicted probabilities, suggesting that
the specific definition we use has essentially no bearing on the conclusions.
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Appendix A. We exclude observations that are employed in tipped occupations
from this sample.11 Additionally, we drop all observations from the states where
there occurred at least one minimum wage increase in the last 4 quarters to allow
wages to adjust to the new environment. Then, we randomly pick 150,000 out
of 1,457,102 observations that satisfy the conditions. The test sample, on the other
hand, is composed of all observations in the states where there is a minimum wage
event in the subsequent 4 quarters that are not in the training sample. There are
273,814 observations in the test sample. All the remaining observations are in the
left-out sample. The latter sample is used only in estimating effects of the mini-
mum wage.12
Our examination below and in Appendix B yields that the best prediction model
uses a tree-based learning tool. This is likely to be due to that predicting potential
minimum wage workers using demographic variables requires higher order inter-
actions, and tree-based tools incorporate interaction terms quite naturally. Below,
we briefly describe tree-based models we use, and refer the reader to appendix B
and Friedman, Hastie and Tibshirani (2009) for a more detailed treatment of tree-
based learning tools.
1.4.1 Tree-based Models: Decision trees, Random Forests, and Boosted Trees
Decision Trees: A single decision tree lies at the basis of many learning tech-
niques, including random forests and gradient tree boosting. A decision tree re-
cursively divides the feature space into two in a way that reduces the pre-specified
11Tipped occupations are defined in the same way as Autor, Manning and Smith (2016). The
sample includes workers in all occupations from states that do not allow tip credits, and those in
non-tipped occupations from other states.
12As suggested in Appendix C, trying alternative training and test samples to build the predic-
tion model produces highly similar results.
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loss function the most.13 More concretely, in the beginning, the tree tries every
possible split to divide the entire sample space into two, and picks the one that
diminishes the loss function the most. Then, each subspace is treated as the new
feature space and the first step is repeated. Once the splitting is over, it predicts the
class of every observation according to the majority vote in the subspace (terminal
node) that the observation belongs.
One question is when to stop the splitting. The splitting can continue until
there is only one data point at each terminal node. Such a tree fits the training
sample perfectly, and would suffer from overfitting. To overcome the problem, it
is common to use the cross-validation procedure to determine the complexity of
the tree. For a more accurate prediction, we collapse some internal nodes (“prune
the tree”), decrease the prediction variance at the expense of bias.
The trees are not among the most successful learners, yet they are relatively
easy to interpret. In figure 1.1, we plot two pruned decision trees produced to pre-
dict whether a wage worker have an hourly wage of less than 125% of the statutory
minimum wage using the demographic and educational characteristics. The sole
difference between the trees is that the one in panel (a) uses a categorical age vari-
able and the other continuous. The tree in panel (a) predicts that the only group
in the training sample with hourly wages less than the threshold are teens. The
majority vote in all the other terminal nodes is “FALSE”, indicating that non-teen
observations are expected to work for hourly wages higher than the threshold. In
other words, the graph shows that the most commonly used teen sample is actu-
ally the suggestion of a single decision tree. The use of continuous age variable
13The loss function is the deviance, defined as −2∑m ∑k nmk ∗ log(pˆmk); where nmk indicates the
number of observations at terminal node m that belongs to class k and pˆmk is the share of observa-
tions at terminal node m that belongs to the class k.
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produces a tree that largely agrees with the former one, except for that it addition-
ally excludes workers of age 19 from the predicted group.
The recommendation of the decision tree is employing most commonly used
sample in the literature to examine the effects of the minimum wage. However,
there are ways to obtain better predictions by combining multiple decision trees.
The two most common ways to do so are the random forest by Breiman (2001) and
the gradient boosted trees by Friedman (2001).
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Figure 1.1. Minimum wage workers according to pruned trees
|Age >= 25              Age < 25
SC, CG         HSD, HSG 
Citizen         Not citizen
Age <= 19      Age > 19
FALSE
FALSE FALSE
TRUE FALSE
(a) Categorical age variable
|Age <= 22              Age > 22
Age <= 18      Age > 18 SC, CG         HSD, HSG 
Citizen          Not citizen
TRUE FALSE
FALSE
FALSE FALSE
(b) Continuous age variable
Notes: The 1996-2017 CPS-ORG is used. The left-hand side tree employs a categorical age variable with categories [16, 20), [20, 25), [25,30), ... , [60, 65); whereas the tree on the right uses
a continuous age variable. “True” indicates that the tree predicts workers in the terminal node are expected to have hourly wages less than 125% of the statutory minimum wage
(minimum wage worker), and “FALSE” otherwise. While all of the variables are tried, the trees pick only the age, education, and citizenship status variables to make splits. LTHS, HSG,
SC and CG indicate workers with no high school degree, with no college education, with no college degree, and college-graduate workers, respectively.
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Random Forest: The random forest is a tree-based ensemble learning tech-
nique. It provides a way to overcome the bias-variance trade-off of a single tree. It
constructs a multitude of fully grown decision trees formed using different train-
ing bootstrap samples. Each one of their predictions is unbiased, yet has large
variances. To reduce the variance, we calculate the average of predictions. To fur-
ther reduce the variance, we decrease the correlation among trees by employing a
randomly selected portion of the predictors at each split. This has no impact on
the bias since individual trees are still fully grown. 14
Boosting: The boosting approaches the problem from a different angle. In-
stead of producing many fully grown trees, it sequentially produces relatively
small trees, each focusing on the errors of previous ones. Then, it adds models
that trees propose to build the final prediction model. Concretely, the first tree in
the boosting is small and a weak learner, aims to correctly classify only slightly
more than 50% of observations. The subsequent trees, also weak learners, pays
more attention to the observations that the preceding trees failed to predict cor-
rectly. This is usually done by altering the outcome variable or slightly changing
the loss function. Once all trees are built, we sum their predictions and obtain the
model.
We build prediction models using these tools. 15
14Note that if trees are perfectly correlated, the reduction of the variance would be nil. If they are
independent, the variance of the final model would be σ
2
B , where σ
2 is the prediction variance of a
single tree and B indicates number of trees.
15The random forest has 2,000 trees. In determining the parameters to find the best model, we
employed a 5-fold cross-validation procedure. The parameters we choose for the boosting are
as follows: number of trees = 4,000; shrinkage factor = 0.005; depth of the tree = 6; minimum
observation in a node = 10. The tree algorithm yields panel (b) of figure 1.1.
19
Precision-Recall Curves and Predicted Probabilities
To compare the models with each other and with commonly used samples, we
employ two concepts in the machine learning literature, precision and recall, that
we deem appropriate for assessing their performances. The precision reports the
correctly classified share. It is the ratio of the number of minimum wage workers
to the number of observations in a given sample. The recall, the share of minimum
wage workers included in the sample, is calculated by dividing the number of
minimum wage workers captured by a given sample to the number of minimum
wage workers in the entire population. For instance, if a sample includes only one
worker and she is a minimum wage worker, then the precision is 1; though the
recall is very small. On the other hand, if the sample contains every observation
as minimum wage worker, then the precision value is very small and the recall is
1. The ideal is to construct a sample where all minimum wage workers as well as
non-minimum wage workers are predicted correctly, so both the precision and the
recall are 1.16
Figure 1.2 shows (i) the precision and recall values of the samples commonly
employed in the minimum wage literature (the markers), (ii) the PR curves corre-
sponding to the models produced by a single pruned tree, the random forest, and
the boosting (the curves), (iii) the precision that would be obtained if every obser-
16Another metric commonly used to compare models is producing the receiver operating char-
acteristic (ROC) curve. The ROC curve plots the recall against false positive rate, the latter defined
as the ratio of number of observations predicted incorrectly as minimum wage workers to all non-
minimum wage workers. In our case, both of them point towards the same model. The difference
in interpretation between the PR and the ROC curves is that while the former answers the question
of “For the given data set, how well the model performs?”, the latter answers “How well the model
performs in general?” Since the two classes are relatively unbalanced (there are substantially fewer
minimum wage workers than non-minimum wage workers), it is relatively difficult to visually
differentiate the models in terms of the latter, thus we choose the PR curve to plot.
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vation is predicted to be minimum wage worker (the horizontal dash line) using
the test sample.17
Figure 1.2. Precision-recall curves
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Notes: The test sample is used. Straight line is produced from the predicted probabilities produced by the boosted trees
model, the long dash line by the tree model, and the short dashed line by the random forest model. Black triangle, black
circle, gray circle, gray triangle, and the plus signs indicate teen, less than high school (LTHS), LTHS younger than 30, high
school or less younger than 30, and restaurant workers samples, respectively. The ideal case is predicting all relevant (with
hourly wage less than 125% of the minimum wage) and non-relevant cases correctly, hence achieving the (1,1) point at the
top-right corner. The horizontal dash line corresponds to a model with no discrimination ability.
We begin by comparing performances of the commonly used samples in cap-
turing minimum wage workers. First, in terms of the precision, the teen sam-
ple performs better than all the other commonly used samples that we compare
(restaurant workers, workers younger than 30 with no high school degree (LTHS,
Age<30), workers younger than 30 with high school or less education (HSL, Age<30),
17Each commonly used sample has a single precision-recall pair in the figure. However, it is
possible to create many samples using the prediction models; thus they have precision recall curves.
To plot the curves, we find the values corresponding to alternative predicted probability cutoff
points using the test data. Put differently, we calculate the recall and the precision values of the
sample that is composed of observations in the test data with predicted probabilities higher than a
certain cutoff value. We obtain the PR curves by connecting the points.
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and workers with no high school degree (LTHS)). In fact, when compared to “LTHS,
Age<30”, and restaurant workers samples, both recall and precision values of the
teen sample is higher. This indicates that teen sample includes more workers that
truly have hourly wages less than 125% of the minimum, and it captures them
more accurately than the former samples. Second, the commonly used samples
that include non-teen workers achieve a higher recall than the teen sample. How-
ever, the rise in the recall is expensive in terms of the precision. For instance, in-
cluding all high school or less workers younger than 30 increases the recall value
by 0.132 compared to the teen sample, yet the precision decreases by 0.243. It im-
plies that many non-teen observations in the “HSL, Age<30” sample are actually
non-minimum wage workers.
On the other hand, the learning tools improve the precision-recall trade-off con-
siderably, especially if the aim is to include non-teen observations. Points in the PR
curves are closer to the top-right corner than the points corresponding to the com-
monly used samples. In addition, for the same recall values, the difference in the
precision values of the commonly used samples and the samples recommended by
the tools increase as the recall increases. For instance, the precision value that the
learning tools achieve for the teen sample recall value is only slightly greater than
that of the teen sample (the vertical distance between the dark triangle and the
curves). For the recall value of the “HSL, Age<30” sample, however, the learning
tools achieve a substantially larger precision value than that of the former sample,
with the boosted trees outperform others (the vertical distance between the gray
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triangle and the straight dark curve). Armed with the latter observation, we pick
the model constructed by the boosted trees as the preferred prediction model.18,19
To further depict the relationship between the predicted probability values ob-
tained from the preferred prediction model and the precision, we plot the total
counts of observations and the precision values by predicted probability bins in
the test data in figure 1.3. As opposed to the PR curve, the figure shows the pre-
cision values of each predicted probability bin separately (not cumulatively). It
shows that the predicted probability range and the precision value of each bin are
highly correlated. Almost all the ranges contain its precision value, suggesting
that the probabilities can be used as proxies. This might be particularly useful in
approximating the “bite” of the minimum wage in data sets with accurate demo-
graphic, and relatively noisy or non-existent hourly wage variables (e.g. the CPS
except CPS-ORG, the American Community Survey).
18In appendix B, we compare the preferred prediction model with the ones built with a linear
probability model, a logistic regression, an elastic-net regression, neural networks, and support
vector machines. The boosted trees perform better than all of them.
19Appendix Table A.6 presents further proof for benefits of using the prediction model. For the
same recall values, the estimated wage elasticities with respect to the minimum wage of the sam-
ples proposed by the boosting are almost always larger than the commonly analyzed demographic
groups. The only exception is the teen sample, and the difference is minuscule. Furthermore, the
standard errors of employment elasticities with respect to wage of the former samples are always
smaller. These results indicate that by asking the “who” question, we better capture the wage effect
(or the program effect (Lemieux, 2017)), and obtain greater statistical power.
23
Figure 1.3. Predicted counts and true positive rates
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Notes: The test sample is used. The light bars show the total number of observations; whereas the dark ones workers with
hourly wages less than 125% of the minimum wage in each predicted probability bins. The percentage values indicate the
share of true relevant cases (with hourly wage less than 125% of the minimum wage) in the bin.
Descriptive Statistics and Relative Influences of Demographic Variables
To provide a more transparent picture on which observations are predicted to
be minimum wage workers, we divide the CPS-ORG data into 16 mutually exclu-
sive subsamples according to the predicted probabilities in descending order and
report shares of selected demographic characteristics in table 1.1. Except for the
first group, all groups are similar-sized; whereas the first group is composed only
of observations that are likely to earn less than 125% of the statutory minimum
wage (predicted probability larger than 0.5).
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Table 1.1. Selected demographic characteristics of predicted probability groups
Teen ≤ 20 Age <30 LTHS HSG Hispanic Non-white Woman Migrant
from Lat. Am.
Smallest p Observations
Group 1 0.789 0.086 0.804 0.110 0.323 0.185 0.675 0.190 0.500 94,478
Group 2 0.261 0.503 0.347 0.312 0.365 0.222 0.644 0.208 0.315 150,205
Group 3 0.022 0.583 0.334 0.401 0.381 0.229 0.477 0.271 0.214 150,147
Group 4 0.001 0.488 0.172 0.542 0.277 0.239 0.569 0.125 0.149 150,367
Group 5 0.000 0.327 0.108 0.574 0.180 0.261 0.597 0.063 0.112 150,225
Group 6 0.000 0.289 0.082 0.507 0.208 0.179 0.598 0.044 0.088 150,022
Group 7 0.000 0.220 0.081 0.383 0.110 0.198 0.520 0.022 0.070 149,288
Group 8 0.000 0.176 0.037 0.455 0.075 0.195 0.606 0.007 0.058 151,450
Group 9 0.000 0.218 0.047 0.186 0.088 0.170 0.538 0.003 0.047 149,799
Group 10 0.000 0.177 0.007 0.326 0.115 0.229 0.285 0.001 0.038 150,516
Group 11 0.000 0.196 0.000 0.175 0.066 0.106 0.573 0.000 0.032 150,416
Group 12 0.000 0.182 0.000 0.098 0.081 0.167 0.434 0.000 0.027 150,203
Group 13 0.000 0.112 0.000 0.282 0.037 0.158 0.310 0.000 0.023 150,089
Group 14 0.000 0.040 0.000 0.058 0.012 0.095 0.454 0.000 0.020 150,406
Group 15 0.000 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.021 0.042 0.471 0.000 0.017 147,194
Group 16 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.056 0.129 0.000 0.000 153,335
Notes: The 1996-2017 CPS-ORG is used. Each cell shows the share of the selected demographic group, the smallest predicted probability value
(p), and the number of wage workers in a given predicted probability subsample. The subsamples are sorted according to the predicted prob-
abilities in descending order, thus subsample 1 (16) is composed of individuals most (least) likely to have an hourly wage less than 125% of the
minimum.
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Examining the table, we observe that the age variable is a highly important
predictor. Teens constitute 79% of subsample 1. This suggests that analyses using
only subsample 1 would be similar to those employing the teen sample. The teen
share drops to 26% in subsample 2 and is virtually zero thereafter, and more than
half of the observations in subsamples 2 and 3 are adults of age 20-30. This sug-
gests that the importance of the age variable is not limited to determining whether
an observation belongs to subsample 1. The model also employs educational at-
tainment heavily in determining the predicted probabilities. Observations with
less than high school education are mostly in the smaller-numbered subsamples,
whereas high school graduates are in the middle-numbered ones. There is almost
no observation without some college education in subsamples 15 and 16. Another
finding worth mentioning is that the share of women workers is very high for first
subsample (67.5%), and is very low in the last (12.9%), indicating that individ-
ual’s gender is important whether one ends up in a low-paying job. At first sight,
the race variable appears to play a smaller role in placing observations in small-
numbered subsamples, yet a careful examination reveals that the variable plays an
important role in determining if an individual is in subsamples 1-10. The share
of non-white individuals decline as the subsample number increases. Lastly, His-
panic individuals share in the sample is 14.56%; whereas they make up more than
32% of the first three subsamples. Share of all demographic subsamples reported
in the table drops close to zero for subsample 16, suggesting that white U.S. citizen
men older than 30 with college education are highly unlikely to be working for
wages near the minimum.
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Figure 1.4. Relative influences of the predictors
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Notes: The training sample is used. The relative influences of the variables in the boosted trees model are calculated from
the training sample. The bars, indicate the decline in the loss function due to the specified variable, are normalized so they
sum up to 100.
For a more rigorous treatment of the importance of each predictor, we plot
the “relative influences” of the variables calculated according to the suggestion
in Friedman (2001) in Figure 1.4.20 The figure largely confirms our previous obser-
vations. It finds “age” as the most important predictor in the sample with a very
20The figure shows the reduction in the loss function caused by each variable used in non-
terminal nodes. We normalize the relative influences so that they sum up to 100. The average
importance of each variable is;
I2l =
1
M
M
∑
m=1
I2l (Tm)
where Il(Tm) is the reduction in the loss function due to the use of variable l in non-terminal nodes
of tree m. However, we wish to caution against interpreting them directly. First, the importance
is in terms of prediction not explanation. Second, there are cases where one variable needs to be
interacted with another for high predictive power. In those cases, only one of them are deemed to
have strong influence, whereas both are essential.
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large margin. The variable for educational credentials comes after age.21 Gender
and citizenship/nativity variables are also relatively important in the prediction.
The indicator variable for Hispanic individuals appear to have less influence on
the prediction, though it is largely due to the fact that it is highly correlated with
the citizenship/nativity variable.
The high impact, and the baseline groups
The predicted probabilities that the boosted trees yield are continuous and do
not directly allow us to determine groups that are highly affected, affected, and
not affected by the policy. To find the approximate predicted probability values
that distinguish these groups from each other, we rely on the wage effect of the
minimum wage. The wage effect is the primary effect of the minimum wage, and
we interpret it as the size of the bite of the minimum wage. It is also interpreted as
the “program effect” (Lemieux, 2017). Our premise is that the size of the estimated
wage effect reveals whether, and by what degree, a group is affected by the policy.
We detail the methods and alternative criteria we employ to choose the thresh-
old predicted probability values in appendix C. Briefly, first, we estimate the wage
effect and choose the threshold values based on the size and statistical significance
of the wage elasticity with respect to the minimum wage estimates.22 Second, we
devise an exercise that combines a procedure highly analogous to the 10 times 10-
fold cross-fitting and the tree algorithm to determine the threshold values based on
the size of the wage effect. The former method is relatively easier to implement,
21In fact, dropping teen observations from the sample decreases the relative importance of the
age variable substantially. It renders age to be the close second most important variable in the
prediction. The educational credentials of the observation becomes the most important predictor.
22The model specifications used in obtaining the wage effects are explained in detail in section
1.5 and in appendix C.
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and the latter method can be seen as a robustness check since it avoids overfitting
by using different samples for prediction and estimation.
Both of the methods point toward similar approximate values for the thresh-
olds, recommending us to use observations with predicted probability values greater
than 0.322 in constructing the high impact group (for highly affected individuals),
and 0.110 for the baseline group (for affected individuals). Lastly, we declare ob-
servations in the last 5 subsamples of table 1.1 as the no impact group. We prefer to
pick a relatively conservative value for the group that is not affected by the policy,
since the threshold values are approximations. The observations in this group are
predicted to be at least 10 times less likely to be minimum wage workers than the
high impact group (the largest predicted probability is 0.032).
Time paths of the precision and the recall values of the high impact, and base-
line groups compared to the commonly used demographic groups
The groups we obtain are demographic groups. They allow us to compare indi-
viduals with similar characteristics across time and space. However, the precision
and recall values of the high impact and baseline groups as well as the commonly
used samples vary across years.
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Figure 1.5. Time paths of precision and recall values
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Notes: The 1996-2017 CPS-ORG is used. Time paths of the precision (panel (a)) and recall (panel (b)) values of the samples indicated at the bottom of each graph are plotted. The high
impact group (the blue straight line) is composed of observations with predicted probability values greater than 0.322, and the baseline group includes observations with predicted
probability values greater than 0.110. The average precision values of teen, high school or less younger than 30 (HSL, age<30), restaurant workers samples, and the high impact and
baseline groups are 0.661, 0.418, 0.620, 0.572, 0.362. The average recall values of teen, high school or less younger than 30 (HSL, age<30), restaurant workers samples, and the high impact
and the baseline groups are 0.219, 0.351, 0.257, 0.391, 0.734.
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Figure 1.5 shows the time paths of the precision and recall values of the com-
monly used samples and the high impact, and the baseline groups using the 1996-
2017 CPS-ORG. We observe that the precision and recall values of all samples vary
over time. The precision follows a U-shaped pattern. The declining real value of
the minimum wage in the U.S. is responsible for the falling precision prior to 2007.
The nominal value of the minimum wage remained constant, yet average wages
grew; hence the hourly wage of a randomly picked individual became more likely
to be larger than 125% of the minimum wage. The federal minimum wage increase
from $5.15 to $7.25 in 2007-2009, on the other hand, counteracted the trend. It in-
creased the real value of the minimum wage, extended the range of wages that are
in the 125% of the minimum wage.
The recall values of the samples follow a relatively stable path until 2007. In
2007, as the total number of workers with hourly wages close to the minimum
substantially increased, the teen share of minimum wage workers fell sharply. This
affects the recall of the samples adversely and the effect largely depends on the
share of teens in the samples.
We again begin with examining the commonly analyzed samples. In Figure
1.2, we observe that teen, and restaurant workers samples achieve the highest pre-
cision in all years.23 The precision of the “HSL, Age<30” sample is considerably
smaller than teen or restaurant workers samples. However, the latter samples miss
majority of the workers earning below 125% of the minimum wage. Thus, the or-
dering dramatically changes when we examine the time paths of the recall values.
The “HSL, Age<30” sample achieves a substantially higher recall value.
23As implied by Figure 1.2, the prediction model can construct samples that have higher pre-
cision values and greater bites than both of these samples for the same recall values. Due to our
subjective preference in the precision-recall tradeoff, we pick samples that contain considerably
more minimum wage workers.
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Samples created by the boosting improve the precision-recall tradeoff in ev-
ery year in the sample. On average, the high impact group captures 39.1% of all
minimum wage workers with a precision value that is merely 13.5% smaller than
that of the teen sample (0.572 instead of 0.661). The recall value of the baseline
group, the group that prefers the recall over the precision, is 0.734, indicating that
it misses only approximately a quarter of minimum wage workers. This is larger
than twice the recall value of the “HSL, Age<30” sample (0.351). Moreover, the
average precision of the baseline group is 0.362, only 13.4% smaller than that of
the HSL younger than 30 sample (0.418).
As meticulous the specific industry or demographic group analyses of the min-
imum wage are, the generalizability has always been a point of contention for
these studies. For those analyzing the impact of the minimum wage on the entire
population, one major concern is whether it is the workers affected by the mini-
mum wage are driving the estimated effects. One way to address the concerns is
to explicitly focus on the number of low-wage jobs after a minimum wage event
(Cengiz et al., 2018; Jardim et al., 2017).24 Another way to alleviate these problems,
as we claim here, is asking the question of “who are potential minimum wage
workers” and using prediction tools to answer it. The tools we employ allow us to
obtain samples that yield estimated effects to be clearer (higher precision). At the
same time, we can present a relatively complete picture (higher recall), since there
are more workers earning close to the minimum for any given sample size.
24Since these studies examine changes in the number of jobs, they can only examine effects for
employed individuals with low wages. Our approach is unconditional on employment, and does
not require observations to have positive wages.
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1.5 Estimating the effects of minimum wage on affected individ-
uals
1.5.1 Methodology
After having determined on the high impact and the baseline groups, we exam-
ine whether and how much the minimum wage increases impact job opportunities
and employment-based health insurance coverage rates of the affected individu-
als. We employ two main specifications throughout the paper: An interactive fixed
effects (IFE) model along the lines of Bai (2009), and the canonical two-way fixed
effects model.
The samples composed of the high impact, and the baseline groups are new to
the literature. Given the current debates revolving around the “best” model spec-
ification for estimating the minimum wage effects, we prefer to remain agnostic
concerning the underlying data generating process and employ a model specifi-
cation that is formed in a data driven way. Thus, we use an IFE model. The IFE
finds patterns in the error term and purges potential confounders, such as local
business cycles and spatial heterogeneities, that can be formulated as interactions
between state-specific intercepts and national time trends of any functional form
using the data. It does not limit the variation of the variable of interest. In statis-
tical terms, the IFE removes the principal components of the error term that are
deemed “important”.25
The regression equation of the preferred specification is as follows,
25In the minimum wage literature, there is no consensus on how to address spatial hetero-
geneities and local business cycles unrelated to, though coincide in time and space with, the mini-
mum wage changes. Scholars have included division-by-time specific intercepts to allow macroe-
conomic shocks having differential impact on divisions and/or state-specific linear trends in their
models (Allegretto et al., forthcoming; Meer and West, 2015), or concentrated on contiguous border
counties (Dube, Lester and Reich, 2010). The latter models are criticized due to restricting the vari-
ation in the variable of interest, or due to preventing the model from capturing the dynamic effects
(Clemens and Wither, 2016; Meer and West, 2015).
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Y˜i,t = β ∗ logMWi,t + ω ∗ X + µi + λt + ui,t, (1.1)
where i indicates state, and t quarter. Yi,t is the outcome variable, state-by-quarter
employment rate, log-transformed wage, or share of individuals with own-employment-
based health insurance. X is the state-by-quarter averaged predicted probability
values of the estimation sample. We include it for narrower confidence intervals,
and to prevent sampling error caused sudden changes in the composition of the
sample from substantially affecting the estimates. µi and λt are state and time fixed
effects.26 27
The dependent variable in equation 1.1 is written as Y˜i,t, not Yi,t. This is because
the IFE subtracts “important” patterns in the error term from the dependent vari-
able before estimating the regression. So the principal component analysis (PCA)
needs to be performed before the estimation. On the other hand, to obtain the
residuals that the PCA employs, we need the regression results. Thus, the coeffi-
cient of interest cannot be estimated analytically. We solve the problem by using
the iterative scheme described in Bai (2009).28
26We note that our preferred specification does not explicitly include variables that control for
business cycles. We rely on the IFE in this respect as well. This is mainly because the same shock
might affect the control and the outcome variables, thus leading to endogeneity issues. For instance,
including state-level unemployment rate might be particularly problematic when we have employ-
ment rate of the baseline group as the dependent variable, since they are likely partly mechanically
correlated.
27In fact, Bai (2009) notes that panel and time fixed effects are also captured by the IFE, hence
they are not necessary for unbiasedness. However, it is recommended to include them; since they
improve the efficiency.
28One question at this point is to determine which patterns are “important”. Put differently,
how many principal components of the error term should we purge? To answer the question, we
calculate the information criterion ICP1 proposed by Bai and Ng (2002), and we find when it takes
the minimum value. Using their notation, ICp1 = ln(V(k, Fˆk)) + k(N+TN∗T )ln(
N∗T
N+T ). In our case, V(k, Fˆ
k)
is the population variance of the error term after k principal components are purged, N indicates the
number states, T is for the number of quarters in the sample. Note that the information criterion
might require no purging, and it might indicate that the appropriate model is a two-way fixed
effects model (i.e. k = 0).
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The second specification is the canonical model; namely, the two-way (state
and quarter) fixed effects model with contemporaneous log-transformed mini-
mum wage as the variable of interest.29 In this model, it is common to include
state-level demographic and business cycle controls to obtain narrower confidence
intervals and to account for state-by-quarter shocks that are unrelated to minimum
wage increases. The canonical model is as follows,
Yi,t = β ∗ logMWi,t +ω∗X + µi + λt + ui,t. (1.2)
X includes state-level demographic and business cycle controls. In terms of the
latter, it is common to include state-level unemployment rate and population vari-
ables. We control for education with three variables: share of individuals with less
than high school education, of high school graduates with no college education,
and of college graduates. To control for age, we include state-by-quarter averaged
age and age squared.30
1.5.2 Wage and Employment Effects of the Minimum Wage
In table 1.2, we begin by examining the wage and employment effects on the
high impact, and the baseline groups in columns 1-2, and 3-4, respectively. The
columns 1 and 3 employ the preferred IFE, and the columns 2 and 4 the canon-
ical specifications. In estimating the employment elasticity with respect to the
29The canonical model is highly criticized due to its inability to address spatial heterogeneities
and the apparent violation of the parallel trends assumption in the case of restaurant, and teen
employment (Allegretto et al., forthcoming; Dube, Lester and Reich, 2010). In studies that examine
wage and employment effects of the minimum wage, a common way to address these problems
is including division-by-time specific intercepts or state-specific linear trends. We do not aim to
conclude these debates by laying out advantages and disadvantages of these model specifications
in the literature. However, as additional empirical evidences for our main employment and wage
estimates, we report the findings using the commonly used model specifications that include linear
state trends or division-by-period fixed effects in appendix tables A.2 and A.3.
30Replacing the demographic share variables with the state-by-quarter averaged predicted prob-
ability values produces virtually the same results.
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minimum wage, we use the group’s state-by-quarter employment rate as the out-
come variable, then divide the estimate to the mean of the outcome variable. In
the row where we report the implied employment elasticity with respect to wage,
we divide the minimum wage-employment elasticity to the minimum wage-wage
elasticity. Since the bites of the policy are not the same across groups, it renders
the columns comparable by normalizing the minimum wage-employment elastic-
ities by the wage effects. This is conceptually similar to using the minimum wage
change as an instrument, and estimating the effect of wage increases on employ-
ment with a two-stage least squares model.
The first column reports a large and statistically significant wage effect (wage
elasticity = 0.234 (0.029)), and virtually no employment effect for the high impact
group (employment elasticity with respect to the minimum wage = 0.006 (0.042)).
The confidence interval rejects any employment elasticity with respect to the min-
imum wage smaller than -0.078. We observe a highly similar result in column 3,
where we report the employment and wage effects for the baseline group. The
IFE model estimates a small positive employment effect that is statistically indis-
tinguishable from zero disemployment effect (employment elasticity with respect
to the minimum wage = 0.036 (0.024)). The wage elasticity is, again, sizable and
positive (wage elasticity = 0.117 (0.018)).
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Table 1.2. Wage and employment effects of the minimum wage on the high impact,
and the baseline groups
Group: High impact group Baseline group
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Wage elasticity wrt MW 0.234*** 0.204*** 0.117*** 0.093***
(0.029) (0.025) (0.018) (0.023)
Number of factors 1 3
Observations 4,488 4,488 4,488 4,488
Average predicted probability 0.482 0.482 0.291 0.291
Emp. elasticity wrt MW 0.006 -0.104*** 0.036 -0.039**
(0.042) (0.026) (0.024) (0.016)
Number of factors 2 3
Observations 4,488 4,488 4,488 4,488
Average predicted probability 0.521 0.521 0.328 0.328
Emp. elasticity wrt wage 0.027 -0.510*** 0.312 -0.418**
(0.224) (0.158) (0.298) (0.201)
Specification
Interactive F.E. Y Y
Notes: State-by-quarter collapsed 1996-2017 CPS-ORG and Basic Monthly CPS
are used. Estimated wage and employment elasticities with respect to the mini-
mum wage, and the implied employment elasticity with respect to wage for the
high impact group are reported. The implied employment elasticity with respect
to wage is obtained by dividing the employment elasticity with respect to the
minimum wage to the wage elasticity. Columns 1 and 2 employ the high impact
group; while columns 3 and 4 the baseline groups. The first and third columns
use the preferred IFE (interactive fixed effects) model. The second and fourth
columns use the canonical two-way fixed effects model. Standard errors of the
employment and wage elasticities with respect to minimum wage are calculated
using state-level cluster-robust variance estimator. To calculate the standard er-
rors of the implied employment elasticity with respect to wage, we estimate 250
state-level clustered bootstrap iterations for minimum wage-employment and
wage elasticities. Each estimated employment elasticity with respect to the min-
imum wage is divided by the corresponding wage elasticity to construct an em-
pirical distribution of the employment elasticity with respect to wage, which is
used to estimate the standard error. All estimates are state population weighted.
Significance levels are * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
In both columns, the implied elasticity estimates are small positive. For the high
impact (baseline) group, the implied employment elasticity with respect to wage is
0.027 (0.312). Its 95% confidence interval rejects any value smaller than−0.445(−0.324).31
31In comparison, the relatively pessimistic estimates are generally around -1 (see web appendix
of Harasztosi and Lindner (2017) for a comprehensive list of estimated employment elasticities with
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In other words, if the average wage of the high impact (baseline) group increases
by 5% (2.5%) as a result of a minimum wage increase, the employment would not
decline by more than 2.1% (0.71%).
Columns 2 and 4, on the other hand, depict a different picture. There, we find
that, for both groups, employment declines as a result of the minimum wage in-
duced wage increase. The employment elasticities with respect to wage in these
columns are around -0.5, suggesting a large disemployment effect of the policy.
Nonetheless, the IFE recommends us to purge more than one unobserved factors
in estimating employment and wage effects of the minimum wage on the groups.
This suggests that the error term of the basic two-way fixed effects model contains
patterns that potentially bias the results. We arrive at a similar conclusion by com-
paring estimated effects of the canonical model, and the models that augment it
with state linear trends and/or division-by-quarter fixed effects in appendix ta-
bles A.2 and A.3. The statistical significances of the employment estimates are lost
and the sizes of the negative estimates considerably drop in all cases where we
include additional controls.
Is extrapolating estimates for teens to all affected workers warranted?
It is common in the literature to find conflicting results from the canonical
model and more saturated ones. Thanks to the prediction model, we can approach
the issue from a novel perspective. We ask whether a specific demographic group
causes the divergence between our preferred IFE, and the canonical model results.
Put differently, given the fact that the current debate mostly revolves around the
respect to wage in the literature). To calculate the standard error of the employment elasticity with
respect to wage, we first create 250 state-level clustered bootstrap samples, and estimate both em-
ployment and wage elasticities with respect to minimum wage using them. Then, we divide each
of the former estimate to the corresponding latter estimate, and obtain an empirical distribution for
the implied employment elasticity with respect to wage. We calculate the standard errors using the
distribution.
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minimum wage-teen employment elasticity and the canonical model, the question
is “Is extrapolating canonical model estimates for teens to affected non-teen work-
ers warranted?”
Figure 1.6. Estimated employment elasticities with respect to minimum wage us-
ing the IFE and the canonical model; alternative lower bounds of age for the high
impact group
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Notes: The 1996-2017 state-by-year collapsed Basic Monthly CPS is used. Estimated employment elasticities with respect to
the minimum wage and the 95% confidence intervals using the preferred IFE (turquoise capped spikes), and the canonical
(black capped spikes) model specifications are shown. The leftmost spikes use the entire high impact group, while the
rightmost spike uses only non-teen observations of the group. The dependent variable is state-by-quarter employment rate,
the variable of interest is log-transformed quarterly minimum wage, and the elasticity is calculated by dividing the estimate
to the mean value of the dependent variable. The dotted horizontal line shows the reported employment elasticity with
respect to minimum wage in Table 1.2 column 2 (the leftmost black marker).
For this exercise, we focus on the high impact group, following the literature’s
preference for precision.32 In figure 1.6, we show the estimated elasticities using
the preferred and the canonical specifications for alternative lower bounds for age
in the sample. Since the youngest observation in our sample is 16 years old, the
leftmost capped spikes in the figure correspond to the 95% confidence intervals of
the estimates reported in columns 1 and 2 in table 1.2. The figure displays that
excluding youngest observations from the sample increases the estimated mini-
32Appendix figure A.7 shows the findings from a similar analysis using the baseline group.
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mum wage-employment elasticity of the canonical model and render them close
to zero, while the IFE estimate remains largely constant. The canonical model esti-
mates converge to the preferred ones as we increase the lowest bound for age (go
rightwards in the figure). As a result of the convergence, the estimated confidence
intervals of the minimum wage-employment elasticity overlap when we focus on
non-teen observations in the high impact group (the rightmost capped spikes). For
comparison, we divide the range of points in both confidence intervals to the range
of points in either of them to obtain the relative size of the intersection region.
While this number is merely 10.0% for the entire high impact group, it increases to
69.5% when the sample is restricted to non-teen observations.
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Table 1.3. Wage and employment effects of the minimum wage for the high impact group; by alternative age restrictions
Age restrictions: Age <20 Age≥17 Age≥18 Age≥19 Age≥20
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Wage elasticity wrt MW 0.295*** 0.274*** 0.220*** 0.188*** 0.205*** 0.166*** 0.194*** 0.156*** 0.174*** 0.143***
(0.030) (0.022) (0.030) (0.026) (0.032) (0.030) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.038)
Number of factors 0 1 1 1 1
Observations 4,485 4,485 4,488 4,488 4,488 4,488 4,488 4,488 4,487 4,487
Average predicted probability 0.562 0.562 0.465 0.465 0.437 0.437 0.417 0.417 0.411 0.411
Emp. elasticity wrt MW 0.012 -0.145** 0.019 -0.076*** 0.021 -0.049** 0.009 -0.032 -0.000 -0.025
(0.080) (0.055) (0.037) (0.023) (0.032) (0.022) (0.030) (0.027) (0.034) (0.037)
Number of factors 2 2 2 1 1
Observations 4,488 4,488 4,488 4,488 4,488 4,488 4,488 4,488 4,488 4,488
Average predicted probability 0.603 0.603 0.487 0.487 0.448 0.448 0.424 0.424 0.418 0.418
Emp. elasticity wrt wage 0.041 -0.532*** 0.086 -0.403*** 0.104 -0.297 0.048 -0.208 -0.001 -0.178
(0.321) (0.200) (0.220) (0.150) (0.225) (0.166) (0.241) (0.230) (0.308) (0.375)
Specification
Interactive F.E. Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: State-by-quarter collapsed 1996-2017 CPS-ORG and Basic Monthly CPS are used. Estimated wage and employment elasticities with respect
to the minimum wage, and the implied employment elasticity with respect to wage are reported. The implied employment elasticity with respect
to wage is obtained by dividing the employment elasticity with respect to the minimum wage to the wage elasticity. Odd-numbered columns use
the preferred IFE (interactive fixed effects) model, and the even-numbered ones the canonical model. All of the estimation samples are subgroups
of the high impact group. The first two columns keep only the teen observations, whereas in other columns we drop observations younger than
the specified age. Standard errors of the employment and wage elasticities with respect to minimum wage are calculated using state-level cluster-
robust variance estimator. To calculate the standard errors of the implied employment elasticity with respect to wage, we estimate 250 state-level
clustered bootstrap iterations for minimum wage-employment and wage elasticities. Each estimated employment elasticity with respect to the min-
imum wage is divided by the corresponding wage elasticity to construct an empirical distribution of the employment elasticity with respect to wage,
which is used to estimate the standard error. All estimates are state population weighted. Significance levels are * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
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Table 1.3 reports the employment, and wage elasticities with respect to the min-
imum wage, and the implied employment elasticities with respect to wage for
teens in the high impact group as well as for the samples in figure 1.6. The IFE
estimates of the minimum wage-employment elasticity are relatively stable, 0.012,
0.019, 0.021, 0.009, and -0.000 for teens, and observations belonging to the high
impact group that are at least 17, 18, 19, and 20 years old. On the other hand, the
canonical model estimates substantially change. They are -0.145, -0.076, -0.049, -
0.032 and -0.025, respectively. Thus, removing teens from the sample decreases the
magnitude of the canonical model estimate by 76.0%, from -0.104 (in Table 1.2 col-
umn 2) to -0.025. In addition, the discrepancy in the estimated employment elas-
ticity with respect to wage between the models disappear as teen observations are
excluded. While employing the IFE model yields essentially the same estimate for
the elasticity whether we examine the teen or non-teen employment effects (0.041
and -0.001), the canonical model reports considerably different estimates (-0.510
and -0.178).
The findings suggest that the conflicting estimates are largely due to teens, a
small and shrinking share of all minimum wage workers.33 The preferred IFE and
the canonical models agree that there is no disemployment effect for the highly
affected non-teens. This indicates that the underlying assumptions made in mov-
ing from the object analyzed (minimum wage effects on teens) to the argument
(minimum wage effects on target groups or overall workforce) are unwarranted.
33We would like to stress that the findings indicate only that the canonical model estimate for
minimum wage-teen employment elasticity is qualitatively different from minimum wage-non-
teen employment elasticity. They do not imply that teens are the only demographic group that
yields conflicting results between the model specifications. As shown in section 1.6, the models
find qualitatively different effects on the no impact group.
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The extrapolation of the canonical model negative estimate for teens to non-teens
yields severely downward biased estimates.34
Robustness of the preferred specification estimates to employing alternative
threshold values in constructing estimation samples
We acknowledge that the threshold values we pick for the groups are approx-
imations and slight alterations are perfectly valid. Also, one might be more inter-
ested in the effects on a sample that is more restrictive (inclusive) than the high
impact (baseline) group, thus prefers to pick a larger predicted probability value
as the threshold. In figure 1.7, we show how the elasticities change as we employ
alternative threshold predicted probability values in constructing the estimation
sample.
34The CBO (2014)’s estimate for directly affected adults extrapolates the teen employment elas-
ticity estimates in the literature, where some of the papers employ the canonical model. Figure 1.6
suggests that the estimate is downward biased.
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Figure 1.7. Estimated elasticities for alternative predicted probability threshold
values
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Notes: The 1996-2017 state-by-year collapsed CPS-ORG and Basic Monthly CPS are used. Estimated wage and employment
elasticities with respect to the minimum wage (panels A and B), and the employment elasticities with respect to wage
(panel C) for samples created using alternative minimum predicted probability threshold values are reported. The
preferred IFE specification is employed. In panels A and B, the 95% confidence intervals are calculated using the robust
standard errors clustered at state level. To calculate the confidence intervals in panel C, we estimate 250 state-level
clustered bootstrap iterations for the employment and wage elasticities with respect to the minimum wage, and obtain the
empirical distribution of the employment elasticity with respect to wage. The second x-axis shows the recall, and the third
the precision of each of the samples.
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Panel (a) shows that the wage elasticity with respect to the minimum wage
declines almost monotonically from 0.30 to 0.10 as we decrease the minimum pre-
dicted probability value in the sample from 0.5 to 0.08, and the precision from 0.71
to 0.32. This is reassuring and expected since it shows the correlation between the
average predicted probability and the wage effect, which we interpret as the size
of the bite of the policy. Panel (b) reports employment elasticity with respect to the
minimum wage, and confirms our earlier findings that (i) the estimate is very close
to 0 when we employ a larger threshold value, slightly increases when we choose
a sample with a high recall value, and (ii) the estimate is always statistically in-
distinguishable from 0. We show the employment elasticities with respect to wage
in panel (c). The graph shows that the elasticity estimates are always around zero,
and the confidence intervals never contain -1. These findings show that employing
slightly different or smaller/larger thresholds in constructing the high impact or
the baseline groups have no qualitative effect on our conclusions, and the quanti-
tative changes in the wage estimates are of expected directions.
Robustness of the preferred specification estimates to alternative workforce def-
inition and specifications
In Figure 1.8, and Tables 1.4 and 1.5, we assess the robustness of the IFE model
estimates to alternative model specifications, and workforce definition.
First, to address the concerns related to potential pre-existing trends biasing the
results that are not purged by interactive fixed effects, we employ a dynamic ver-
sion of the preferred specification. We include up to 2 years of leads, and 3 years of
lags of the log-transformed minimum wage in the regression equation 1.1. Figure
1.8 plots the annualized time paths of the estimated wage, and employment elas-
ticities with respect to the minimum wage for the high impact, and the baseline
groups. The figure shows that neither of the graphs indicate a pre-existing trend,
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Figure 1.8. Time paths of wage and employment effects of the minimum wage on
the high impact, and the baseline groups
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(b) High impact group; employment
elasticity
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(c) Baseline group; wage elasticity
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Notes:The 1996-2017 state-by-year collapsed CPS-ORG and Basic Monthly CPS are used. Estimated wage, and employment
elasticities with respect to the minimum wage and the 95% confidence intervals using the preferred IFE model specification
are shown. The dependent variables are state-by-quarter employment rate and average log of wage. The variables of interest
are contemporaneous, 3 years of lags, and 2 years of leads of the log of the quarterly minimum wage. The employment
elasticity is calculated by dividing the estimate to the mean value of the dependent variable. Panels (a) and (b) report the
employment, and wage elasticities with respect to the minimum wage for the high impact group; while panels (c) and (d)
report those for the baseline group. The year prior to the minimum wage increase is declared the reference.
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suggesting the validity of the argued causal relationships. The findings confirm
our earlier conclusions. While the average wages of the groups rise after the mini-
mum wage increase, the statistical evidence cannot reject the no employment effect
hypothesis.
In Tables 1.4 and 1.5, we begin by examining if the main findings change when
we consider full-time equivalent (FTE) count of workers instead of head count (col-
umn 1). Specifically we use the ratio of FTE to population as the dependent vari-
able in estimating the regression equation 1.1.35 We find that main estimates for
the minimum wage-employment elasticity in tables 1.4 and 1.5 are highly similar
to the corresponding main estimates. On the other hand, the wage elasticities are
smaller in magnitude due to the fact that full-time workers generally earn hourly
wages higher than part-time workers. In addition, reported usual hours worked is
potentially error-prone. Therefore, the points estimates of employment elasticity
with respect to wage is very close to the main estimates, but they are less precise,
particularly for the baseline group.
35To obtain FTE employment, we multiply the binary employment indicator with the hours vari-
able and divide by 40. When hours variable is missing, if the worker reports usually working more
than 35 hours, we consider them as full-time workers. Those reporting working fewer than 35
hours are assumed to be employed for 20 hours. In wage regressions, we calculate state-by-quarter
average of log wage by weighting each individual according to their earnings weight multiplied
by the working hours.
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Table 1.4. Robustness of the preferred estimates; high impact group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Wage elasticity wrt MW 0.191*** 0.198*** 0.255*** 0.200*** 0.221*** 0.222*** 0.241***
(0.027) (0.028) (0.032) (0.029) (0.025) (0.028) (0.054)
Number of factors 1 2 0 0 0 1 1
Observations 4,488 4,488 4,488 4,284 3,876 3,468 4,488
Average predicted probability 0.482 0.482 0.482 0.482 0.482 0.482 0.482
Emp. elasticity wrt MW 0.010 -0.018 0.047 -0.024 -0.004 0.036 0.016
(0.033) (0.040) (0.038) (0.052) (0.050) (0.040) (0.051)
Number of factors 2 2 2 0 1 3 2
Observations 4,488 4,488 4,488 4,284 3,876 3,468 4,488
Average predicted probability 0.521 0.521 0.521 0.521 0.521 0.521 0.521
Emp. elasticity wrt wage 0.054 -0.089 0.186 -0.118 -0.018 0.164 0.068
(0.290) (0.219) (0.215) (0.276) (0.292) (0.309) (0.464)
Specification
Interactive F.E. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
FTE Y
Unweighted Y
Division-quarter FE Y
1-year differenced Y
3-year differenced Y
5-year differenced Y
Event-based Y
Notes: State-by-quarter collapsed 1996-2017 CPS-ORG and Basic Monthly CPS are used. Estimated wage and employment elasticities with respect to the minimum wage, and the implied employment elasticity with respect to wage for the high
impact group are reported. The implied employment elasticity with respect to wage is obtained by dividing the employment elasticity with respect to the minimum wage to the wage elasticity. All columns augment the specified models using the
interactive fixed effects. The first column changes the workforce definition, incorporates hours employed, hence reports estimates for full-time equivalent (FTE) counts of workers. The second column does not use the population weights. Column
3 employs only within division variation, includes division-by-quarter fixed effects. Columns 4-6 employ 1-year, 3-year, and 5-year differenced specifications. Column 7 employs the event-based approach proposed by Cengiz et al. (2018), and
estimates the effects for 125 non-trivial state-level events. Standard errors of the employment and wage elasticities with respect to minimum wage are calculated using state-level cluster-robust variance estimator. To calculate the standard errors of
the implied employment elasticity with respect to wage, we estimate 250 state-level clustered bootstrap iterations for minimum wage-employment and wage elasticities. Each estimated employment elasticity with respect to the minimum wage is
divided by the corresponding wage elasticity to construct an empirical distribution of the employment elasticity with respect to wage, which is used to estimate the standard error. All columns except for column 2 are state population weighted.
Significance levels are * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
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Table 1.5. Robustness of the preferred estimates; baseline group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Wage elasticity wrt MW 0.089*** 0.116*** 0.096*** 0.098*** 0.105*** 0.112*** 0.143***
(0.026) (0.023) (0.020) (0.026) (0.023) (0.023) (0.035)
Number of factors 2 2 3 1 2 3 3
Observations 4,488 4,488 4,488 4,284 3,876 3,468 4,488
Average predicted probability 0.291 0.291 0.291 0.291 0.291 0.291 0.291
Emp. elasticity wrt MW 0.024 0.002 -0.009 -0.013 0.054** 0.026* 0.030
(0.022) (0.024) (0.025) (0.026) (0.024) (0.015) (0.027)
Number of factors 3 2 2 0 2 3 3
Observations 4,488 4,488 4,488 4,284 3,876 3,468 4,488
Average predicted probability 0.328 0.328 0.328 0.328 0.328 0.328 0.328
Emp. elasticity wrt wage 0.275 0.019 -0.094 -0.131 0.517 0.230 0.208
(0.622) (0.262) (0.367) (0.316) (0.358) (0.392) (0.438)
Specification
Interactive F.E. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
FTE Y
Unweighted Y
Division-quarter FE Y
1-year differenced Y
3-year differenced Y
5-year differenced Y
Event-based Y
Notes: State-by-quarter collapsed 1996-2017 CPS-ORG and Basic Monthly CPS are used. Estimated wage and employment elasticities with respect to the minimum wage, and the implied employment elasticity with respect to wage for the baseline
group are reported. The implied employment elasticity with respect to wage is obtained by dividing the employment elasticity with respect to the minimum wage to the wage elasticity. All columns augment the specified models using the
interactive fixed effects. The first column changes the workforce definition, takes into account of hours employed, hence reports estimates for full-time equivalent (FTE) counts of workers. The second column does not use the population weights.
Column 3 employs only within division variation, includes division-by-quarter fixed effects. Columns 4-6 employ 1-year, 3-year, and 5-year differenced specifications. Column 7 employs the event-based approach proposed by Cengiz et al. (2018),
and estimates the effects for 125 non-trivial state-level events. Standard errors of the employment and wage elasticities with respect to minimum wage are calculated using state-level cluster-robust variance estimator. To calculate the standard
errors of the implied employment elasticity with respect to wage, we estimate 250 state-level clustered bootstrap iterations for minimum wage-employment and wage elasticities. Each estimated employment elasticity with respect to the minimum
wage is divided by the corresponding wage elasticity to construct an empirical distribution of the employment elasticity with respect to wage, which is used to estimate the standard error. All columns except for column 2 are state population
weighted. Significance levels are * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
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Columns 2-7 in tables 1.4 and 1.5, we try alternative model specifications, where
all of them are augmented with interactive fixed effects when deemed necessary.
We report unweighted estimates, and exploit only within census division variation
in columns 2 and 3. In columns 4-6, we change the regression equation into 1-, 3-,
and 5-year differenced models. As detailed in Baker, Benjamin and Stanger (1999)
and Meer and West (2015), while 1-year differenced estimate focuses more on the
immediate effect, 3-year and 5-year estimates are more appropriate in examining
longer-run effects. The discrepancy between the first- and long-differenced models
might indicate potential dynamic effects. 36
Column 7 augments the event-based approach proposed by Cengiz et al. (2018)
with interactive fixed effects. Following their methodology, we define primary
events as those with non-trivial state-level minimum wage increases, and control
for the small and federal minimum wage events. Primary events are defined as
those with state-level minimum wage increases exceeding $0.25 in 2016 dollars,
and where more than 2% of all workers earn between the old and new minimum
in the year preceding the event. Then, we construct a binary variable indicating the
non-trivial events and build a window that starts 3 years prior to the increase and
ends 5 years after the event. Similar binary variables and windows are built for
small and federal events, to control for their effects. This specification allows us to
compare the estimated treatment effect with the immediate pre-treatment period
(one year prior to the event), similar in spirit to Autor, Donohue III and Schwab
(2006). More concretely, the regression equation we estimate is as follows,
36Concretely, we drop the state fixed effects, and use the differenced values of each side of the
equation 1.1. Then, the resulting regression equation is as follows;
˜∆kYi,t = β ∗ ∆klogMWi,t + γ ∗ ∆kX + λt + ∆kui,t, (1.3)
where ∆k is 1-year, 3-year, or 5-year differenced value of the variable. Similar to the equation 1.1,
˜∆kYi,t indicates that time- and state-variant unobserved factors deemed important by the IFE are
purged from the dependent variable.
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Y˜i,t =
4
∑
k=−3
βktreati,k + ω ∗ X + κs∗Small + κF∗Federal + µi + λt + ui,t, (1.4)
where treati,k is a binary variable that takes on the value of 1 if the minimum wage
increased k years from date t in state i. X, µi, λt, and Y˜i,t are defined similar to equa-
tion 1.1. Small and Federal contain variables that control for small, and federal
events.37 We multiply 15 (Σk≥0βk − β−1) with the percentage change of the mini-
mum wage for the average causal effect on the outcome variable.
Alternative model specifications largely agree with our main estimates. In all
cases, we estimate an employment effect that is statistically indistinguishable from
0, and a wage effect that is always statistically significant at 1% level.
The effects by demographic subgroups
Thus far, our findings indicate that the minimum wage policy is beneficial for
the average workers in the high impact, and the baseline groups. However, cer-
tain demographic subgroups might be more likely to be in the target population,
thus policy-makers are potentially more interested in the effects on them. For this
purpose, and to reveal heterogeneous effects by demographic characteristics, we
construct subgroups of the high impact, and the baseline groups. We analyze the
effects on affected non-teen (20-64), and prime age (25-55) individuals that have
been largely missing in the literature as well as women, teens, black or Hispanic
individuals, individuals with no high school degree, those younger than 30 with
high school or less education, and high school graduates with no college educa-
tion.
37The variables we use to control for federal and small events is the same as the ones employed
in table A.6 in Cengiz et al. (2018). Following them, we collapse the windows for small and federal
events into three periods; EARLY, PRE, and POST. EARLY is for 3 and 2 years before, and PRE is
for 1 year before the event. POST is for 0 to 4 years after the event.
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Figure 1.9. Estimated employment, and wage elasticities with respect to the minimum wage; by demographics
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(a) High Impact Group
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(b) Baseline Group
Notes: The 1996-2017 state-by-year collapsed CPS-ORG and Basic Monthly CPS are used. The graphs plot estimated employment elasticities with respect to the minimum wage against
the wage elasticities. The left-hand side panel uses demographic subgroups of the high impact group, and the right-hand side panel the baseline group. The demographic subgroups
in panel (a) and (b) are teen, non-teen, woman, black or hispanic, less than high school (LTHS), high school or less younger than 30 (HSL, age<30) observations as well as high school
graduates with no college education (HSG). The panel (b) also reports estimates for prime age (age 25-55) individuals in the baseline group. The dotted line shows employment elasticity
with respect to wage equals to -1.
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In Figure 1.9, we plot estimated employment, and wage elasticities with re-
spect to the minimum wage of selected demographic subgroups in the high impact
(panel (a)), and the baseline groups (panel (b)).38 In panel (a), we observe a sizable
wage effect of the minimum wage for all subgroups in the high impact group.39
On the other hand, the employment elasticities with respect to the minimum wage
are all very close to zero. The only subgroups with negative employment elastic-
ities with respect to the minimum wage are black or Hispanic individuals (-0.014
(0.082)), non-teens (-0.000 (0.033)), and individuals with less than high school ed-
ucation (-0.031 (0.050)). These effects are statistically indistinguishable from zero,
and the wage elasticities are considerably larger in magnitude (0.237 (0.067), 0.174
(0.035), and 0.234 (0.023), respectively). The combination of the sizable wage ef-
fects and the small employment effects results in all the points to lie to the north
of the dash line where employment elasticity with respect to wage is -1. Hence, on
average, the total wage bill devoted to each of the subgroups of the high impact
group has substantially increased with the minimum wage rise.
Similarly, in panel (b), none of the estimates indicate a statistically significant or
sizable disemployment effect, while all of them experience a wage increase, similar
to panel (a).40 On the other hand, our findings indicate a small positive effect for
relatively higher skilled groups; high school graduates, non-teen, and prime-age
individuals (the employment elasticities are 0.060 (0.023), 0.034 (0.017), and 0.046
(0.020), respectively.).
38The only subgroup that we do not report in panel (a) is prime age individuals in the high
impact group, since there are few observations.
39The estimates are reported in appendix Tables A.7.
40The estimates are reported in appendix Tables A.8.
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1.5.3 Effects on own-employment-based health insurance
Constructing groups based on individuals’ demographic characteristics enables
us to examine effects of the minimum wage aside from the wage and employment.
One such outcome that the policy might have an impact on is employment-based
health insurance coverage. A potential explanation for the absence of a nega-
tive employment effect is that firms decrease non-wage job attributes in an effort
to diminish the rise in the total compensation (Clemens, Kahn and Meer, 2018).
For minimum wage workers, own-employment-based health insurance might be
severely affected41. In the extreme case, the “program effect” is never realized in
terms of the total compensations; the cost of labor is unchanged.
Although, at first glance, decreasing non-wage benefits appears as a path that
firms are expected to follow in the aftermath of a mandatory wage increase, there
are multiple factors that inhibit employers from making shifts in the total compen-
sation from non-wage components to wage components. After a minimum wage
increase, employers might not change the level of health insurance contribution,
since it might cause a rise in turnover (Gruber and Madrian, 2002). In addition,
in many cases, firms employ workers that are affected by the minimum wage as
well as those that are not. Thus, they are limited by non-discrimination rules in
terms of within firm inequality in non-wage benefit provision (Carrington, McCue
and Pierce, 2002). Even when the rules do not pose a constraint, small businesses
might continue to contribute due to minimum participation clauses of commercial
health insurers (Simon and Kaestner, 2004). Furthermore, employers might use
alternative channels of adjustment that they believe would be less costly to them,
41The Affordable Care Act’s employer mandate is implemented only recently and for large firms
(firms with 100+ full-time equivalent employees since 2014, firms with 50+ full-time equivalent
employees since 2016). Since the mandate is a recent policy affecting a very small share of our
sample, it has negligible impact on our findings.
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such as passing a portion of the cost onto consumers by raising their output prices
(Aaronson, French and MacDonald, 2008; Allegretto and Reich, 2018).
To examine whether employers react to minimum wage increases by alter-
ing employment-based health insurance coverages of the high impact, and the
baseline groups, we employ the IFE, and the canonical specifications.42 The ex-
act specifications we use are highly similar to the equations presented in section
1.5, with two main changes: First, we use annual variation of the minimum wage
as opposed to quarterly variation, since CPS-ASEC is conducted on annual ba-
sis.43 Thus, we use state-by-year share of individuals in the sample that have
own-employment-based health insurance (OEBHI) as the outcome variable; and
log-transformed annually averaged statutory minimum wage as the variable of
interest. Second, we allow states that have expanded the Medicaid coverage to
suddenly change the coverage rate after the implementation. In other words,
we include another set of state-specific dummies for the post-expansion years
(post-expansioni,t ∗ µi) to prevent the effects of the Medicaid expansion confound
the estimated minimum wage effects.
42By “own-employment-based health insurance”, we mean employment-based health insurance
related to current or past employment. This excludes those having employer sponsored health
insurance only as dependent.
43We note that the survey questions in the CPS-ASEC are related to the previous calender year.
So, we adjust the year variable accordingly.
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Table 1.6. Own-employment-based health insurance (OEBHI) effects of the mini-
mum wage
Sample: High Impact
High Impact,
employed
Baseline
Baseline,
employed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OEBHI Elasticity wrt MW 0.059 -0.134 0.034 -0.101 0.095 0.026 -0.002 0.001
(0.255) (0.181) (0.206) (0.195) (0.109) (0.072) (0.092) (0.077)
Number of factors 1 1 2 2
Observations 1,069 1,069 1,069 1,069 1,069 1,069 1,069 1,069
Mean of the dep. var. 0.068 0.068 0.120 0.120 0.188 0.188 0.280 0.280
Average p 0.516 0.516 0.475 0.475 0.326 0.326 0.285 0.285
Specification
Interactive F.E. Y Y Y Y
Notes. State-by-year collapsed 1997-2017 CPS-ASEC is used. Estimated own-employment-based health insur-
ance elasticity with respect to the minimum wage is reported. The first four columns restrict the sample to
the high impact group; whereas columns 5-8 to the baseline group. In columns 3, 4, 7, and 8, we keep only
observations employed at some point during the year. Odd-numbered columns employ the interactive fixed
effects specification and even-numbered columns the canonical model, both augmented with state-by-ACA
expansion indicators. All estimates are state population weighted. State-level clustered standard errors are
reported. Significance levels are * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
Table 1.6 reports our findings for the OEBHI effects of the minimum wage
changes. We show estimated elasticities from the preferred IFE (odd-numbered
columns) and the canonical (even-numbered columns) models. In addition to the
high impact and the baseline groups, we restrict the samples to individuals em-
ployed at one point during the year in columns 3-4 and 7-8.44 While the estimates
for the groups correspond to every individual predicted to be in the samples, the
restriction possibly provide a more focused analysis for the population partici-
pated in the labor force.
Column 1 of table 1.6 reports that the IFE model estimates virtually no ef-
fect on the share of individuals with own-employment-based health insurance
(0.059 (0.255)). The canonical model in column 2, although yields a smaller elas-
ticity estimate (−0.134 (0.181)), agrees with the preferred estimate from a statisti-
44The variable we employ to determine if the individual was employed during the last year is
OCCLY. The variable does not require the respondent to be employed throughout the year.
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cal significance point of view. Excluding observations that were never employed
during the year in columns 3 and 4 produce similar estimates (0.034 (0.206) and
−0.101 (0.195)).45
We examine the effect for the baseline group in columns 5 and 6. The share of
individuals with own-employment-based health insurance is considerably larger
for the baseline group than the high impact group (18.8% as opposed to 6.8%) and
this substantially improves the precision of the estimates. Both the IFE, and the
canonical model estimate small and statistically insignificant positive elasticities
(0.095 (0.109) and 0.026 (0.072)). Similarly, when we exclude individuals that have
not worked in the year in columns 7 and 8, neither the IFE nor the canonical model
finds a negative shock that is statistically significant at conventional levels. Both
estimates are very close to 0 (−0.002 (0.092) and 0.001 (0.077)).
To summarize, we do not reject the null hypothesis of no effect of the mini-
mum wage on individual’s likelihood of having own-employment-based health
insurance.46 This conclusion coincides with empirical studies that claim no effect
on the fringe benefit generosity (Dube, Naidu and Reich, 2007; Simon and Kaest-
ner, 2004). On the other hand, it differs from those that conclude minimum wage
changes have decreased the likelihood of having employment-based health insur-
ance (Clemens, Kahn and Meer, 2018). Our examination of Clemens, Kahn and
45The sizes of the standard errors are admittedly large. This is expected, since, as indicated in
the table, a relatively small share of individuals in the group have own-employment-based health
insurance.
46The estimates cannot reject the null and they are positive when we examine if the minimum
wage changed the employer contribution. Using the preferred specification, the elasticities we
obtain are 0.349 (0.366) and 0.194 (0.176) for the high impact, and the baseline groups. As expected,
the estimates are relatively imprecise; because (i) the employer contribution per capita is relatively
small, on average $213.79 and $688.01 for the groups; and (ii) the contributions are estimated by
the U.S. Census Bureau. We also conclude in favor of the null hypothesis of no effect when we
limit the baseline group to those older than 26 (elasticity = 0.101 (0.084)). When we examine the
share of policyholders for private or group health insurance, the estimates are slightly larger, yet
still statistically insignificant (the elasticity estimates are 0.142 (0.290) for the high impact group,
and 0.177 (0.106) for the baseline group).
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Meer (2018) in appendix reveals that the main factor behind the discrepancy is
the way the outcome variable is defined. While our outcome variable is “own-
employment-based” health insurance, that in Clemens et al. is “employment-
based.” Individuals with “employment-based” insurance, however, include those
that do not have employment-based insurance related to their work, but have it
only as dependents.47 However, finding a decline in the latter after minimum wage
increases is likely spurious. In fact, as shown in appendix Table A.9, Clemens,
Kahn and Meer (2018)’s findings are entirely driven by a fall in the share of in-
dividuals in very low wage occupations that are covered by employment based
health insurance as dependents. When we focus on changes in own-employment-
based health insurance, we conclude the null hypothesis of no effect, coinciding
with our findings.
1.6 A falsification test with predicted probability values
When one empirically examines effects of minimum wage increases on groups
other than teens, it might be possible that the estimated effect is conflated with
shocks on unaffected individuals. As shown in figure 1.2, the commonly used
demographic groups other than teens, and overall workforce include many non-
minimum wage workers. Since the aim is to establish a causal relationship be-
tween the outcome variable and the minimum wage, one would expect from a
reserch design to capture the estimated effects more clearly for groups likely to be
minimum wage workers. If this is not the case; unless there is a strong counteract-
ing factor, the proposed research design might not be adequate to analyze effects
of the minimum wage.
47Note that some individuals are policyholders and, at the same time, dependents of a policy-
holder. Our outcome variable also considers them as individuals with own-employment-based
health insurance.
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Table 1.7. Employment, wage, and OEBHI effects of the minimum wage on the no
impact group
Dep. var.: Employment Wage OEBHI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Elasticity wrt MW 0.001 -0.018* 0.016 -0.012 0.017 -0.014
(0.012) (0.010) (0.025) (0.024) (0.035) (0.031)
Number of factors 1 1 1
Observations 4,488 4,488 4,488 4,488 1,069 1,069
Average predicted probability 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022
Specification
Interactive F.E. Y Y Y
Notes. State-by-quarter collapsed 1996-2017 CPS-ORG and Basic Monthly CPS, and state-by-
year collapse 1997-2017 CPS-ASEC are used. Estimated employment (columns 1 and 2), wage
(columns 3 and 4) and own-employment-based health insurance (columns 5 and 6) elastici-
ties with respect to the minimum wage for the no impact group are reported. Odd-numbered
columns employ the interactive fixed effects specification and even-numbered columns the
canonical model. All estimates are state population weighted. State-level clustered standard
errors are reported. Significance levels are * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
The predicted probabilities can be used for such a falsification test. We can
assess the validity of argued causal relationship in studies that employ specific
demographic groups or overall workforce by estimating whether the effect is ob-
served for those that are unlikely to be minimum wage workers. The underlying
assumption is that any argued effect should fade for these individuals.
To illustrate the test, we begin with analyzing the preferred IFE, and the canon-
ical model estimates for the employment, wage, and OEBHI (own-employment-
based health insurance) effects of the minimum wage on the no impact group in
Table 1.7. Comparing columns 1 and 2 reveal that while we find no employment
effect when the IFE is employed (βˆ = 0.001 (0.012)) , the canonical model estimates
a marginally significant negative employment effect (βˆ = −0.018 (0.010)). Given
that both specifications agree on the absence of the program effect (the wage elas-
ticity estimates are statistically indistinguishable from zero, 0.016 (0.025) and -0.012
(0.024) in columns 3 and 4), the findings corroborate our claim that the canonical
model estimates fail to distinguish the effects of the minimum wage from other
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shocks. When we examine OEBHI elasticity with respect to the minimum wage,
both specifications agree that the effect is statistically indistinguishable from zero
(0.017 (0.035) and -0.014 (0.031)). Therefore, we conclude that the IFE performs
relatively well in all cases. The canonical model, however, appears to confound
minimum wage effects with other shocks in estimating the employment effects.
Second, we examine the empirical models and findings in Meer and West (2015).
The study examines the overall employment effects of the minimum wage. The
authors argue that the minimum wage changes occurred between 1977 and 2012
affect employment growth rather than the level. Using 1977-2012 Business Dynam-
ics Statistics (BDS) and building long-differences models to capture the dynamic ef-
fects, they claim that the total employment effect of the minimum wage is obtained
approximately three years after the policy change. Starting with the three-year dif-
ferenced specification, long-differences estimates indicate employment elasticity
with respect to minimum wage around -0.05, with the fourth-differences estimate
being the smallest. Based on this finding, they choose a first-difference distributed
lag specification with contemporaneous statutory minimum wage and its three
lags as the baseline regression model.48 The model estimates the long-run em-
ployment elasticity of the minimum wage -0.07.
In the test, we assess whether the argued employment decline is more pro-
nounced for workers in the high impact group and disappears for the no impact
group. To do this, first, we combine the data provided by the authors with the
48The model can be written as follows;
∆1empi,t =
3
∑
m=0
βm × ∆1mwi,t−m + ψ× ∆1controlsi,t + τr,t + ∆1ei,t,
where i, r and t indicate state, census region and year,∆1 indicates 1-year differencing, emp is the
log of employment count obtained from 1977-2011 annual Business Dynamic Statistics (BDS) and
mw is the statutory log of minimum wage on March 12, and τr,t is region-by-year effects. controls
include include state-level population (log of population and the share of individuals aged 15–59)
and business cycle (log of per-capita gross state product) controls.
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employment distribution of predicted probability groups from the CPS. This com-
bination shrinks the time window of the sample and keeps only the more recent
years (2000-2011 or 1997-2011). Second, instead of having X-year differenced log-
transformed employment counts as the outcome variable, we employ the percent
change in employment counts in X years. This approximation is valid as long as
the magnitude of the percentage change is small. These two alterations have no
qualitative effect on the findings as shown below. On the other hand, they allow
us to partition the baseline estimate of Meer and West (2015). Partitioning the esti-
mated effect reveals groups that are main drivers of the negative estimate. We do it
by imposing no change in employment counts of any predicted probability group
except for the one examined. The right hand side variables, on the other hand, is
the same for each group. Thus, each group is examined separately; and the sum
of the estimated effects is numerically the same as the estimated effect for overall
employment.49
49Consider that the total workforce is composed of two mutually exclusive groups L and H. 1-
year percentage change in the total employment, then, is Y = (L1−L0)+(H1−H0)L0+H0 . Imposing no change
in, say, H implies H1 − H0 = 0. Then, the dependent variable can be written as the summation of
two dependent variables, one imposes no change in H, and the other no change in L: Y = YL +YH =
(L1−L0)
L0+H0
+ (H1−H0)L0+H0 . Since β = (X
′X)−1X′Y and Y = YL + YH , β = (X′X)−1X′YL + (X′X)−1X′YH =
βL + βH , where βL is the estimate obtained from the regression where no change in H is imposed.
Note that the relative size of β
L
β depends both on the percentage change of the total employment of
group L ( L1−L0L0 ), and the share of workers belonging to group L in the population (
L0
L0+H0
). Thus,
when partitoning the estimates, the relative sizes of the groups matter as well.
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Table 1.8. Re-examination of Meer and West (2015)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Wage elasticity wrt MW 0.001 0.154*** 0.100** 0.038 -0.049
(0.025) (0.049) (0.044) (0.039) (0.038)
Emp. elasticity wrt MW -0.051** -0.047* -0.049* -0.002 -0.003 -0.012 -0.029*
(0.024) (0.028) (0.029) (0.004) (0.007) (0.022) (0.015)
Observations 1,581 612 612 612 612 612 612
Percentage Approximation Y Y Y Y Y
Estimation period: 1981-2011 2000-2011 2000-2011 2000-2011 2000-2011 2000-2011 2000-2011
Predicted prob. restriction: pred. prob. > 0 pred. prob. > 0 pred. prob. > 0 pred. prob. > 0.5 pred. prob. > 0.322 pred. prob. > 0.110 pred. prob. ≤ 0.032
Notes. State-by-year collapsed 1996-2017 CPS-ORG, Basic Monthly CPS, and the data provided by Meer and West (2015) are used. Estimated wage and employment elasticities with re-
spect to minimum wage are reported. All columns employ the 4-year differenced specification. Column 1 reproduces the column 4 of table 3 panel A in Meer and West (2015). Column
2-7 restrict the sample to 2000-2011, the sample where we can calculate the predicted probabilities. Columns 3-7 employ the percentage approximation in estimating the employment
elasticity with respect to the minimum wage. Columns 4-6 impose no change in employment for observations with predicted probability smaller than 0.5, 0.322, and 0.110. Column 7
focuses on employment changes for observations predicted to be in the no impact group (predicted probability smaller than 0.032). State-level clustered standard errors are reported.
Significance levels are * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
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We follow Meer and West (2015)’s order and begin with the long-differences
specifications (table 3 in their paper). In Table 1.8, we examine the 4-year differ-
enced model, the one that produces the smallest estimate. Column 1 reproduces
their estimate. In columns 2-7, we restrict the sample to years 2000-2011. Columns
3-7 employ the percentage approximation. The changes produce very similar point
estimates (that in column 3 is -0.049 (0.029) instead of -0.051 (0.024)), though it is
less precise due to the use of a smaller sample. In column 4, we impose no change
on the employment counts of workers with predicted probabilities smaller than
0.5, and focus only on the change in the number of jobs held by those predicted to
have wages less than 125% of the statutory minimum wage. We find no employ-
ment effect for this group, though the wage effect is positive and statistically sig-
nificant.50 Expanding the sample to include all workers in the high impact group
(column 5) also indicate no disemployment effect. The estimated employment ef-
fect is slightly smaller for the baseline group as a whole, though only 23.8% of the
overall employment elasticity estimate is due to the changes in the group. 59.3% of
all the employment decline is explained by the effect on the no impact group that
experiences no program effect.
50Compared to our main estimates, the wage effects are smaller and more imprecise. This is
expected since the regressions only consider annual variation in the minimum wage, and the time
span of the sample is smaller.
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Figure 1.10. Partitioning the estimated employment elasticity in Meer and West
(2015) into predicted probability groups
Employment elasticity wrt MW = -0.096 (0.041)
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Notes: State-by-year collapsed CPS-ORG, Basic Monthly CPS, and the data provided by Meer and
West (2015) are used. Estimated employment elasticities with respect to the minimum wage are
reported. In estimating the employment effect on each bin, we impose the null hypothesis of no
change in other bins. The green histogram bars show the long-run elasticity, and capped spikes are
the 95% confidence intervals calculated using cluster-robust standard errors. The purple line is a
running sum of bin specific estimates up until the predicted probability bin.
Lastly, we partition their baseline estimates in Figure 1.10. Similar to the previ-
ous case, neither the change in the sample period nor the percentage approxima-
tion qualitatively affect Meer and West (2015)’s findings. The estimate is slightly
smaller than their baseline estimate (-0.096 (0.041) instead of -0.074 (0.036)). Cor-
roborating the evidence in Table 1.8, we observe from the figure that the source of
the negative estimate for the overall workforce is entirely driven by groups with
predicted probabilities smaller than 0.05. In other words, both of the models in
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Meer and West (2015) appear to suggest that individuals that are least likely to be
minimum wage workers have been most adversely hit by the minimum wage.51
1.7 Conclusion and Discussion
Almost none of the existing studies on effects of minimum wages have rigor-
ously tackled the question “who are minimum wage workers?” This has led most
of the literature to focus on a handful of specific small subgroups of affected work-
ers, even though the generalizability of these findings has been always an issue.
The primary contribution of this paper is to use machine learning tools to broaden
the scope of the minimum wage analysis well beyond these small demographic
groups or particular industries. Using these tools, we create a demographically-
based group that captures more than 73% of all minimum wage workers. This
group includes substantially more minimum wage workers than the commonly
used samples in the literature. In addition, the share of non-minimum wage work-
ers in this group is relatively small, allowing us to present a highly comprehensive
and informative picture about effects of the policy.
Our preferred method of constructing counterfactuals using an interactive fixed
effects approach finds that minimum wages raised low-end wages without any siz-
able decline in employment or own-employment-based health benefits of affected
51The combination of the CPS and the BDS requires the assumption that the employment counts
of the groups we use in the analysis are highly correlated with the changes we would obtain if
the BDS reported individual level demographic variables and we relied only on the latter data.
The assumption is not necessarily valid. As an alternative way to assess the robustness of the
findings, we augment their specification with interactive fixed effects in appendix figure A.9. In
this case, the information criterion recommends us to purge as many factors as possible. This
indicates that i) the information criterion is uninformative in this case, and ii) the model that does
not purge the unobserved factors is likely misleading. We examine stability of the estimates, and
find that the estimated elasticity loses statistical significance when we purge only one factor; and
it ranges between -0.01 and 0.01 when we include six or more interactive fixed effects, suggesting
that we need to include at least six factors in the estimation. This is in line with Moon and Weidner
(2015)’s argument that in cases where the information criterion is uninformative, one might obtain
the unbiased and consistent estimate by searching for the number of interactive fixed effects beyond
which including additional factors negligibly affects the result.
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individuals. The conclusion holds for various subgroups of the affected workers.
The conclusion is also confirmed by a variety of methods to construct the counter-
factuals, except for the canonical two-way fixed effects model. The latter method
indicates a decline in employment for the affected individuals. However, we show
that this discrepancy is driven entirely by teens: while the models find conflict-
ing results for the minimum wage-teen employment elasticity, they agree that the
minimum wage has no disemployment effect on the affected non-teens. Therefore,
our approach allows us to make progress by showing that the methodological de-
bates around teen employment effects are specific to this small and shrinking part
of the minimum wage workforce. For the non-teen adults affected by the policy,
the employment impact is uniformly non-negative.
We also show that the predicted probabilities can be used to determine whether
argued effects of the minimum wage policy is spurious. The test asserts whether
these effects are observed for those unlikely to be minimum wage workers. It
provides a tool to reveal if the research design is rejecting the true null hypothesis,
assuming the policy has no impact on the non-minimum wage workers. The test
is particularly relevant when unaffected individuals compose a considerable share
of the estimation sample. While illustrating the test, we re-examine Meer and West
(2015), and show that their finding of the minimum wage-employment elasticity
of -0.07 is driven by negative shocks on unaffected individuals.
Overall, our findings suggest the employment impact of minimum wage changes
to date in the United States has been quite modest. These findings appear to be
at odds with a standard competitive model of the labor market, though not nec-
essarily with particular calibrations with very low input substitutability and low
elasticity of output demand. At the same time, the results are probably more easily
rationalizable with models with labor market frictions and monopsonistic compe-
66
tition (e.g., Bhaskar and To (1999),Dube, Lester and Reich (2016), and Manning
(2003)).
Answering the “who” question using machine learning tools opens up several
promising avenues for future research. Outcomes other than employment and
wage are also affected by the minimum wage, and they play important roles in
theoretical models as well as workers’ lives. Among them include the effects on
commuting patterns and residential mobility, health outcomes, and crime rates
of the affected individuals. By accurately identifying potential minimum wage
workers, particularly affected non-teen or prime age individuals, our methodology
provides necessary tools to researchers for making generalizable arguments on the
impact of the minimum wage on such outcomes.
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CHAPTER 2
IS IT MERELY A LABOR SUPPLY SHOCK?
IMPACTS OF SYRIAN MIGRANTS ON LOCAL ECONOMIES
IN TURKEY
2.1 Introduction
The Syrian Civil War started in 2011, has led more than 5 million Syrians to
leave their country. Such a huge displacement affects countries worldwide. As a
result, the topic of “immigration” has taken the center stage in political debates.
The primary question for large segments of societies is: “What will happen to my
job if they come here?” The canonical economic model paints a relatively pes-
simistic picture for the affected natives; predicts a wage, and possibly employ-
ment, decline (Borjas, 2013; Dustmann, Schönberg and Stuhler, 2016). The empiri-
cal evidence, however, is mixed, and the debate on the labor market effects of the
migration still continues (Akgündüz, Van den Berg and Hassink, 2015b; Borjas and
Monras, 2016; Card, 2009; Clemens and Hunt, 2017; Peri, 2016).
In this paper, we contribute to this debate by exploiting an unusually large
and sudden migration flow of more than 2.5 million Syrians into Turkey between
2012 and 2015, displayed in figure 2.1; and assess whether effects of the migration
can be reduced to a labor supply shock. We examine the effects of the Syrian mi-
grants on the native workforce and on the native wage distribution. We provide
evidence for the lack of adverse employment and wage effects on affected native
workers. Regarding the migration solely as a labor supply shock does not coincide
with the empirical findings. The descriptive supply-demand framework requires
a migrant-induced rise in labor demand that offsets the supply increase (Constant,
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2014; Peri, 2014). To document the labor demand rise, we also provide evidence
on two of the mechanisms, rise in housing demand and new firm formation, that
may enable local labor markets to absorb the labor supply shock.
Figure 2.1. Total number of Syrian forced migrants in Turkey
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Notes: The figure shows the total number of Syrian forced migrants in Turkey between 2011 and
2015. Only Syrian nationals fled their country due to the war are considered. The data provided
by Ministry of Interior Directory General of Migration Management is used.
One main empirical challenge in estimating effects of migration is that migrants
potentially prefer to go to regions that are experiencing an economic boom, so the
underlying pre-existing trends might bias the estimates. This is probably less rele-
vant in the case, since the primary reason for the migration is the war in the home
country, and Syrian migrants in Turkey reside largely in the border regions (see
figure 2.2). However, there is no certainty that these regions and the rest of the
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country have been following a similar path. To address the potential endogeneity,
we employ the generalized synthetic control method (GSC) that purges underly-
ing pre-existing trends using a data-driven procedure (Xu, 2017), in addition to
standard difference-in-differences and two-stage least squares models.
Figure 2.2. Regional distribution of Syrian migrants
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Notes: The graphs plot the NUTS-2, and provincial distributions of the number of Syrian guests as
a share of native population in 2015. Dark blue areas indicate that the Syrian guest population is
at least 10% of the native population, white areas at most 2%, and light blue areas between 2% and
10%. The data provided by Ministry of Interior Directory General of Migration Management is
used.
As initial evidence of the impacts, we present estimates for employment and
wage effects of the forced migration from Syria on natives with informal jobs, with
less than high school degree (LTHS), and with high school and above education
(HSG). More than 90% of the migrants do not have a high school degree. They can-
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not formally work, thus they have entered Turkish labor market through informal
employment. Nevertheless, the entry has not adversely affected native workers.
We show that the average wage of the informal jobs has considerably declined;
yet LTHS natives did not experience an employment or wage loss. On the con-
trary, they have been able to move to formal employment, suggesting imperfect
substitution between migrant and native labors. The migration has benefited HSG
natives by significantly increasing their wages. Examining the wage distribution
corroborates these results. We find that the migration has increased wages of some
native workers to the national minimum wage who would otherwise have earned
below the minimum wage. In addition, it enlarged the share of upper-middle in-
come workers, and had virtually no effect on top wage-earners.
The non-finding of an adverse wage or employment effect even after such a
massive shock indicates a counteracting labor demand rise. In exploring the mech-
anisms that may offset the labor supply shock, we first consider developments in
the residential construction sector. Based on the fact that this industry is relatively
large and low-skilled labor intensive, the migrant-induced demand increase for
the residential buildings can absorb a portion of the labor supply shock. This is
particularly relevant in the case, since approximately 90% of the migrants reside
outside Temporary Protection Camps (TPC). We estimate that the migration has a
major positive impact on the residential construction sector. The construction of
new dwelling units has risen by more than 33% in the host provinces.
An alternative channel that enables local labor markets to absorb the labor sup-
ply shock is the rise in new firm formation. Karahan, Pugsley and Sahin (2016)
notes that migration in the U.S. attracts capital to host regions, and leads to an in-
creased new firm formation. This effect is valid also in Turkey. We estimate that
the total number of new firms in the host provinces has risen by 24%. The in-
crease is partly due to Syrian entrepreneurs. New firms with at least one Syrian
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co-founder has increased from 81 in 2011 to 1,599 in 2015. On the other hand, the
new firm formation with no Syrian co-founders has also increased, by more than
20%, reflecting the Syrian entrepreneurs have not crowded-out non-Syrians.
The canonical accounting framework in the immigration literature employs a
constant elasticity of substitution production function. In section 2.6, we exam-
ine whether the effects of the migration can be reduced to a labor supply shock.
We show that the canonical model overpredicts the wage decline even when cap-
ital is assumed to adjust perfectly and a moderate level of imperfect substitution
between native and migrant laborers is allowed. This indicates that other param-
eters of the framework are also affected by migration. Our findings on the effects
on residential construction and new firm formation suggest that the distribution
parameter between low-skilled and high-skilled workers, the capital intensity and
the productivity also change with migration.
Currently, the debate on the impact of the Syrian migration to Turkey revolves
around its effects on the employment. The findings from empirical studies on
the subject are mixed. Three of the studies that are closely related to ours are
Akgündüz, Van den Berg and Hassink (2015b), Del Carpio and Wagner (2015),
and Tumen (2016).1 The former study argues that there is no significant employ-
ment effect on native workers; while the latter two claim a significant decline in
informal employment. Our re-examination of the latter two studies reveals that
the discrepancies are largely due to the difference in selected control regions, and
the methods of statistical inference. In Appendix B, we replicate the baseline es-
timate of Tumen (2016). Our analysis shows that (i) the control regions of their
baseline regression model have followed a path that is dissimilar to the rest of the
country, and the findings qualitatively change for alternative control regions; and
1An expanded version of Tumen (2016) is published as Ceritoglu et al. (2017).
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(ii) allowing for within region correlation of the errors prevents us from rejecting
the no-effect hypothesis. Del Carpio and Wagner (2015) do not address the serial
correlation either, hence their estimated confidence intervals are potentially too
precise as well. In addition, based on the reported results in the study, the implied
counterfactuals of the treated regions do not follow a similar path as the actual
ones before the migration shock, weakening the causal interpretation.
On the other hand, the literature on quasi-experimental migration shocks gen-
erally focuses on changes in wages of natives whose education levels are similar
to the migrants. Our findings mostly coincide with those that estimate no or small
adverse effects on the native wages (Clemens and Hunt, 2017; Peri and Yasenov,
2018). Our baseline 95% confidence interval indicates that the average wage of na-
tive LTHS workers has not declined by more than 4.8% in the regions where the
migrant population is at least 10% of natives. Given the size of the shock, this rules
out some of the estimates in the literature obtained from different refugee waves,
including -1.3 wage elasticity in Borjas and Monras (2016), and the implied wage
elasticities ranging between -0.5 and -1.5 in Borjas (2015) for Marielitos in the US in
the early 1980s.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the canon-
ical model and its underlying assumptions. The dataset is presented in Section
3. Section 4 develops the empirical methodology, briefly explains the generalized
synthetic control method, and the inference methods. Section 5 presents the em-
pirical findings about the effects of the migration on native workforce and wage
distribution, on the residential building construction sector, and on the new firm
establishments. Section 6 discusses the empirical findings relying on the canonical
framework. We conclude in section 7.
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2.2 Migrant-induced labor demand shocks integrated into the canon-
ical production accounting framework
This section presents the canonical production function and examines the un-
derlying assumptions that limit the analysis of migration to the labor supply shock.2
The model is presented in Borjas (2013) and Borjas (2014). It is the standard two-
level nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function where
aggregate production, Q, primarily depends on the capital stock, K, and the num-
ber of laborers in efficiency unit, L. In calculating L, another CES function is em-
ployed to homogenize different types of labor (H subscript for high-skilled and L
for low-skilled workers). Then, the production function is;
Q = A((1− α)Kρ + αLρ) 1ρ (1a)
L = (θLγL + (1− θ)LγH)
1
γ (1b)
where ρ < 1, γ < 1, α (θ) corresponds to the distribution parameter between K
and L (LL and LH), and A is the residual (factor neutral technology coefficient).
Assuming that each factor is paid according to its marginal contribution, the real
wage of a low-skilled laborer is wLL = αL
ρ−1Q1−ρAρθLγ−1L L
1−γ.
Low-skilled migration causes LL (number of low-skilled workers) to increase.
Its effect on the wages of native low-skilled workers can be found by the following:
dlnwLN = dln(α) + (ρ− 1)dln(L) + dln(A) + (1− ρ)(sLdln(L) + sKdln(K))+
dln(θ) + (γ− 1)dln(LL) + (1− γ)dln(L).
(2.2)
2We do not present a survey of the immigration literature. For a comprehensive literature review
see Kerr and Kerr (2011) as well as Borjas (2014).
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Three of the assumptions made by the canonical model in the short-run are
the following: (1) low-skilled immigrants and natives are perfectly substitutable;
(2) the change in LL affects only L and Q in the short-run, with the latter effect
is through the former; and (3) capital adjustment is perfect (dlnL = dlnK) in the
long-run.3 Then, in the short-run, we have
dln(A) = dln(α) = dln(θ) = dln(K) = 0, dln(Q) = dln(L) ∗ sL, (2.3)
where sL is the share of (homogenized) labor. Assuming diminishing marginal
returns, since percentage increase in homogenized labor is higher than that of ag-
gregate production (sL < 1), as well as the percentage increase in low-skilled labor
(dln(LL)) is larger than that of homogenized labor (dln(L)), the change in the aver-
age wage is always negative. For the given assumptions, any low-skilled migration
is predicted to lead a decline in wages of low-skilled native workers.
Peri and Sparber (2009) and Ottaviano and Peri (2012) show empirically that
native and immigrant workers are not perfectly substitutable. The model can in-
corporate less than perfect substitution between natives and immigrants by adding
one more level of CES aggregator;
LL = (ωLL
δL
L,N + (1−ωL)LδLL,I)
1
δL , (2.4)
where LL,N indicates supply of low-skilled native workers, LL,I supply of low-
skilled migrant workers, and the elasticity of substitution between low-skilled na-
tive and migrant workers is σLL,I ,LL,N =
1
1−δL .
4 Then, native low-skilled wages are
3Certainly, this list of assumptions is by no means exhaustive.
4Simply adding up the number of low-skilled natives and migrants to obtain LL implicitly as-
sumes δL = 1, where natives and immigrants are perfectly substitutable.
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wLL,N = αL
ρ−1Q1−ρθLγ−1L L
1−γωLδL−1L,N L
1−δL
L . Assuming the supply of native work-
ers does not change, the effect of migration on the marginal product of low-skilled
native workers is;
dlnwLL,N = dlnwLL + dln(ωL) + (1− δL)dln(LL), (2.5)
where the last term, strictly positive, diminishes the size of the predicted negative
effect.
The main argument of this paper complements the growing literature on native-
immigrant complementarity. We claim that migrants bring their purchasing power,
wealth to the host country. On the one hand, in the short-run, the increased pur-
chasing power attracts capital, and migrant and native entrepreneurs establish
new firms. So, the capital stock might increase in the short-run as well (dlnK 6= 0).
Additionally, the boost in the new firm formation can lead to productivity in-
creases (dlnA 6= 0) (Decker et al., 2014). On the other hand, migration also increases
the relative demand for basic needs goods, such as residential buildings, poten-
tially affect the relative sizes of industries, and change the skill and capital intensi-
ties of the aggregate production function in the host regions (dlnθ 6= 0, dlnα 6= 0).
2.3 Legal status of the migrants, and data
The first Syrian migrants who seek refuge in Turkey have arrived in 2012, the
official number has reached over a million in 2014 and continued to increase in
2015. Syrians running away from the civil war are not eligible to apply for refugee
status and considered as “guests” in Turkey (Özden, 2013). Guests cannot seek asy-
lum in another country and cannot work formally. In 2014, Turkish government
started to distribute identity cards that enabled them to access to certain services
including aid, healthcare, and education. The cards do not allow them to work
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formally, though. Before 2016, employers could apply for work permits only if
the potential Syrian employee had entered Turkey with a valid visa. This policy
prevented almost all Syrian guests from working formally. By January 2016, only
7,351 of them had work permits. The number, on the other hand, greatly underes-
timates the number of Syrians employed. Üstun (2016) reports that approximately
400,000 Syrians are employed informally in 2015.
We get the data on the number of Syrian guests in Turkey from the Ministry of
Interior Directory General of Migration Management (MoI) database.5 The avail-
able data on the total number of Syrian guests in Turkey starts from 2011, yet it is
potentially underestimated before 2014. We pick 2012 as the first year of the wave.
In 2015, MoI reported the number of Syrian migrants at province level; their age
and educational distribution at national-level.6,7 We acquire the historical distri-
bution of Arabic speaking population from the 1965 Turkish Census.
For labor market effects of the migration, we rely on statistics published by
TURKSTAT, the official statistical institute of Turkey. Using 3,921,420 individu-
als aged between 15-64 from 2004-2015 Household Labor Force Surveys (LFS), we
generate annual employment counts at the NUTS-2 regional level.8,9 The survey
5We provide detailed variable descriptions and data sources in appendix table B.1.
6The educational attainment distribution of the migrants data is from May 2016.
7In 2014, the Ministry of Interior made a public statement on the number of Syrian guests in
each province. Although the relative Syrian densities in the statement is highly similiar to the
recent data, the figures are too round to be exact.
8The survey does not report province of residence or work information. NUTS-2 regions are
composed of combination of multiple provinces with populations less than 3 million habitants.
92014 and 2015 LFS waves implement new regulations to ensure full compliance with the Euro-
pean Union. The changes are primarily for better precision; such as collecting the data every week
instead of first week of each month and using the most recent population counts. However, the
definitions of rural and urban areas and their weights have been altered. For instance, nation-wide
rural share of population was 27.7% (13.5%) in 2013 according to pre-2014 regulations (2014 regu-
lations). One concern might be that the changes affect our empirical findings. We address the issue
in appendix C.
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does not include guests or refugees, so the analysis focuses exclusively on citizen
workers.10
The wage variable from the same data set reports individual’s monthly wage
income from the primary job.11 In TURKSTAT LFS, the question is asked only if the
individual declares herself as a wage worker, hence excludes self-employed indi-
viduals. As a result, 1,010,230 observations, approximately a fourth of the sample,
report positive wages.
Following the model presented in section 2.2, we divide the native workforce
into two according to the educational credentials. In Turkey, the compulsory ed-
ucation is currently 12 years, yet it was 5 years until 1997, and 8 years until 2012.
This implies that, except for very young workers, having a high school diploma is
a signal for high skill. Based on this, similar to Akgündüz, Van den Berg and Has-
sink (2015b) and Tumen (2016), we define natives with no high school degree as
low-skilled workers (LL,N). According to the data, 62.5% of all employed natives
in the sample belong to the group.
New residential building and occupancy permits data as well as gross provin-
cial GDP information are also from TURKSTAT.12 The former two are adminis-
trative data covering 2004-2015; thus they do not include squatter housing units
(gecekondu), which is relatively common in Turkey, particularly among low-income
households. If the migration causes an increase in newly built gecekondus, the total
effect on the new residential buildings is partly invisible to the data we use. This
potentially pulls the estimates towards zero. Therefore, we interpret the estimates
as they constitute lower-bounds.
10We do not include 2016 in the analysis due to the political and economic turmoil in the after-
math of the attempted coup.
11Share of workers with two jobs is negligible, less than 3%.
12Regional and province level GDP data ends in 2014.
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We use the administrative data on new firm establishments published by The
Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB). Since 2010,
TOBB collects and reports province level information on new company establish-
ments and their start-up capital on behalf of TURKSTAT.13 The data also provides
total amount of new Syrian co-founded firms and the capital invested in Turkey.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.1 presents a descriptive summary of the demographic characteristics of
(15+) Syrian migrants at national-level. For comparative purposes, we also present
comparable statistics for all (15-64) natives, and (15-64) natives that reside in the
regions where the ratio of migrant population to the natives is greater than 10%.14
The table shows that the guests have less education than both native samples.
While 92.4% of them have no high school degree, this number is 66.1% for all na-
tives, and 76.6% for the latter sample. They are also younger and less likely to be
woman than natives.
13Data on new company establishments starts from 2009 and data on start-up capital investment
from 2010.
14We exclude natives older than 65, because they are mostly retired, and not in the labor force.
79
Table 2.1. Characteristics of Syrian migrants, and natives
Syrian migrant (Age: 15+) Native (Age: 15-64) Native (Age: 15-64)
Educational Attainment
No degree 0.623 0.116 0.234
Primary School 0.215 0.321 0.280
Secondary School 0.086 0.224 0.252
High school 0.047 0.191 0.143
Some college and above 0.027 0.148 0.092
Age groups
15-18 0.182 0.123 0.176
19-24 0.189 0.106 0.127
25-29 0.154 0.119 0.120
30-34 0.129 0.124 0.116
35-39 0.095 0.117 0.104
40-44 0.069 0.107 0.099
45-49 0.055 0.089 0.078
50-54 0.044 0.088 0.075
55-59 0.030 0.070 0.056
60-64 0.021 0.058 0.050
65+ 0.032 - -
Gender
Man 0.531 0.501 0.490
Woman 0.469 0.499 0.510
Regions: All All Syr./Nat. > 10%
Notes. The first column reports the demographic characteristics of the (15+) Syrian migrants in 2015. For compari-
son, we also provide comparable numbers for all (15-64) natives, and (15-64) natives in the regions where the ratio of
Syrian migrant population to natives (Syr./Nat.) is at least 10% calculated from 2015 TURKSTAT Household Labor
Force Survey. Data on Syrian migrants is from Ministry of Interior Directory General of Migration Management.
Table 2.2 summarizes the data on native employment and wages, residential
permits, and new firm establishments. We divide the sample into 6, according to
the ratio of Syrian guest population to natives (less than 2%, between 2% and 10%,
and more than 10%) and the period (2004-2011 and 2012-2015).
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Table 2.2. Descriptive statistics
Pre-2012 Averages 2012-2015 Averages
Variables Syr./Nat. > 10% 10% ≥ Syr./Nat. ≥ 2% 2% > Syr./Nat. Syr./Nat. > 10% 10% ≥ Syr./Nat. ≥ 2% 2% > Syr./Nat.
Labor Force Statistics
Working age population 1,559,380 2,833,012 1,323,757 1,832,563 3,135,181 1,444,050
Employment rate 0.366 0.435 0.488 0.393 0.487 0.528
Informal employment rate 0.228 0.155 0.235 0.195 0.130 0.207
Employment rate of LTHS 0.335 0.379 0.448 0.354 0.418 0.479
Average wage (in 2010 TL) 793.182 1,013.708 992.321 944.653 1,146.054 1,125.238
Average wage in informal employment (in 2010 TL) 486.547 632.988 541.072 558.988 630.005 593.086
Average wage of LTHS (in 2010 TL) 596.169 744.461 711.090 684.889 797.797 778.216
Building Statistics
Resid. building permits (m2) 816,598 2,639,413 768,649 2,219,706 4,086,398 1,127,139
Resid. building permits (# dwelling units) 4,798 17,219 5,043 12,872 26,465 7,086
Resid. building permits (# buildings) 689 2,509 841 1,148 2,999 910
Resid. occupancy permits (# dwelling units) 2,383 8,414 3,635 7,005 20,114 6,051
New Firm Statistics
# New firm establishments 470.600 1,988.667 303.699 563.250 2,246.107 303.544
Start-up capital investment (in 2010 mln. TL) 173.547 667.043 79.246 133.015 435.109 53.020
Notes. The table reports the mean values for the outcomes. The sample is divided into 6, according to the relative size of the supply shock (the ratio of Syrian forced migrant population to na-
tives, Syr/Nat.), and time dimensions. Pre-2012 corresponds to 2004-2011, 2009-2011, and 2010-2011 for labor and building statistics, the number of new firm establishments, and the total start-up
capital investment, respectively. Labor statistics are from TURKSTAT Household Labor Force Survey, building statistics from TURKSTAT, and new firm statistics from TOBB.
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In terms of the overall native population, the regions with high and low Syrian
density are similar. Employment rate, on the other hand, is remarkably lower for
the former regions than others before 2012. Decomposing it into formal and infor-
mal employment rates reveals that the discrepancy is primarily due to the share of
formally employed workers. The share of individuals that are formally employed
is considerably lower in the latter regions. More than two thirds of workers in high
Syrian density regions are informally employed, whereas this number is below
50% for other region groups. This partly explains the pre-2012 difference across
regions in the average wages of all workers, and of those without a high school
degree. The employment rates and wages have considerably increased; and the
informal employment rate has declined after 2012 in all region groups.15
Building, and new firm statistics reveal that the size of the economic activity
is similar in high and low Syrian density regions, and remarkably larger in the
medium density regions. The latter is primarily due to Istanbul and Izmir, two
provinces whose combined gross provincial products amount to more than 35%
of Turkish GDP. After 2012, we observe substantial increases in the residential
building statistics for all region groups, and in the new firm statistics for high and
medium Syrian density regions.
2.4 Econometric Framework
Difference-in-Differences Specification
Following the previous studies (Akgündüz, Van den Berg and Hassink, 2015b;
Tumen, 2016), we initially employ a difference-in-differences (DiD) model to assess
the effects of Syrians in Turkey. The DiD econometric model is;
15The increases and the decrease do not occur due to a specific recession or a boom year, but a
general trend affecting throughout Turkey.
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Yi,t = β ∗ Ti,t + λi + µt + ei,t, (2.6)
where i indicates the region or province, t time period, and Yi,t is the outcome vari-
able. The main outcome variables are informal, less than high school (LTHS), high
school and above graduates (HSG), and overall employment rates and wages; the
number of new residential buildings; and the log of number of new firm establish-
ments. λi and µt are region or province, and year specific effects, respectively. Ti,t
is a binary variable that takes on the value of 1 for the years after 2012 in the re-
gions with relatively dense Syrian population, and 0 otherwise. β, the coefficient of
interest, yields the mean difference between control and treated regions after purg-
ing national macroeconomic shocks and time-invariant region or province effects.
This model implicitly assumes that the dependent variables would follow similar
paths in the control and treated regions in the absence of the migration shock.
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Figure 2.3. Frequency distribution of Syrian migrants as a share of native popula-
tion
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Notes: The graphs plot the frequency distributions of the ratio of Syrian forced migrant population
to natives in 2015 at NUTS-2, and at province level. The vertical dash lines separate control
regions, the regions excluded in the DiD and the GSC specifications, and the treated regions. The
x-axis in panel (b) is broken due to unusually large Syrian density in one province (Kilis). The data
provided by Ministry of Interior Directory General of Migration Management is used.
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There are Syrians in all regions of Turkey, but it is possible to determine where
they constitute a substantial share of regional population. As shown in figure 2.3,
as of 2015, the total number of Syrian guests always constitute less than 2% of
the native population in 16 NUTS-2 regions (62 provinces). We consider these
regions (provinces) as controls. Between 2% and 10%, there are 7 NUTS-2 regions
(14 provinces). They are excluded entirely from the sample in the DiD. Though
artificial, this allows us to create a sizable difference between treated and control
regions in terms of Syrian guest population as a share of native population. In 3
NUTS-2 regions (5 provinces), the Syrian population is at least as large as 10% of
the native population. Then, the data employed in this specification includes 19
NUTS-2 regions (67 provinces) where 3 (5) of them are treated.
We normalize the total counts of workers by working-age native population of
the corresponding demographic group. Similarly, the number of building permits
is normalized by the gross provincial product (GPP). Using current population or
GPP may yield misleading results if the migration causes native out-migration or
affects economic activity in the province (Borjas, 2003; Card and Peri, 2016). To
prevent this from biasing the findings, we use the working-age population and
GPP in 2011 to normalize. For the sake of interpretability, we divide the estimates
from the latter regressions by the mean of the dependent variable to get percentage
change (%∆Y);16
%∆Y ≈ ∆Y
Y
=
β
Y
. (2.7)
Generalized Synthetic Control
We employ the generalized synthetic control (GSC) method to prevent under-
lying regional trends from affecting the estimates. In the presence of unobserved
time varying confounders, such as regional trends, the identifying assumption of
16We wish to emphasize that the approximations have no qualitative effects on the findings.
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difference-in-differences estimator, namely the parallel trends assumption, might
be violated. The GSC model overcomes this problem by purging the patterns in
the error term that can be formulated as interactions of region-specific intercepts
(factor loadings) and time varying coefficients (latent factors).
Specifically, if the error term of the equation 2.6 is ei,t = Γi ft + ui,t and Γi ft
are unobservable time-varying confounders that are correlated with the treatment
T and ui,t is idiosyncratic error, then the estimates of the DiD model are biased
and inconsistent. Bai (2009) has proposed a way to surmount this problem. His
interactive fixed effects (IFE) model solves it by finding and purging the patterns
in the composite error term ei,t. More clearly, given Γi ft,
βˆ(Γ, f ) =
N
∑
i=1
(X′iXi)
−1 N∑
i−1
Xi(Yi − fΓi), (2.8)
where X includes all observable controls, fixed effects and the variable of interest.17
Subtracting the time-varying confounders from the outcome eliminates the part of
the error term causing the endogeneity and renders the estimates unbiased and
consistent.
Given βˆ, the unobservable confounders can be found by the principal compo-
nent analysis (PCA): By turning the vector Wi,t = Yi,t − Xi,tβ of length T ∗ N into
a TxN matrix, we estimate its principal components. The PCA is an unsupervised
machine learning method that unravels patterns in the feature space that can be
decomposed as Ci,t = Di ∗ Et.18 For instance, NUTS-2 region-specific trends of any
polynomial degree can be detected by PCA. So, given β and Wi = fΓi + ei, we can
calculate fΓi. In addition, given fΓi, we can find βˆ from equation 2.8. As long as
17Note that in the absence of fΓi term, this is the standard fixed-effects estimator.
18Mathematically, it creates surfaces of lower dimension that are closest to the observations
(James et al., 2013). The number of dimensions are selected by the user .
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the number of principal components are specified, this scheme can be solved by
iteration.
Xu (2017) proposes that leave-one-out cross-validation procedure can be used
to determine the number of unobserved factors to be purged. For any number
of principal components, the procedure leaves out one pre-treatment observation
from all treated units at a time, builds a model using the control units and the rest
of the pre-treatment observations of the treated units to predict the left-out obser-
vations. The number of unobserved factors to be purged is determined from the
model with the smallest mean squared prediction error (MSPE). Once the model
with the smallest MSPE is obtained, the GSC creates the counterfactual; namely the
hypothetical treated regions in the post-treatment periods that have not received
the treatment. The counterfactual and the actual treated regions are compared to
estimate impact of the treatment.
Before proceeding, Xu (2017) cautions the users when the number of pre-treatment
periods is fewer than 10 or the number of control units is fewer than 40. The use of
data-driven selection methods, and the calculation of the GSC confidence intervals
described below require more data than the basic fixed-effects estimators. This pre-
vents us from employing GSC in estimating the effect on the number of new firm
establishments. Additionally, we note that there are 9 pre-treatment years and 16
control regions in our employment and wage regressions.
Alternative Specification: OLS
Alternatively, instead of pooling all the treated regions and dropping some re-
gions from the sample, we estimate the same model using regional treatment inten-
sity variable calculated by interacting the binary treatment variable with the 2015
ratio of Syrian guest population to natives. All NUTS-2 regions or provinces are
used in this specification. Then, the alternative estimation equation is as follows;
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Yi,t = ω ∗ Syri,t + λi + µt + ei,t, (2.9)
where Syri,tis the treatment intensity or relative size of the supply shock (ratio of
Syrian forced migrant population to native population) variable. It takes non-zero
values starting from 2012. Although findings are not affected qualitatively, we add
the quadratic term of the treatment intensity variable in the building permits and
firm establishment regressions, since the relationships exhibit a concave pattern.
The quadratic model is Yi,t = ω1 ∗ Syri,t + ω1 ∗ Syr2i,t + λi + µt + ei,t.
The estimated coefficients of the alternative specification are not directly com-
parable to the ones obtained from previous models. Therefore, we approximate β
by dividing ω to the average difference in treatment intensity in the post-treatment
period between treated Syrtr and control regions Syrco;
β = ∆Y ∗ ∆Syr
∆Syr
≈ ω ∗ ∆Syr, (2.10)
where ∆Syr = Syrtr − Syrco. In the regressions with the quadratic term, we ap-
proximate β by ω1 ∗ ∆Syr + ω2 ∗ (Syr2tr − Syr2co).
Alternative Specification: 2SLS
A general concern in the literature is that underlying trends that improve the
economic outcomes in a region might also pull immigrants. The rise might be
incorrectly attributed to immigrants due to the way the regression model is con-
structed. Although the GSC arguably overcomes the problem, we also employ
instruments that rely on the distance (Llull, 2017; Peri, 2012) and historical ethnic
enclaves (Borjas and Monras, 2016; Card and Lewis, 2007; Card, 2009).
We use an indicator variable for border regions (or provinces) as an instrument.
It is natural to expect that border regions host disproportionately more migrants
than others, since it is the least costly way to be away from the war in terms of
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transportation expenses. The cost is borne by the guests and it is unrelated to the
regional business cycles. Furthermore, occasionally, a part of the family stays in
Syria and, depending on the conditions of the war, visited during religious holi-
days by the leavers.
Secondly, we redistribute the total number of Syrian guests according to 1965
province-level Arabic speaking shares.19 The distribution of Arabic speaking pop-
ulation in 1965 is independent of current regional trends. Networks established
by older generations attract newcomers. One issue arises here is that there were
67 provinces in Turkey in 1965; however there are 81 provinces since 1999. Hence,
we build a crosswalk between 1965 provinces and 1999 provinces according to the
pre-treatment native population. If a province in 1965 is split into two or more in
later years, we distribute the Arabic speakers according to the 2011 native popu-
lation. If a new province is composed of parts of multiple provinces of 1965, then
we group them and distribute the speakers similarly. 20
We use the past distribution of Arabic speakers for the guest distribution, and
normalize it by pre-treatment population to obtain conjectured Syrian population
in 2015. Formally, we calculate the conjectured number of Syrian migrants in
province i as follows;
(Total Guests2015 ∗ Arabic speaking1965,i ∗ Ci). (2.11)
Total Guests2015 is the total number of Syrian guests in 2015, Ci is the conversion co-
efficient between 1965 and 1999 provinces, Arabic speaking1965,i is the ratio of Ara-
bic speaking population in province i to all Arabic speaking population in Turkey
19This instrument is highly similar to the one used in Altindag and Kaushal (2017).
20This method implicitly assumes that the population ratios between provinces in 2011 reflect
Arabic speaking ratios in 1965. We acknowledge that this assumption does not necessarily reflect
the reality. However, using the population information from other years has virtually no effect on
findings.
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in 1965. Note that ∑i Arabic speaking share1965,i ∗ Ci = 1. Then, our second instru-
ment is the conjectured number of Syrian migrants divided by the pre-treatment
population in province or region i, depending on the aggregation level.
In regressions with the quadratic endogenous term, we add a third instrument.
To capture the non-linear term, we follow the suggestion in Wooldridge (2010).
First, we predict the relative supply shock using our exogenous variables. Then,
we create a variable by taking the square of the predicted values and include it in
the instruments. By construction, this instrument is able to retrieve the non-linear
exogenous component, and it satisfies the exogeneity assumption as long as other
instruments do. We employ equation 2.10 to approximate β.
Given the assumptions, the DiD estimate can be directly interpreted as the
causal effect. However, as shown below, the parallel trends assumption is violated
in some cases. Therefore, when feasible, we present the estimate from the GSC
method as our baseline estimate and others as supplementary evidences. In the
firm formation regressions, we cannot use the GSC due to very short time span of
the data, and consider estimates from the other models as equally likely to capture
the truth.
Inference
In DiD models with fixed effects, the inference is based on the assumption that
the number of treated and control groups grow as the sample size gets larger. If the
number of treated groups is fixed and small, the inference is problematic. An in-
tuitive exposition of this problem is presented in Conley and Taber (2011). Briefly,
group-time random effects in the error term of the treated group do not vanish as
the sample gets bigger. The confidence interval, although unbiased, is inconsistent;
because it captures part of the error term as well as the true effect.
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Conley and Taber (2011)’s randomization inference procedure arguably over-
comes the problem. The main idea is that the variability of the coefficient of in-
terest can be estimated from the distribution of the coefficients estimated from
the placebo treatments. The latter coefficients are obtained by assigning placebo
treatments to the control sample. This requires the “exchangeability” assumption,
namely the treated units are chosen at random, and the observations from different
NUTS-2 regions have the same joint distribution(Doudchenko and Imbens, 2016).
MacKinnon and Webb (2016) shows that randomization inference based on co-
efficients (RI-β) does not perform well in the existence of heterogeneity; but RI-t
recovers very quickly as the number of treated groups increase. For instance, when
the number of treated units is 3 and the standard error of the treated sample is
twice (half) the control sample, RI-t rejects the true null hypothesis less than 10%
(more than 2%) of the time when the test size is set to 5%. The same procedure
shows that the true null is rejected in more than quarter of the trials with RI-β
procedure.
In the regressions where the panel variable is at NUTS-2 level, to obtain the
empirical distribution of placebo t-statistics for the null zero, we assign placebo
treatments to all groups of 3 regions other than the original group. We get 968
placebo t-statistics.21 This number is large enough to produce a cumulative dis-
tribution that resembles a continuous function. We produce the p-values of the
estimates using the distribution of the placebo t-statistics.
The GSC standard errors are produced using a parametric bootstrap technique
(Xu, 2017). First, we create a set composed of the residuals of the control sam-
ple. Second, we randomly declare one control region as the “treated region”, re-
sample the control regions with replacement, apply the GSC and obtain a vector
21(193 )− 1 = 968.
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of prediction residuals 2000 times. Then, a second bootstrap with 2000 iterations
commences. The former (latter) set of residuals are sampled with replacement to
impose randomness to the control (true treated) regions. Using 2000 “randomness
imposed” data, the GSC estimates are computed at each iteration. The estimates
are used to construct the confidence intervals and standard errors.
In the regressions with continuous variable of interest, the strict difference be-
tween treated and control units is blurred. For employment and wage regressions,
the small number of clusters issue persists, though. As noted by Angrist and Pis-
chke (2008) and Cameron and Miller (2015), with few clusters, the standard er-
rors tend to be underestimated. Similar to Akgündüz, Van den Berg and Hassink
(2015b), we assess the reliability of the test using the cluster-robust standard errors
in these regressions by reporting the p-values derived using the wild cluster boot-
strap methods (CGM), which are shown by Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008)
to perform well. We report the p-values from the “wild restricted residual boot-
strap” (WRR) for the 2SLS regressions when the number of clusters is fewer than
30 (Davidson and MacKinnon, 2010).
2.5 Empirical Results
2.5.1 Effects on the native workforce
2.5.1.1 Employment effect
Dustmann, Schönberg and Stuhler (2016) remarks that the labor supply of na-
tive workers is not necessarily inelastic. Natives might not work below some wage
levels and a portion of the impact of the migration might be absorbed as a fall in
native employment. Additionally, the debate on the effects of the Syrian migration
mostly revolves around its impact on native employment. Therefore, we start by
examining the effect on it.
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We do not directly observe Syrians in the LFS dataset. In determining the most
impacted native groups, we exploit the fact that Syrians cannot formally work. We
are able to identify workers working informally from the survey since TURKSTAT
asks respondents whether they have social security coverage. According to the
Turkish law, every employee should respond affirmatively. This implies that no
social security coverage indicates informal employment. 55.55% of workers with
no high school degree are employed informally in 2011; whereas this number is
23.02% (7.38%) for workers with high school degree (some college education or
above). Additionally, in terms of educational credentials, table 2.1 reports that
more than 92% of the migrants do not have a high school diploma. We consider
native individuals with no high school degree as the most impacted demographic
group, and jobs that do not provide social security coverage are the most impacted
jobs. We also present estimates for native high school and above graduates as well
as on the average native worker.22
22We provide additional findings for sub-groups of the highly impacted demographic group, and
jobs in the appendix table B.4.
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Table 2.3. Impact of Syrian migrants on employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: DiD
βˆ 0.008 0.020 0.063 0.013
Clustered se (0.023) (0.025) (0.047) (0.021)
RI-t p-value 0.779 0.539 0.286 0.607
# Clusters 19 19 19 19
# Treated clusters 3 3 3 3
Observations 228 228 228 228
Panel B: GSC
βˆ -0.003 0.000 - -
GSC SE 0.034 0.047 - -
GSC p-value 0.898 0.991 - -
# Unobserved factors 1 1 0 0
# Clusters 19 19 19 19
# Treated clusters 3 3 3 3
Observations 228 228 228 228
Panel C: Alternative model; OLS
βˆ 0.005 0.017 0.076 0.015
Clustered SE (0.019) (0.023) (0.038) (0.021)
CGM p-value 0.775 0.457 0.072 0.491
# Clusters 26 26 26 26
Observations 312 312 312 312
Panel D: 2SLS
βˆ 0.009 0.015 0.069 0.005
Clustered se (0.022) (0.023) (0.043) (0.020)
WRR p-value 0.762 0.577 0.281 0.806
First-stage F-test 35.925 35.925 35.925 35.925
# Clusters 26 26 26 26
Observations 312 312 312 312
Groups: Informal LTHS HSG Overall
Notes: The table reports the change in the native informal employment rate, employment rate of the natives with no high
school diploma (LTHS), employment rate of natives with at least high school degree (HSG), and overall employment rate
in the treated regions after the migration shock, using 2004-2015 NUTS-2-by-year aggregated TURKSTAT Household Labor
Force Survey. The dependent variables are the native informal, LTHS, HSG and overall employment counts normalized
by 2011 working-age population or the population of the demographic group. Panels A, B, C, and D employ the DiD, the
GSC, the alternative model specification, and the 2SLS to estimate the effects, respectively. In addition to the standard errors
clustered at NUTS-2 level and the GSC standard errors, the p-values produced by the randomization inference by t-statistic
(RI-t), the parametric bootstrap technique of the GSC, the wild cluster bootstrap (CGM), and the wild restricted residual
bootstrap (WRR) are reported for inference. Panel B reports the number of unobserved factors purged by the GSC, and
panel D reports the first-stage F-statistics.
94
Table 2.3 shows our findings on the employment effects of the Syrian migration.
Panel A uses the DiD, panel B the GSC, panel C the alternative model that incor-
porates intensity of the migration shock by replacing the binary treatment variable
with the continuous regional relative size of the supply shock variable, and panel
D the 2SLS model. The first two rows of all panels indicate the estimated coefficient
of interest, and the cluster robust or the GSC standard errors. The third rows calcu-
late the p-values using the randomization inference (RI-t), bootstrap results from
the GSC, the wild cluster bootstrap (CGM), or the wild restricted residual boot-
strap (WRR). Each panel reports the number of clusters. Panels A and B report the
number of regions that are defined as treated as well. In addition, panel B reports
the number of purged unobserved confounders. Lastly, we present the first-stage
F-statistics in panel D to assess the weak identification of the endogenous variable.
The first column of panel A shows that the informal employment rate has not
changed after the migration. The estimated effect is 0.008, statistically indistin-
guishable from zero. When we focus on the highly impacted demographic group,
we find that the LTHS employment-rate has risen by 2 percentage points, though
the corresponding p-value and standard error are large (p = 0.539 and se = 0.025),
preventing us from rejecting the null hypothesis. Similarly, the employment-rate
of high school and above graduates (HSG) increase by 6.3 percentage points after
the migration . However, the estimate is quite imprecise (se = 0.047) due to rela-
tively small number of HSG population in the treated regions. Column 4 reports
that the estimated change in overall employment rate is also very close to zero
(βˆ = 0.013).
Panel B uses the GSC model. For informal employment, the cross-validation
procedure finds that one unobserved factor needs to be purged. Doing this pro-
duces small negative estimate for the effect of the migration (−0.003(0.034)). Sim-
ilarly, with one unobserved factor, the employment effect is essentially zero for
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LTHS individuals (0.000(0.047)). The cross-validation procedure suggests that the
DiD performs the best, and we do not need to purge any unobserved factors.
Therefore, we leave the last two columns in panel B blank, since they are the same
as those of panel A.
Panel C employs the alternative specification. In this specification, we include
all the NUTS-2 regions in our analysis, and assess the reliability of the cluster-
robust standard errors by using the wild cluster bootstrap procedure. As noted,
for comparability, we divide estimated coefficients by the difference in the Syrian
densities between treated and control regions. All of the estimates are qualitatively
and quantitatively similar to the findings from previous specifications, denoting
no adverse employment effect of the migration. Findings from the two-stage least
squares model in the panel D are also pointing to the non-rejection of the null
hypothesis. The first-stage F-statistic of the model indicates that the parameter of
interest is strongly identified. 23
23We have one endogenous and two instrumental variables. The Hansen’s J statistics never reject
the null hypothesis that the model is over-identified, with p-values always greater than 0.10.
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Figure 2.4. Impact of Syrian migrants on native informal, and LTHS employment rates over time; the GSC
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Notes: The graphs plot the changes in the native informal, and less than high school (LTHS) employment rates in the treated regions compared to
the counterfactual, using 2004-2015 NUTS-2-by-year aggregated TURKSTAT Household Labor Force Survey. The vertical dash lines indicate the
first year of the migration shock. The generalized synthetic control method (GSC) is employed to estimate the effects. The shaded areas show 95%
confidence intervals, calculated using the parametric bootstrap of the GSC.
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Pooling all the post-treatment years and comparing them with the entire pre-
treatment period might be misleading in the existence of dynamic effects. In ad-
dition, the time path of the effect can be used to further assess the validity of the
parallel trends assumption of our baseline model, as in Allegretto, Dube and Re-
ich (2011) and Dube (2017). We present the evolution of the LTHS and informal
employment rate using the GSC in Figure 2.4. The solid line in the figure shows
the estimated difference in the employment rate between the treated units and the
counterfactuals; whereas the horizontal dash line at 0 indicates the perfect coinci-
dence of the two. The vertical line is for the year 2012, the first year of the shock.
The estimated line is very close to zero during both the pre- and post-treatment
periods for both LTHS individuals and informal employment, displaying no pre-
existing trends or lagged displacement effects.
In table 2.3, we pool formal and informal workers when estimating the effect of
migration on native LTHS employment . This potentially conceals the effect of mi-
gration on the share of LTHS workers employed formally. Informal employment
is prevalent among routine-physical-task-intensive sectors; such as elementary oc-
cupations (category 9 according to ISCO-08) and skilled agricultural, forestry, and
fishery workers (category 6 according to ISCO-08).24 Also, Syrian forced migrants
are largely non-Turkophone, suggesting that it is highly unlikely that they are em-
ployed in jobs that are relatively communication intensive. Peri and Sparber (2009)
argues that natives move to less routine-physical-task-intensive jobs in response to
migration due to native-immigrant labor complementarity. The main implication
of the argument for our case is that the formal share of native LTHS employment
should rise after the shock.
2462% and 83% of all workers in these occupations are informally employed, and slightly more
than half of all LTHS workers are employed in them.
98
Figure 2.5. Impact of Syrian migrants on formally employed share of native LTHS
workers over time; the GSC
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Notes: The figure plots the change in the share of formally employed native LTHS workers out of all
native LTHS workers in the treated regions compared to the counterfactual, using 2004-2015 NUTS-
2-by-year aggregated TURKSTAT Household Labor Force Survey. The vertical dash line indicates
the first year of the migration shock. The generalized synthetic control method (GSC) is employed.
The shaded areas show 95% confidence intervals, calculated using the parametric bootstrap of the
GSC.
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We confirm the argument in figure 2.5. The formally employed share of LTHS
workers has increased considerably after 2012. The GSC estimate for the increase
after the shock is 0.033 (0.021) with two unobservable factors.25 The rise is persis-
tent, the point estimates increase over time. The finding suggests that the native
workers have partly protected themselves by moving to relatively less routine-
physical-task-intensive formal jobs.
Our findings on employment effect of Syrian migration partly differ from both
Tumen (2016) and Del Carpio and Wagner (2015) who both find negative and sta-
tistically significant effects of Syrian migration on the natives’ informal employ-
ment. We delineate our differences in Appendix B in detail. Briefly, we show that
their findings are driven primarily by the choice of control regions, and the implied
counterfactuals that exhibit underlying economic trends different from the treated
regions. Additionally, the significance of their findings are potentially a result of
underestimated standard errors. Within-region correlation of the error terms is not
addressed in either of the studies.
2.5.1.2 Wage effect
The other channel through which migration wave might impact labor markets
is wages. Natives might accept lower wages to protect their employment.
In studies that analyze the wage effects of the migration, it is common to ad-
just the data for demographic composition of workers (Borjas, 2015; Card, 2009;
Monras, 2015). To decrease potential contaminating effects of incidental changes
of the composition due to the relatively small size of the sample and to elim-
25The DiD estimate for the change is 0.057 (0.026). The findings of no change in informal and
LTHS employment rate, and rising formal share of LTHS employment might appear conflicting
at first glance. However, we note that this is primarily driven by the level differences of the for-
mal employment rate of LTHS individuals between the treated and control regions. Although the
formal share of LTHS workers rise considerably and informal employment rate is unaffected, the
effect of the former on the total LTHS employment is limited due to the small number of formally
employed LTHS individuals.
100
inate effects of differential levels and trends of the returns to personal charac-
teristics at national-level, we time-demean the log-transformed wage variable at
individual-level for each of the age-by-education-by-gender groups, and obtain
residual wages. Specifically, we calculate the residual wages as follows;
Y˜n,g,i,t = Yn,g,i,t −Ymg,t. (2.12)
n indicates individual, g the demographic group. Yn,g,i,t is individual’s log wage,
and Ymg,t is the average wage of workers in group g.
26
After having obtained the residual wages, we collapse the data at region-by-
year level. In the appendix, figure B.2 shows the benefits of the demeaning for av-
erage wages. Except for using the GSC model with residual wages as the outcome,
all cases display a U-shaped pre-existing trend, invalidating the causal interpreta-
tion.
26In other words, we regress log of wage on time dummies for each age-by-education-by-gender
group. Further region-demeaning slightly improves the precision, and has no effect on the point
estimates.
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Table 2.4. Impact of Syrian migrants on wages
(1) (2) (3) (4)
βˆ -0.113 -0.021 0.057 0.017
GSC SE (0.128) (0.025) (0.023) (0.023)
GSC p-value 0.391 0.396 0.011 0.466
# Unobserved factors 3 3 2 3
# Clusters 19 19 19 19
# Treated clusters 3 3 3 3
Observations 228 228 228 228
Groups: Informal LTHS HSG Overall
Notes. The table reports the percentage change in the (residual) wages of native infor-
mal, less than high school (LTHS), high school and above graduates (HSG), and overall
workers in the treated regions after the migration shock, using NUTS-2-by-year aggre-
gated 2004-2015 TURKSTAT Household Labor Force Survey. Only the GSC estimates
are reported; because the other specifications are likely to suffer from the violation of
parallel trends assumption. The GSC standard errors and p-values are calculated us-
ing the parametric bootstrap technique. The number of unobserved factors purged by
the GSC is reported.
Armed with this information, we only report the GSC estimates for the (resid-
ual) wage effects of the migration wave in table 2.4.27 Firstly, as opposed to the em-
ployment estimates, we find that wages of the workers informally employed have
dropped, on average, considerably after the inflow of migrants (%∆Y = −0.11 (0.13)).
However, the estimated wage effect we obtain for native workers with no high
school education is −0.02 (0.02). In addition, as shown in figure 2.6, the average
wage of informally employed workers decreases every year after 2012, yet that of
native LTHS workers recovers quickly, and the estimate is -0.015 and -0.014 in 2014
and 2015.
27In Appendix Table B.6, we present the estimated wage effects using other model specifications
for completeness. The violation of parallel trends nullifies the causality, yet the estimates still con-
vey descriptive information of how the wages of selected demographic groups changed after 2012
in the treated regions compared to the control regions.
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Figure 2.6. Impact of Syrian migrants on average wages of native informally employed, and LTHS workers over time; the
GSC
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Notes: The graphs plot the percentage change of the average (residual) wages of native informally employed, and LTHS workers in the treated
regions compared to the counterfactual, using 2004-2015 NUTS-2-by-year aggregated TURKSTAT Household Labor Force Survey. The vertical dash
lines indicate the first year of the migration shock. The generalized synthetic control method is employed to estimate the effects on the residual
wages. The shaded areas show 95% confidence intervals, calculated using the parametric bootstrap of the GSC.
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This is unexpected at first glance, since most of the LTHS workers are infor-
mally employed. The rise in formal share of native LTHS workers explains the
conundrum. It is likely that the native LTHS workers that would earn relatively
higher have moved to formal employment with the migration. Their wages have
increased; while wages of those remained informally employed have slightly fallen.
Thus, the change in the average wage of LTHS workers is small in magnitude.
Given the imperfect substitution between LTHS and HSG workers, we expect
a positive effect on the average wages of native HSG workers. Column 3 of table
2.4 confirms the expectation and reports that the average wage of native HSG rises
statistically significantly by 5.7% with the migration. Lastly, column 4 reports that
the average wage of all native workers has slightly increased (%∆Y = 0.02 (0.02)).
By focusing on the estimates for 2015, the year with the official province-level
Syrian migrant counts are available, we can compare our findings to the larger
literature on the effects of quasi-experimental migration shocks. The data reports
that the ratio of Syrian population to natives in the treated regions is 0.151. Even
when we conservatively assume that the ratio of migrant LTHS workers to native
LTHS workers is 10% in the treated regions, our 95% confidence interval rejects the
supply shock has led LTHS native wages to decline by more than 4.8%, and to rise
by more than 5.6%.28 This coincides with studies that do not find a significant wage
decline after a migration shock (Clemens and Hunt, 2017; Peri and Yasenov, 2018).
However, it rules out some of the estimates in the literature obtained from differ-
ent refugee waves, including -1.3 wage elasticity in table 3 of Borjas and Monras
(2016), and the implied wage elasticities ranging from -0.5 to -1.5 in Borjas (2015)
for Marielitos in the U.S. in the early 1980s .
28A more reasonable estimate for the number of migrant LTHS workers is 200,000, as explained in
section 2.6. This corresponds to 13.7% (13.3%) of the native LTHS worker count in 2011 (2015). Us-
ing the number, our 95% confidence interval rejects that 10% increase in the low-skilled workforce
due to the migration decreases wages of low-skilled natives by 3.5% (3.6%).
104
Effects on the native wage distribution
To further delineate the impact, we provide estimates for the effects of the Syr-
ian migration on the shares of workers earning above various multiples of the
national minimum wage. We normalize wages by the minimum wage due to the
fact that the changes that occur around the minimum wage might reveal both the
shift towards the formal employment and the effects on the informally employed
workers with low wages.
Similar to the wage regressions, we do not employ region-by-year shares as is,
but the shares adjusted for demographic characteristics. To do this, we calculate
the annual nation-wide share of workers earning above given threshold for each
of the age-by-education-by-gender group. Then, we subtract the average shares
from observed outcomes that take the value of 1 if the individual earns above
the threshold, and 0 otherwise. Finally, we calculate the mean of the residuals
at region-by-year level and get (residual) shares.29
Therefore, the regression equations we use to estimate the change in share of
workers earning more than given threshold is as follows;
Y˜mi,t = β ∗ Ti,t + λi + µt + ei,t, (2.13)
where Y˜mi,t is the (residual) share of workers earning at least m% of the minimum
wage, and m is multiples of 50 between 50 and 400. Unless the GSC recommends
the DiD, we employ the GSC. Hence, Y˜mi,t is also free from unobserved factors that
are deemed important by the cross-validation procedure.
29In terms of equation 2.12, Ymn,g,i,t is 1 if the individual’s wage is greater than the threshold m,
and 0 if not. Ymg,t is the average share for workers in group g earning above m% of the minimum
wage in time t.
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Figure 2.7. Impact of Syrian migrants on the wage distribution of native workers
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Notes: The figure plots the percentage point change in share of workers earning above multiples of
the national minimum wage in the treated regions compared to the counterfactual, using
2004-2015 NUTS-2-by-year aggregated TURKSTAT Household Labor Force Survey. Unless there is
no unobserved confounders deemed important, the generalized synthetic control method is
employed to estimate the effects. The shaded areas show 90% confidence intervals, calculated
using the parametric bootstrap of the GSC. The second x-axis is the average wage percentile value
corresponding to the multiples of the national minimum wage.
Figure 2.7 presents the findings. We make three observations: First, the share of
workers earning at or above the minimum wage has increased by 2.50 percentage
points in the treated regions compared to the counterfactuals. This is compati-
ble with our finding that migrants have pushed natives to formal jobs that are
relatively higher wage jobs. Some low-wage informal workers who would have
earned slightly less than the minimum wage become minimum wage workers af-
ter the migration. Second, the migration has increased the share of workers earning
upper-middle income. The shares of workers earning at or above 200%, and 250%
of the minimum wage have increased by 2.11, 2.19 percentage points. Third, the
migration had almost no effect on very-high-wage workers in the treated regions.
To sum up, our findings confirm that Syrian migrants enter the labor force
through informal employment. This causes a reduction in the average wage of in-
formal jobs. However, after the shock, an important portion of the affected native
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workers are more likely to find formal jobs that pay relatively higher wages; hence,
on average, they are protected from the potential adverse wage effects. Therefore,
we conclude that there is scant evidence for adverse effects of the migrants on na-
tive wages. The non-finding of employment and wage effects even after such a
huge migration shock implies that the effects of the migration are not limited to
the labor supply.
2.5.2 Effects on residential building construction sector
Migrants improve the economy in the regions they reside. This is not only due
to the additional labor-power; but they also bring their wealth and purchasing
power to the host country. One of the industries that potentially benefit the most by
migrants is the residential construction. This is especially relevant in Turkey, since
around 90% of Syrian population live outside the Temporary Protection Camps
constructed by the government.30
30Howard (2017) observes a similar migration-induced residential demand boost in the United
States.
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Table 2.5. Impact of Syrian migrants on residential buildings
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: DiD
βˆ/Y 0.444 0.443 0.330
Clustered SE (0.093) (0.058) (0.077)
C.R. p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
# Clusters 67 67 67
# Treated clusters 5 5 5
Observations 804 804 804
Panel B: GSC
βˆ/Y - 0.337 0.246
GSC SE - (0.121) (0.147)
GSC p-value - 0.006 0.008
# Unobserved factors 0 2 2
# Clusters 67 67 67
# Treated clusters 5 5 5
Observations 804 804 804
Panel C: Alternative model; OLS
βˆ/Y 0.347 0.341 0.243
Clustered SE (0.064) (0.066) (0.083)
C.R. p-value 0.000 0.000 0.005
# Clusters 81 81 81
Observations 972 972 972
Panel D: 2SLS
βˆ/Y 0.542 0.430 0.196
Clustered se (0.210) (0.157) (0.074)
C.R. p-value 0.012 0.007 0.010
SW F-test; lin. term 7.793 7.793 7.793
SW F-test; quad. term 4.225 4.225 4.225
# Clusters 81 81 81
Observations 972 972 972
Measurement unit: m2 dwelling unit building
Notes: The table reports the percentage change in the residential building permits in the treated regions after the migration
shock, using province-by-year aggregated 2004-2015 TURKSTAT building statistics. The dependent variable is the total new
building permits in m2(squared meters), in the number of dwelling units, and in the number of buildings divided by 2011
gross provincial product. The percentage change is approximated using the equation 8. Panels A, B, C, and D employ the
DiD, the GSC, the alternative model specification, and the 2SLS to estimate the effects, respectively. Standard errors are
clustered at province level or the GSC standard errors are reported. The corresponding p-values are reported for inference.
Panel B reports the number of unobserved factors purged by the GSC, and panel D reports Sanderson-Windmeijer first-stage
F-statistics. For better precision, the regressions are weighted by 2011 gross provincial product.
108
Table 2.5 shows the impact of the migration shock on residential building per-
mits. The first column measures the number of new residential building permits
in m2(squared meters); whereas the second in dwelling units and the third in new
buildings. The dependent variables are all normalized by 2011 gross provincial
product (GPP). For interpretation, we further divide the estimated coefficients by
the mean value of the dependent variable to get the percentage change due to the
migration shock.31 Thanks to the availability of province-level data, the cluster-
robust standard errors can be used for p-values; yet we keep the structure of the
table similar to the previous ones for consistency. Following Solon, Haider and
Wooldridge (2015)’s suggestion, we weight the regressions by 2011 GPP for better
precision.32
Panel A reports the estimates using the DiD specification. On average, the new
residential building permits in m2 has increased by 44% in areas with dense Syrian
population than the counterfactual case. In column 2, the estimate is virtually
the same and more precise. Column 3 shows that the number of permits in new
buildings has also risen by 33%. We reject the null hypothesis of no effect in all
columns at conventional levels.
Employing the GSC in panel B produces smaller, though qualitatively similar
estimates. When m2 is used for measurement unit, the cross-validation suggests
the validity of the DiD model. Two unobservable factors are deemed important
and purged in columns 2 and 3. The GSC estimates indicate that the number of res-
idential dwelling unit permits has increased by 34%, and the number of permits in
new buildings has increased by 25% after the shock. All estimates are statistically
significant.
31Alternatively, one can use the log-transformed number of new residential buildings as the de-
pendent variable and avoid the approximation. We present findings from that specification in
appendix table B.7.
32The weighting has no qualitative impact on the results.
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Using continuous variable of interest and its quadratic term in panel C, we es-
timate that the arrival of migrants has increased the number of new residential
building permits by 35% (34%) when m2 (the number of dwelling unit) is used
for measurement; whereas the increase is 24% in the last column. Panel D em-
ploys the two-stage least squares model, and points towards the same direction of
change.33 Although the alternative model estimates are smaller compared to the
ones in panels A and B; all models show that the migration boosted the residential
construction industry.
33There are two first stage regressions, since we include the quadratic term of the Syrian guest
intensity variable. We report Sanderson-Windmeijer F-statistics for each of them (Sanderson and
Windmeijer, 2016).For the first two columns, the Hansen’s J statistic does not reject the null hypoth-
esis that the model is over-identified, with p-values well above 0.2. It is 0.07 for the third column.
We also estimate the model with the LIML estimator that performs better than 2SLS in the existence
of weak instruments. The estimates are 0.559, 0.429 and 0.178.
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Figure 2.8. Impact of Syrian migrants on the number of new dwelling unit building
permits over time; the GSC
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Notes: The figure plots the percentage change in the new dwelling unit building permits in the
treated regions compared to the counterfactual, using 2004-2015 province-by-year aggregated
TURKSTAT Building Statistics. The vertical dash lines indicate the first year of the migration
shock. The generalized synthetic control method is employed to estimate the effects. The shaded
area shows the 95% confidence intervals, calculated using the parametric bootstrap of the GSC.
For better precision, the regressions are weighted by gross provincial product.
Plotting the time pattern of the treatment effect presents a more transparent
picture and enables us to assess the parallel trends assumption. The figure 2.8
shows the GSC estimates for the evolution of the percentage change in the new
residential dwelling unit permits. New dwelling unit permits in the treated regions
have increased and remained higher than the counterfactual during the entire post-
migration-wave period. The sustained increase is reassuring since the migrant
flow from Syria is not a one-shot event, as shown in figure 2.1.
One possible concern is that the rise in the new building permits only means
that the government has allowed entrepreneurs to build on the designated lot, it
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does not indicate whether buildings are erected on the site. In the appendix, figure
B.3 confirms that the buildings are constructed and ready to be occupied. The
number of occupancy permits in dwelling units rises by 33% in 2014, and 42% in
2015.34
2.5.3 Effects on new firm establishments
Another channel through which we observe the labor demand effect of the mi-
gration is the new company establishments. Migration-induced regional demand
attracts capital and leads to increased new company formation, both of which cre-
ate new employment opportunities (Baptista, Escária and Madruga, 2008; Kara-
hasan, 2015; Van Stel and Suddle, 2008). Moreover, migrants themselves might
start new businesses.
34According to our estimates, the direct effect appears to partly disappear in the long run. Similar
pattern is also observed in Howard (2017) (see figure 8 in his paper), though he concludes that
migration-induced housing demand boom is an accelerator, hence has long-term effects.
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Table 2.6. Impact of Syrian migrants on new company establishments
Number of Firms Start-up Capital
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: DiD
βˆ 0.362 0.265 0.521 0.449
Clustered se (0.093) (0.063) (0.102) (0.078)
C.R. p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
# Clusters 67 67 67 67
# Treated clusters 5 5 5 5
Observations 469 469 402 402
Panel B: Alternative model, OLS
βˆ 0.337 0.278 0.500 0.464
Clustered se (0.099) (0.094) (0.130) (0.128)
C.R. p-value 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.000
# Clusters 81 81 81 81
Observations 567 567 486 486
Panel C: 2SLS
βˆ 0.240 0.207 0.561 0.540
Clustered SE (0.101) (0.111) (0.203) (0.210)
C.R. p-value 0.020 0.066 0.007 0.012
SW F-test; lin. term 8.772 8.772 8.770 8.770
SW F-test; quad. term 7.458 7.458 7.456 7.456
# Clusters 81 81 81 81
# Treated clusters
Observations 567 567 486 486
Syrian share excluded : Y Y
Notes. The table reports the percentage change in the new company
establishments, and real start-up capital invested in the treated re-
gions after the migration shock, using province-by-year aggregated
2009-2015 and 2010-2015 TOBB firm statistics. The dependent vari-
ables are log-transformed number of new company establishments, and
log-transformed real start-up capital invested. The second and fourth
columns exclude companies with at least one Syrian co-founder, and
the Syrian capital. Panels A, B, and C employ the DiD, the alternative
model specification, and the 2SLS to estimate the effects, respectively.
Standard errors clustered at province level, and the corresponding p-
values are reported for the precision and the inference. Panel C reports
the Sanderson-Windmeijer first-stage F-statistics.
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Table 2.6 documents the increase in new company establishments as a result
of the Syrian migration.35 The first two columns report the percentage change in
the number of new company establishments; while the last two columns the total
start-up capital invested. If migrant capital crowded out other capitals, then the
increase in the number of new companies would be at the expense of non-Syrian
entrepreneurs. To examine this possibility, we exclude all the companies with at
least one Syrian founders, and all capital invested by Syrians in columns 2 and 4.
The short time span of the data before 2012 prevents us from employing the GSC
model.
According to the DiD model, the number of new company establishments has
increased by 36.2% due to the migration shock. The second column shows that
it is not only Syrian entrepreneurs that enjoyed the better economic environment.
The number of new company establishments with no Syrian founders has also
risen by 26.5%. The corresponding estimates are larger when we focus on the total
initial capital invested in columns 3 and 4 (52.1% when start-up capital invested
by entrepreneurs of all nationalities are included, and 45% when we exclude the
Syrian share). The alternative models, OLS and 2SLS, in panels B and C indicate
similarly sized and statistically significant positive effects of the migration.36
The difference between columns 1 and 2 (or 3 and 4) implies that Syrian mi-
grants played a direct role in boosting the firm formation. Figure 2.9 presents the
evolution of the total number of companies with Syrian founders (top graphs), and
the initial capital invested in 2010 TL by Syrian nationals (bottom graphs). The
35The data on new company establishments is at province level; hence the few clusters issue does
not arise in this case. In addition, there are no zero values in the new company establishments data,
so we log-transform the dependent variables and do not approximate using equation 2.7.
36The 2SLS regressions include the linear and quadratic terms of the Syrian guest intensity vari-
able. The p-values corresponding to the Hansen’s J statistics of each of the regressions are greater
than 0.1, leading us to accept the null hypothesis of no over-identification. LIML estimates of
columns 1-4 are 0.23, 0.21, 0.56 and 0.54.
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Figure 2.9. Progression of Syrian capital in Turkey
Panel A: Syrian (co-)founded firms
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Panel B: Initial capital invested by Syrians
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Notes: The graphs plot the evolution of the number of companies founded, and the real initial
capital invested by Syrian nationals, using new firm statistics from TOBB. The vertical dash lines
indicate the first year of the migration shock. The figures on the left-hand side display the
absolute number of Syrian firms or the total start-up capital investment (in 2010 TL) by Syrians;
whereas those on the right-hand side show the Syrian shares out of total number of new
companies (co-)founded by foreign investors, or out of total foreign start-up capital investments.
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left-hand side graphs report the absolute numbers and the right-hand side ones
the shares out of all non-native start-ups.
First, all graphs point to a massive increase in the Syrian business creation. In
2010, the total number of new companies with Syrian founders was virtually zero.
It is 1,599 in 2015. While the Syrian share in total number of new companies with
foreign founders was 2.3% in 2010; it is 32% in 2015. Examining the start-up capital
invested by Syrian nationals displays a similar pattern. In 2010, the total start-up
capital invested by Syrians in Turkey was 7.93 million TL. This corresponds to 1.3%
of all initial capital investments by foreign entrepreneurs. In 2015, the Syrian share
in total foreign start-up capital is 22.9% and its outstanding amount reaches to
159.9 million TL (in 2010 TL). Lastly, we also note that Syrian-non Syrian partner-
ships have increased with the migration. From 2010 to 2015, the total initial capital
investment by non-Syrian partners in Syrian co-founded firms rose from 2,067,780
TL to 14,023,571 TL (in 2010 TL). We also note the similarity of the graphs with fig-
ure 2.1. Increase in total number of Syrians is highly correlated to the total number
of firms founded by Syrians. More Syrian migrants in Turkey has translated into
more Syrian companies in Turkey (Akgündüz, Van den Berg and Hassink, 2015a).
Syrian wealth and purchasing power have created a fruitful environment for
entrepreneurs in Turkey. Even in the short-run, capital is attracted to regions with
high Syrian density. The migrants boost the local demand and the rise urges en-
trepreneurs to invest more (dlnK > 0). Syrians themselves are also among the
entrepreneurs that benefited from it.
2.6 Discussion
In this section, we discuss whether the predictions of the canonical model co-
incide with the empirical estimates. We show that the model that assumes perfect
substitution between migrant and native workers overpredicts the native LTHS
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wage decline even if capital is assumed to fully adjust . Allowing for the native-
migrant complementarity decreases the discrepancy between empirical estimates
and theoretical predictions, yet it is not sufficient either. Based on our findings
on the effects on residential building and new firm formation, we suggest that
the technology parameter (A), the distribution parameter between low-skilled and
high-skilled workers (θ), and the capital intensity parameter (α) of the canonical
accounting framework are also affected by the migration.
Imperfect substitution between native and migrant workers
To calculate the theoretical predictions, we need elasticities of substitution be-
tween LTHS and HSG workers, and between native and migrant workers.
We cannot directly calculate the elasticity of substitution between low-skilled
migrants and natives (σLL,NLL,I ) because we only have data on migrants’ residence,
and no data on their wage and place-of-work-by-education. Instead, we devise
an algorithm that searches σLL,NLL,I by employing the canonical accounting frame-
work, the wage and employment estimates for native workers, and elasticity of
substitution between LTHS and HSG workers (σLH ,LL) for given number of LTHS
and HSG-equivalent migrant workers in the treated regions.37 Specifically, the
search employs our baseline wage and (composite) employment changes in the
treated regions, and search for σLL,NLL,I that allow us to obtain the empirically esti-
mated elasticity of substitution between LTHS and HSG workers.
We can estimate the elasticity of substitution between LTHS and HSG workers
at national-level by employing a standard Katz and Murphy (1992) type of regres-
37We differentiate “HSG migrant worker” and “HSG-equivalent migrant worker”. The latter
considers skill downgrading of the migrant workers.
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sion equation using the 2004-2011 TURKSTAT LFS.38 The regression equation is as
follows;
ln(
wLH,N
wLL,N
)t = ln(
1− θ
θ
)t − 1
σLH ,LL
∗ ln(LH
LL
)t. (2.14)
The coefficient of interest is 1σLH ,LL
. The first term in the right hand side of the
equation 2.14 is a linear time trend to capture the relative demand shifts.
The estimation yields ln(
wLH,N
wLL,N
)t = 0.031 (0.004) ∗ year− 0.679 (0.155) ∗ ln( LHLL )t +
constant. Then, the implied elasticity of substitution between LTHS and HSG
workers is σˆLL ,LH = 1.473. It is similar to the ones commonly estimated in the
literature (Card, 2009), despite the fact that we alter the definition of high-skilled
workers to include high school graduates in order to account for the education
distribution of Turkish workforce .
Having obtained σˆLL ,LH = 1.473, we can search for the elasticity of substitution
between LTHS native and migrant workers using the estimated employment and
wage changes in the treated regions compared to the controls. In other words, we
aim to obtain σLL,ILL,N (and δL, since σLL,I ,LL,N =
1
1−δL ) that satisfy the reduced form
wage estimates and the σˆLL ,LH at the same time. Mathematically, the formula we
employ is;
%∆wLH,N −%∆wLL,N = (γ− δH)×%∆LH − (γ− δL)×%∆LL, (2.15)
where %∆LL and %∆LH stand for percentage change in LL and LH, calculated
according to equation 2.4.
The search requires assumptions on i) the place-of-work-by-education distribu-
tion of the migrants to obtain changes in LL and LH in the treated regions, and ii)
relative shares of native and migrant workers (ω). Moreover, its validity requires
38We leave out the migration period from the analysis. Running the same regression for 2004-
2015 period with the assumptions and estimates below yields essentially the same estimates and
has no qualitative effect on the results.
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similarity of σLL ,LH at the national-level and underlying σLL ,LH for the treated re-
gions. We acknowledge that these are relatively strong assumptions, hence the
results should be considered as a set of possible scenarios.
We compare 2011 and 2015 estimates for the calculation, since there is essen-
tially no guests in 2011 and we have reliable data for the 2015 province level dis-
tribution of Syrian forced migrants.39 Guided by the previous studies (Ottaviano
and Peri, 2012), we assume the elasticity of substitution between HSG-equivalent
native and migrant workers,σLH,I ,LH,N to be high. We set σLH,I ,LH,N = 33. Assuming
that ω = 0.5 (according to the framework in section 2), table 2.7 produces implied
elasticities of substitution between LTHS and HSG labor for alternative values of
total employed LTHS and HSG-equivalent migrants in the treated regions.
39Total LTHS (HSG) employment is 1,463,343 (571,664) in the treated regions in 2011. Between
2011 and 2015, the estimated percentage changes in the average wages (employment) of native
HSG, and LTHS workers are 9% and -0.9% (5.7% and 3.5%).
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We pick bounds for the number of LTHS migrant workers (200,000 and 225,000),
HSG-equivalent migrant workers (0 and 2,000). 200,000 LTHS migrant workers
correspond to 13.7% (13.3%) of the native LTHS workers in 2011 (2015) in the
treated regions. Although the employment rate of migrants is lower than natives,
the ratio of LTHS to HSG individuals is larger for migrants. Hence, we expect the
ratio of the LTHS migrant workers to LTHS native workers to be slightly less than
the population ratio (15.1%). We can also reach the similar number for LTHS mi-
grant workers in the treated regions if we use the residency information as a proxy
for province-level employment distribution of Syrian migrants. Given that the to-
tal number of employed migrants is roughly 400,000, and slightly more than 50%
of the migrants reside in the treated regions, we again obtain 200,000 LTHS mi-
grant workers. Making conjectures on the number of HSG-equivalent employed
migrants in the treated regions is relatively more challenging. Although their
employment-rate might be larger than LTHS migrants, they suffer from skill down-
grading. They cannot work formally, and almost all of them are non-Turkophone.
In addition, they are likely to migrate to large cities, such as Istanbul and Izmir,
that provide more diverse employment opportunities. Hence, we expect the mi-
grant HSG-equivalent workers in the treated regions to be very close to zero. We
also provide implied σLL ,LH for 225,000 LTHS and 2,000 HSG migrant workers.
According to the table 2.7, we obtain σLH ,LL = 1.473 when there is a modest elas-
ticity of substitution between migrant and native LTHS workers (the exact range
for implied σLL ,LH is between 5.75 (row 2) and 16.13 (row 3)). This is largely com-
patible with the ones reported in Manacorda, Manning and Wadsworth (2012) for
the U.K. (5 for recent immigrants), and in Ottaviano and Peri (2012) for the U.S. (11
for low-skilled workers).40
40This implies that we could search for the number of HSG-equivalent and LTHS migrant work-
ers using the wage and employment estimates for native workers, σˆLL ,LH = 1.473, and the estimated
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By construction, implied σLL,NLL,I values for given numbers of LTHS and HSG-
equivalent migrant workers satisfy the relative wage estimates. Another poten-
tially revealing question is whether solely relaxing the perfect substitution be-
tween migrant and native workers is sufficient to obtain the reduced form wage
estimates. Specifically, do we obtain LTHS wage decline of 0.9% for the year 2015
compared to 2011, when we plug in σˆLL,NLL,I , σˆLH ,LL to the equation 2.2, and assume
that capital-labor ratio returns back to its original level (dln(K) = dln(L)) ?
The canonical model that assumes perfect substitution between natives and mi-
grants predicts the average native LTHS wage to decline by 3.6% for the mid-point
of the cases (212,500 LTHS and 1,000 HSG-equivalent migrant workers). Relax-
ing the perfect substitution assumption, the decrease becomes 3.2% for σLL,N ,LL,I =
16.13, and 2% for σLL,N ,LL,I = 5.75. When we assume 200,000 LTHS and 2,000 HSG-
equivalent migrant workers to predict the lower bound for the wage decline, we
obtain %∆wLL,N = −3.2% for σLL,NLL,I = ∞; and %∆wLL,N = −1.7 for σLL,NLL,I = 5.75.
Although we have assumed perfect capital adjustment, all the predicted changes
overestimate the decline. This implies that, for the canonical nested CES model,
migration alters some of the parameters that are assumed to be unrelated with it.
Productivity and LTHS share effects of the migration
Peri (2012) proposes that immigration positively affects total factor productiv-
ity (A) and the parameter that determines distribution between low-skilled and
high-skilled workers (θ). He argues that the effects are partly due to efficient
specialization of immigrants and natives in different task-intensive occupations
(dlnA > 0), and the productivity gains are concentrated among (or biased to-
elasticities of substitution between migrant and native workers estimated in the literature. Unless
perfect substitution between native and migrant workers is assumed, the search yields 200,000-
225,000 LTHS, and 0-2,000 HSG migrant workers. To obtain σLL,NLL,I = 50, we would need to
assume 240,000 LTHS and 0 HSG-equivalent migrant workers in the treated regions.
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wards) low-skilled workers (dlnθ > 0). In addition, Clemens, Lewis and Postel
(2018) notes that restrictions on immigration lead employers to adopt capital in-
tensive production techniques (implying dlnα > 0 in our case). Based on our
empirical findings, we add two more channels that complement the arguments in
explaining changes in A, θ, and α. They are (i) migration-induced increased new
firm formation; and (ii) the rise in housing demand.
First, the positive relationship between rise in start-up rates and the productiv-
ity growth is well documented (Decker et al., 2014). A recent study by Alon et al.
(2017) argues that younger firms are the locomotive of the productivity growth
for two main reasons: Low productivity young firms lose their market share very
quickly to the high productivity ones (re-allocation), and they exit the market (se-
lection). They find that, in the long-run, 1 percentage point increase in start-up
rate leads state-level productivity to rise by 1.7% in the U.S (see Table 2 column 4
in their paper).
The estimates are for the U.S., and size of the effect possibly varies across coun-
tries. However, qualitative findings potentially hold for Turkey as well. If the
true estimate for the treated regions were similar, we could directly quantify the
long-run effect of the migration on the factor neutral technology parameter (A).
The Ministry of Customs and Trade (2014) reports that the start-up rate in Turkey
is approximately 4.2%. Then, as long as the start-up rate in the treated regions
is similar to the rest of the country, the most conservative estimate for the rise in
company formation in table 2.6 (0.238) would yield that the productivity would
rise by 1.7% in the treated regions in the long-run.41
Second, migration-induced housing demand might alter the regional produc-
tion function, affect sectoral composition and relative demand for low-skilled la-
411 percentage-point increase from 4.2% to 5.2% corresponds to 23.8% increase, virtually the same
as the smallest estimate in column 1 of table 2.6 (0.238).
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bor in the treated regions. The construction industry is a sizable and relatively
low-skilled labor intensive. In 2011, the industry employed 9.8% of all LTHS wage
workers. 78.9% of all construction workers do not have a high school degree. The
numbers are even higher (10.1% and 85.8%, respectively) when we limit the sam-
ple to the treated regions. Comparing the latter number with the share of LTHS
wage workers in Turkey (in the treated regions), 50.6% (61.46%), reveals that the
relative demand for the low-skilled workers increases with the migration. This is
potentially another channel that pushes native LTHS wages upwards after the mi-
gration (dlnθ > 0).Additionally, if the construction industry in the treated regions
employs a technology that is relatively less capital-intensive, then the migration
may alter the capital intensity of the regional production function (dlnα > 0).42
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the impact of more than 2.5 million Syrian migrants on
host local economies in Turkey. We begin with its employment and wage effects
on the native workers. We find no robust evidence of an employment decline for
the demographic group that is expected to be adversely affected the most (indi-
viduals with no high school diploma), nor for the informal employment. In terms
of the wage effects, we find some evidence indicating that the wages of informally
employed natives have declined by more than 10%. However, a similarly sized
effect does not occur for the native less than high school (LTHS) workers thanks
to a rise in formal employment share of the group. The minimum wage is bind-
ing for formally employed workers, hence some workers who would otherwise
42An alternative explanation for the absence of an adverse effect on the native workforce might
be the government intervention. The Turkish government might artificially boost the demand in
the treated regions in order to alleviate the adverse effects on the native workers. Our examination
in the Appendix suggests that the government intervention alone cannot explain the migration-
induced demand boost.
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have earned less than it have become minimum wage workers. On the other hand,
workers with at least high school degree (HSG) have benefited from the shock.
Their wages have, on average, increased by 5.7%.
The non-finding of an adverse effect in the short-run even after such a large
inflow of migrants requires an explanation. According to the descriptive demand-
supply framework, there must occur a labor demand shift, along with the labor
supply shift, so that migration has no effect on native employment and wages.
We use two indicators for the positive demand shock specifically germane to the
case of Turkey; the number of new residential dwelling units and the number of
new company establishments. Compared to the counterfactual case, the former
has increased by 34%, and the latter by more than 24% in the host regions after
the migration. Given that the construction industry is relatively low-skilled la-
bor intensive, it can partly absorb the shock. Additionally, the rise in new firms
suggests a general increase in job creation. Furthermore, Syrian migrants also co-
found new firms and directly employ people. New companies with at least one
Syrian co-founder was fewer than 100 in 2011, whereas it was 1,599 in 2015.
The analysis on immigration has focused on its impacts on the labor supply
partly at the expense of the other effects. According to the canonical model, in the
short-run, the only affected parameter is total labor supply (L in equation 1a, and
LL and LH in equation 1b); whereas capital (K in equation 1a) adjusts in the long-
run. Our findings suggest that even when we assume capital to be fully adjusted,
the canonical model severely overpredicts the wage decline. The predictions ap-
proach to the empirical findings when we introduce imperfect substitutability be-
tween migrant and native workers, yet it is not sufficient either. Other parameters
of the framework need to change as well. We argue that migrant-induced boost in
the new firm formation potentially increases the productivity and pulls all native
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wages upwards. Additionally, the boost in the residential construction industry
might alter the regional production function in favor of low-skilled workers.
One of the main policy questions related to immigration is whether native
workers are adversely affected. We show that the affirmative answer to the ques-
tion is not empirically warranted in the case of Turkey. Nonetheless, two main
characteristics of the current case raise potential questions. The first one is re-
lated to the informality of the migrants: What if the migrants had work permits?
It might be argued that the migrants with work permits would substantially in-
crease the intensity of the shock up to a point that native workers are adversely
affected. Nevertheless, the government enforcement for formal employment is
relatively weak in general, and in the host regions in particular as shown in table
2.2. The relatively high informality rate suggests that not having a work permit
might not have substantially deterred Syrian guests from competing for jobs. In
other words, we conjecture that granting work permits to Syrians would likely not
considerably change their effect on native workforce. Second, Turkey is a semi-
industrialized developing country. Would the increase in supply of low-skilled
workers alter technologies in industries, and potentially the development path of
the country? As we mention in the discussion section, our results suggest some
alterations in the regional production functions at least during the first couple of
years of intense migration from Syria. Providing definite answers to the questions
is beyond the scope of the paper, and presents a program for the future research.
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CHAPTER 3
WHEN DOES THE PRIVATIZATION PROCESS BEGIN?
TOTAL EFFECTS OF PRIVATIZATION IN TURKEY
3.1 Introduction
Systematically selling public assets to private agents is a marking feature of the
post-1980s world. The privatization has been supported by international organiza-
tions, such as IMF and World Bank, and opposed by left-wing parties and unions
(Brune, Garrett and Kogut, 2004; Shirley and Walsh, 2000). Generally, scholars
have argued that empirical evidence supports that the privatization has raised real
sales (output) without reducing employment substantially, hence it brings about
important social benefits (Bortolotti and Milella, 2008). Governments of both de-
veloped and developing countries have initiated privatization programs, and by
the 2000s, the privatization was a global phenomenon.
In this paper, using 1993-2015 TOP 500 manufacturing firms of Turkey data pre-
pared by Istanbul Chamber of Industry, we examine impacts of the privatization
process as a whole on privatized Turkish firms, by focusing on the effects on em-
ployment, real sales, and profit margin. The paper makes two main contributions
to the literature: First, thanks to the institutional and legal framework of the pri-
vatization in Turkey, we empirically assess the pre-sale restructuring by showing
changes in employment, real sales and profit margins of publicly owned enter-
prises (POE) after the government decides to sell it. Second, exploiting the long
time dimension of the data (23 years), we show long-run firm-level effects of the
privatization on the aforementioned variables. This enables us to directly test the
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scholars’ main argument on the socially beneficial effects of the privatization as
well as to document its potential distributional consequences.
Overall, the findings reveal that the employment and real sales decline by 28%
and 30% with the privatization decision before the firm is sold to private agents.
Even though it is still owned by the government, the firm shrinks in terms of real
sales and employment once it is included in the privatization program. This indi-
cates a change in the objectives of the firm. Armed with this knowledge, we build
our empirical model that compares actual privatized firms with the counterfac-
tuals that were never included in the privatization program. We show that after
the sale of the firm, the real sales recover, yet the workforce declines even further.
Our baseline estimates indicate that the privatization has resulted in 65% decline
in firm level workforce, 18% rise in the profit-margin, and statistically no change in
real sales, in the long-run. Thus, the argued social benefits of the privatization are
not realized in Turkey. On the contrary, the privatization has resulted in an income
transfer from the wage-earners to profit-earners.
Disregarding the pre-sale restructuring implies that the government makes no
alteration before the sale. We show the invalidity of the assumption, and the size
of the bias it causes. The size might be particularly large when only couple of pre-
sale years are observed. In these cases, the estimated rise in real sales is larger and
the fall in employment is smaller than the truth. Specifically, when only 3 pre-sale
years are observed, more than 30% of the employment decline is missed by the
regressions; while the real sales is estimated to rise by 24%. This causes the social
benefits of the privatization to be incorrectly overestimated.
There is a large literature on the firm-level effects of the privatization.1 Ar-
guably, the most popular approach, employed in Naceur, Ghazouani and Omran
1Some of the reviews are provided by Megginson and Netter (2001), Mühlenkamp (2015), and
Parker and Kirkpatrick (2005).
128
(2007), Boubakri and Cosset (1998), Chen et al. (2017), Dewenter and Malatesta
(2001), La Porta and Lopez-de Silanes (1999), Okten and Arin (2006), Villalonga
(2000), is comparing pre- and post-sale averages of the variables of interest. Al-
though La Porta and Lopez-de Silanes (1999) and Dewenter and Malatesta (2001)
note that significant changes occur before the date of sale, the studies pick the date
of sale for the first year of the privatization process. This paper improves upon
these studies by explicitly addressing the pre-sale restructuring. In addition, to es-
tablish causality, we utilize a range of specifications to control for industry trends,
and assess whether the control sample is valid by examining pre-existing trends.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 briefly describes the privatization
process in Turkey and the data. Section 3 presents empirical results and discusses
them. Section 4 concludes.
3.2 Privatization in Turkey and the Data
Most of the countries have launched large-scale privatization programs and
gathered revenues from them in 1990s. Turkey’s privatization revenue, on the
other hand, has remained low compared to the size of its public sector until 2000s
(Atiyas, 2009). The large-scale privatizations take place in the 2000s. However,
the privatization has entered the political agenda in 1984 (Okten and Arin, 2006).
The Housing Public Participation Council (HPPC) was founded in 1984, and au-
thorized to making privatization-related decisions. The HPPC collects and ana-
lyzes data on firms when they are included into the privatization program, and
the firm’s assets are transferred to the HPPC. In other words, once a POE is de-
cided to be privatized, its assets are transferred to some other entity within the
government. Between 1984 and 1994, due to legal gaps and court overrulings,
various councils and administrations with privatization-related decision-making
authorization, similar to the HPPC, are founded and abolished. In 1994, still sur-
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viving Privatization Administration (PA) is established (for a thorough examina-
tion on institutional and legal framework of privatization in Turkey, see Güran
2011). Thanks to these institutions, we have information on the exact date for the
start of the privatization process: the year when the firm’s assets are transferred to
the PA.2 Block sales are the most common privatization method in Turkey (Naceur,
Ghazouani and Omran, 2007; Atiyas, 2009).
2For brevity, henceforth we call all the councils and administrations as Privatization Adminis-
tration, even if Privatization Administration does not exist in the particular year.
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Table 3.1. Dates of Asset Transfer to PA and of Privatization
Company Industry
Privatization
Administra-
tion
Privatization
Asil Celik
Basic Metal
Industry (Steel
Production)
1998 2000
Erdemir
Basic Metal
Industry (Steel
Production)
1987 2006
Eti
Aluminyum
Basic Metal
Industry
(Aluminum
Production)
2003 2005
Gemlik
Gubre
Manufacture of
Industrial
Chemicals
(Fertilizer)
2000 2004
IGSAS
Manufacture of
Industrial
Chemicals
(Fertilizer)
2002 2004
Iskenderun
Demir-Celik
Basic Metal
Industry (Steel
Production)
1998 2002
PETKIM
Manufacture of
Industrial
Chemicals
(Petro-
chemical)
1987 2008
PETLAS Manufacture ofTires 1990 1997
Petrol Ofisi
Manufacture of
Industrial
Chemicals
(Petroleum)
1998 2000
TUPRAS PetroleumRefinery 1990 2005
Notes: The dates of asset transfer to PA and privatization are gathered from Privatization Administration website. The
former date indicates the starting date of the pre-privatization restructuring. The last column indicates the year the firm is
privatized.
The primary database used in this paper is 1993-2015 TOP 500 manufacturing
firms (in terms of sales) of Turkey, prepared by Istanbul Chamber of Industry (ICI).
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It contains information on employment, sales, pre-tax profits, and value added of
the largest manufacturing firms in Turkey on a yearly basis. The dates of privati-
zation and of the asset transfer to PA, and the government’s share before and after
the privatization are from Privatization Administration database. These dates and
the privatized firms are reported in Table 3.1. Unlike sources that rely on stock
exchange databases, such as Compustat (Global Vintage), one of the greatest ad-
vantages of the ICI dataset is that we observe public firms that are not considered
for privatization. Put differently, we possess information on the performances of
the POEs that are entirely government owned and are not to be privatized, and the
pre-privatization-process information of the privatized firms. Furthermore, the
surviving firms report over a 23-year period, hence the data allows us to better
assess the validity of the comparison sample based on the existence of the pre-
existing trends as well as the long-term effects of the privatization.
On the other hand, we only observe the largest firms in Turkey. Although all
privatized firms, and large private and public firms are always among the top
500, the selection causes shrinking (rising) firms to disappear from (appear in) the
data. To alleviate the problem, first, we employ the second largest 500 manufactur-
ing firm dataset for some of the missing firm-years as well as the stock exchange
database when available. Second, to decrease measurement error and to obtain the
comparison sample of firms similar to the privatized firms, we exclude firms that
are observed for fewer than 10 years.
The constructed dataset contains 171 firms, where 154 (7) of them are private
(public) throughout the period analyzed and 10 are privatized. All the 10 firms
have been transferred to the PA before they are sold, 4 of them were already owned
by the PA in 1993. All the firms transferred to the PA are privatized eventually.
Although 10 firms might appear a relatively small “treated” number of firms,
this sample is arguably representative of the Turkish privatization experience. Ac-
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cording to the Privatization Administration database, until 2015, the block sale rev-
enues from all the 10 privatized firms in Turkey amount to $10.9 billion; whereas
total block sale revenues of all privatized Turkish non-financial firms is $21.6 bil-
lion. Additionally, the privatized firms in the sample are all controlled by the gov-
ernment before the privatization process, and it loses the control with the sale. On
average, in the year of the privatization, the public share of the privatized firms
in our sample decreases from 85% to 5%. Three years after the privatization, this
number is merely 1.25%.
Table 3.2. Summary Statistics
Mean Median Standard Deviation
Log of employment
Private 6.493049 6.463029 0.945102
Public 8.125639 8.28223 1.201592
Privatized (before sale) 7.897181 8.361942 1.015378
Privatized (after sale) 7.356836 7.157342 1.017719
Log of real sales per employee (in 2010 TL)
Private 8.082854 8.123257 0.728408
Public 6.814559 6.742146 0.7558534
Privatized (before sale) 7.953611 7.773273 1.090156
Privatized (after sale) 8.639857 8.369403 1.504467
Log of real sales (in 2010 TL)
Private 14.56349 14.47167 0.9843518
Public 14.91457 15.23147 1.168878
Privatized (before sale) 15.85079 16.05145 1.628488
Privatized (after sale) 15.91795 15.00904 1.837152
Profit margin
Private 0.0859068 0.061497 0.1343623
Public 0.092303 0.0185243 0.3136473
Privatized (before sale) -0.0332725 0.0290445 0.2931016
Privatized (after sale) 0.0878714 0.0598835 0.1388922
Notes: ICI’s 1993-2015 Top 500 Manufacturing Firms database is used. The sample includes 10 privatized, 154 private and 7
public firms.
Table 3.2 reports the means, medians, and standard deviations of the public
firms, private firms, privatized firms before the sale, and privatized firms after the
sale. It shows that public firms are slightly larger than private firms in terms of
133
sales, yet they employ substantially more workers. Although the mean value of
the profit margin (pre-tax profit divided by sales) of the public firms is slightly
larger than the private firms, the median value is considerably larger for the latter
ones. In all these respects, the privatized firms are relatively similar to the public
ones before the sale, and to the private ones after the sale.
3.3 Empirical Methodology, Findings, Discussion
3.3.1 Empirical Implementation
To assess the changes during the pre-sale restructuring, pre-existing trends as
well as the effects of the privatization, we initially employ the following model;
Yi,t = β1 ∗ PrePAi,t + β2 ∗ PAi,t +
K=8
∑
k=0
β3,k ∗ DOSi,t+k + λi + µt + ei,t. (3.1)
i indicates the firm and t year. Yi,t is the log of total workforce of the firm, log
of real sales per employee, log of real sales, or pre-tax profit per sales in Turkish
Lira.3 We place all public and private firms in the comparison sample following
La Porta and Lopez-de Silanes (1999) and Goldstein (2006). We set the year before
the privatized firm’s assets are transferred to the PA as the reference to assess the
pre-existing trends. Therefore, PrePA, PA, and DOS variables are always 0 for non-
privatized firms (public or private throughout the sample period). PrePA takes on
the value of 1 when the privatized firm is not considered for privatization, except
for the year before the firm’s assets are transferred to the PA, it is 0. PA is a binary
variable that is 1 when the firm’s assets are owned by the PA, and 0 otherwise.4
DOSi,t+k is an indicator variable for k years after the date of sale. k ranges from 0
3Following the literature (e.g. Megginson, Nash and Randenborgh (1994); Naceur, Ghazouani
and Omran (2007)), we define “real sales” as the inflation-adjusted nominal sales.
4The number of PA period varies for the privatized firms, so we pool them.
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to K = 8, to estimate annual changes in the first 9 years after the sale. λi and µt are
firm and year fixed effects.
This specification requires information on at least three exclusive periods of
the privatized firms: (i) pre-PA period when the firm is not included in the pri-
vatization program; (ii) PA period when it is owned by the government, and is
considered for privatization; (iii) the period when the firm is sold to the private
owners. 4 of the 10 privatized firms in our sample were already owned by the PA
in 1993, hence the regression equation 3.1 is estimable only for 6 of the privatized
firms.5 In other words, equation 3.1 does not allow us to employ all the privatized
firms in our sample, and we use only 6 of them in this analysis. Finally, to prevent
late-privatized firms from having a considerable influence over the estimation of
β1 and early privatized firms from being included in the comparison sample, we
construct a window that includes only the observations between the first 5 years
before the firms’ assets are transferred to the PA and 9 years after the sale.
5For the 4 firms, in addition to the firm fixed effects, either PrePA or PA or DOS variables take
the value of 1 in each year. This is a standard “dummy variable trap” that prevents estimation
of/controlling for all four variables simultaneously.
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Figure 3.1. Time Paths of Log of Employment, of Real Sales, of Real Sales per
Employee and Value Added per Sales
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Notes: The figure depicts time paths of the privatized firms’ log of employment, log of real sales,
log of real sales per employee, and value added per sales. All estimates are relative to the year
before the PA (PA−1,) hence it is set to 0. Pre− PA and PA periods are composed of multiple
years, and the average estimates are reported. DOS0 to DOS8 estimates indicate 0 to 8 years after
the date of sale of the firm. The straight line indicates the point, and the shaded area the 95%
confidence interval estimates.
Figure 3.1 visually displays the changes in the log employment, log real sales
per capita, log real sales, and profit margins relative to the year before the firms’
assets are transferred to the PA. There are 7 important points related to the fig-
ure that we wish to emphasize: First, it confirms our claim that the privatization
process begins before the firm is sold. Compared to the pre-PA years, employ-
ment and real sales of the firms decrease by 28% and 30% during the PA years. It
implies that the government shrinks the firm for the privatization. Second, the em-
ployment further declines rapidly in the first couple of years of the privatization
and remains depressed in the long-run. Third, the decline in the real sales is re-
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versed after the firm is sold to its private owners and is essentially the same as the
counterfactual firm that has never privatized. Fourth, as an outcome of the second
and third points, the real sales per employee, though remains virtually unchanged
during the PA period, increases rapidly after the privatization. Fifth, the profit
margin rises after the privatization. Sixth, we do not observe a pre-existing trend
that would violate the parallel trends assumption of the regression equation 3.1
for any of the variables; suggesting our identifying assumption; namely, the coun-
terfactuals of the privatized firms would follow a path similar to our comparison
sample after controlling for macroeconomic shocks. Seventh, the firm undergoes
post-sale restructuring. Especially real sales levels of the privatized firms change
rapidly in the first couple of years after the firm is sold to its private owners. In
all cases, however, the graphs display that firms, on average, reach their long-run
path after the 4th year of the sale.
Quantifying the effects of the privatization as a whole
Based on the observations from Figure 3.1, we divide the post-sale period into
two: POST1[0, 3] (POST2[4, 8]) is 1 from the first (5th) until the end of the 4th (9th)
year after the sale for the privatized firms. Otherwise, it takes on the value of 0. To
quantify the total effects of the privatization, we exclude the observations when the
privatized firm is owned by the PA and employ the following benchmark model;
Yi,t = β1 ∗ POST1[0, 3]i,t + β2 ∗ POST2[4, 8]i,t + λi + µt + ei,t. (3.2)
Equation 3.2 is intuitively very similar to the equation 3.1. The exclusion of
the PA period guarantees that the comparison is between the actual privatized
firm after the privatization and the counterfactual firm that never entered the pri-
vatization program. The main variable of interest is β2, captures the effects of the
privatization after the post-sale restructuring; whereas the average effect of the lat-
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ter is captured by β1. For better precision, equation 3.2 declares the entire Pre-PA
period as the reference and estimates only two variables for the post-sale period.
One major downside of the regression equations 3.1 and 3.2 is that we cannot
employ all the privatized firms in our sample to quantify the total effects of the
privatization, since some firms are already owned by the PA in 1993. Alternative
to these models, one can control for the firm-specific PA period trends linearly and
estimate the total effects of the privatization:
Yi,t = β1 ∗ POST1[0, 3]i,t + β2 ∗ POST2[4, 8]i,t + αi ∗ PAtrendi,t + λi + µt + ei,t. (3.3)
PAtrendi,t are firm-specific PA period trends that take on the value of j in the
jth year of the PA for firm i, and 0 otherwise.6 Regression equations 3.2 and 3.3
are our benchmark and alternative models. For robustness of the estimates, we
additionally (i) include two-digit ISIC rev.2 industry-specific trends (ii) control for
two-digit ISIC rev.2 industry specific period effects (iii) exclude the firms in the
same industry as privatized firm. The former two sets of controls allow industries
to follow alternative linear trends, and macroeconomic shocks to affect industries
differently. If the estimated effects are not due to change in ownership, but reflects
a general trend in the industry; linear trends or industry-by-year fixed effects elim-
inate the bias. Conversely, if we observe no effect in the baseline model; but sig-
nificant changes occur in the industry, these models reveal it. From an opposite
point of view, the sale of the POE may cause a spillover that affects all the firms
in the industry. The potential spillover effects render these firms invalid controls,
because they are also affected by the sale.
6There are 10 firms, so there are 10 firm-specific PA period trends. This specification extrapolates
using the PA Trends when pre-PA period is not observed. Hence, for the 4 firms whose assets are
transferred to the PA before 1993, the post-privatization averages are compared with hypothetical
pre-PA averages.
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Table 3.3. Total Effects of Privatization
Panel A: Log Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
POST1[0,3] -0.885*** -0.895*** -0.959*** -0.846*** -0.897*** -0.909*** -0.969*** -0.848***
-0.166 -0.166 -0.144 -0.169 -0.166 -0.167 -0.148 -0.167
POST2[4,8] -1.063*** -1.081*** -1.177*** -1.008*** -1.054*** -1.074*** -1.150*** -0.994***
-0.226 -0.226 -0.203 -0.228 -0.198 -0.199 -0.177 -0.201
Observations 3429 3429 3429 2225 3522 3522 3522 2318
Panel B: Log Sales per Employee
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
POST1[0,3] 0.624** 0.608** 0.647*** 0.635** 0.674*** 0.654*** 0.709*** 0.692***
-0.241 -0.241 -0.246 -0.243 -0.218 -0.218 -0.232 -0.22
POST2[4,8] 1.038*** 1.013*** 1.009*** 1.081*** 0.966*** 0.937*** 0.978*** 1.009***
-0.263 -0.263 -0.295 -0.267 -0.235 -0.235 -0.263 -0.239
Observations 3429 3429 3429 2225 3522 3522 3522 2318
Panel C: Log Sales
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
POST1[0,3] -0.262** -0.288*** -0.318** -0.210* -0.219** -0.251** -0.265* -0.149
-0.101 -0.102 -0.138 -0.107 -0.098 -0.099 -0.139 -0.103
POST2[4,8] -0.015 -0.058 -0.158 0.087 -0.088 -0.137 -0.177 0.017
-0.103 -0.103 -0.146 -0.115 -0.111 -0.114 -0.15 -0.121
Observations 3549 3549 3549 2289 3643 3643 3643 2383
Panel D: Profit Margin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
POST1[0,3] 0.111 0.112 0.111 0.111 0.104 0.105 0.104 0.107
-0.09 -0.09 -0.089 -0.09 -0.076 -0.076 -0.074 -0.076
POST2[4,8] 0.181** 0.183** 0.171** 0.184** 0.142* 0.144* 0.137* 0.145*
-0.087 -0.087 -0.085 -0.088 -0.076 -0.076 -0.074 -0.077
Observations 3450 3450 3450 2225 3543 3543 3543 2318
# Privatized Firms 6 6 6 6 10 10 10 10
Specification PA excl. PA excl. PA excl. PA excl. PA trends PA trends PA trends PA trends
Industry-Specific Trends No Yes No No No Yes No No
Industry-Year Effects No No Yes No No No Yes No
Same Industry Dropped No No No Yes No No No Yes
Notes: ICI’s 1993-2015 Top 500 Manufacturing Firms database is used. Panels A, B, C and D report firm-level log employ-
ment, log real sales per employee, log real sales, and profit-margin effects of privatization in the medium- and long-run
compared to the counterfactual case that the firm was never included in the privatization program. First four columns
drop PA period from the sample (equation 3.2). The last four columns employ alternative specification (equation 3.3). All
columns include firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors, clustered at firm-level, are in the parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p
< 0.05, *** p < 0.01
We only discuss the coefficient for POST2[4, 8], the long-run effects of the pri-
vatization, though we report the estimated medium-run effect as well. Panel A
of Table 3.3 reports the employment effects of the privatization. The benchmark
specification indicates a sizable and statistically significant employment decline of
1.06 log points in the long-run. This corresponds to 65% decline in the firm-level
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employment in the long-run due to the privatization.7 All specifications largely
agree with the benchmark specification on the size and the statistical significance
of the decline.
Panel B of Table 3.3 shows that log sales per employee has quickly increased
with the privatization. The absolute magnitudes of the estimates are almost the
same as those for the Panel A. The similarity suggests that the numerator (real
sales) has not changed, but the denominator (employment) has declined. This is
confirmed in Panel C of Table 3.3. None of the columns indicate a statistically
significant change in real sales. The estimated effects range between -18% and 9%,
depending largely on the importance of the firms in the same industry as controls.
When only within industry-variation is employed (the specification with industry-
by-year fixed effects in column 3), we obtain negative estimates; suggesting that,
on average, firms in the same industry as the privatized firm have been able to
increase their sales.8 The fact that the estimates are not statistically significant at
conventional levels, on the other hand, prevents us from rejecting the no-effect on
real sales hypothesis.
In panel D, we document the rise in the profit-margin, calculated as the ratio
of the pre-tax profit to the sales. The benchmark specification indicates 18% in-
crease after the date of sale. The range of the estimates is relatively small, between
0.14 and 0.18, and all of them are statistically significant at 10% level. One con-
cern related to the baseline regression equation might be that the control sample is
skewed in the sample selection, largely composed of private companies (154 of 171
firms are private throughout the sample period). In the Appendix , we address the
7Due to the size of the change, the percentage approximation of the log-transformation fails.
8Column 3 compares the privatized firms with other firms in the same industry. Column 4
compares the privatized firms with firms in other industries. Therefore, intuitively, the difference
in the estimated effects in columns 3 and 4 indicates the difference between two samples of control
firms. Hence, estimating no change in real sales in column 4 while column 3 finds negative effect
implies a real sales increase for the other firms in the same industry as the privatized firm.
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concern. First, we determine control firms for each of the 6 privatized firms based
on the pre-PA period sales averages. This limits the number of firms in the control
group, selects control firms that are arguably more similar to the privatized ones.
Second, using the 10 privatized firms, 7 public firms, and randomly selected 25
private firms, we re-estimate the equation (2) 5,000 times for each of the depen-
dent variables. Then, we plot the estimated coefficients and t-statistics for each of
the dependent variables. This explicitly decreases the importance of private firms
in the control sample. The exercises confirm the estimates presented in Table 3.3,
indicate that the main findings are obtained from alternative control samples.
Privatized Share
The way the date of sale is defined considerably affects the findings of the mod-
els, especially if partial privatizations are prevalent in the sample. This problem
is not particularly severe in our case, since Turkish government held 85% of the
firms’ shares before the date of sale, and sold virtually all of them in the first cou-
ple of years following the sale. However, to address the issue of partial privati-
zation, and as a robustness check, we replace the variable of interest in equations
3.2 and 3.3 with continuous privatized share variables. Keeping the same dates for
privatization, we can employ the following models;
Yi,t = β1 ∗ Privatized Share1[0, 3]i,t + β2 ∗ Privatized Share2[4, 8]i,t+
λi + µt + ei,t; (3.4)
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Yi,t = β1 ∗ Privatized Share1[0, 3]i,t + β2 ∗ Privatized Share2[4, 8]i,t+
αi ∗ PAtrendi,t + λi + µt + ei,t; (3.5)
Privatized Share variables range from 0 to 1. Similar to the previous model, we
divide post-sale period into two: Privatized Share1 (2) captures the effects in the
first 4 years of the sale (5th to 9th year after the sale). The privatized shares are
calculated as the difference between shares government owns in the year before
the privatization process begins and after the sale. To prevent PA period to con-
taminate the results, we are dropping it, or we control for it using firms-specific
PA trends. We also exclude all observations outside the time window constructed
earlier. The dependent variables we analyze are the log of employment, log of real
sales per employee, log of real sales, and profit margin in sales.
142
Table 3.4. Total Effects of Privatization; Privatized Share
Panel A: Log Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Privatized Share1 -0.927*** -0.938*** -1.008*** -0.885*** -0.946*** -0.959*** -1.016*** -0.894***
-0.195 -0.195 -0.177 -0.197 -0.192 -0.192 -0.177 -0.192
Privatized Share2 -1.076*** -1.095*** -1.194*** -1.020*** -1.086*** -1.107*** -1.178*** -1.024***
-0.223 -0.223 -0.203 -0.226 -0.203 -0.203 -0.186 -0.206
Observations 3429 3429 3429 2225 3522 3522 3522 2318
Panel B: Log Sales per Employee
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Privatized Share1 0.651** 0.635** 0.646** 0.663** 0.701*** 0.682*** 0.674*** 0.720***
-0.261 -0.261 -0.254 -0.265 -0.241 -0.241 -0.242 -0.245
Privatized Share2 1.056*** 1.031*** 0.991*** 1.097*** 0.989*** 0.959*** 0.913*** 1.027***
-0.258 -0.258 -0.275 -0.263 -0.24 -0.24 -0.256 -0.245
Observations 3429 3429 3429 2225 3522 3522 3522 2318
Panel C: Log Sales
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Privatized Share1 -0.277*** -0.304*** -0.367*** -0.220* -0.242** -0.275*** -0.346** -0.168
-0.103 -0.103 -0.13 -0.112 -0.101 -0.103 -0.133 -0.107
Privatized Share2 -0.011 -0.055 -0.195 0.09 -0.098 -0.148 -0.270* 0.005
-0.105 -0.105 -0.14 -0.115 -0.116 -0.119 -0.146 -0.125
Observations 3549 3549 3549 2289 3643 3643 3643 2383
Panel D: Profit Margin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Privatized Share1 0.115 0.116 0.117 0.115 0.108 0.109 0.112 0.111
-0.096 -0.097 -0.095 -0.097 -0.081 -0.081 -0.08 -0.082
Privatized Share2 0.187** 0.189** 0.178** 0.190** 0.153* 0.155* 0.150* 0.156*
-0.088 -0.088 -0.086 -0.09 -0.078 -0.078 -0.076 -0.08
Observations 3450 3450 3450 2225 3543 3543 3543 2318
# Privatized Firms 6 6 6 6 10 10 10 10
Specification PA excl. PA excl. PA excl. PA excl. PA trends PA trends PA trends PA trends
Industry-Specific Trends No Yes No No No Yes No No
Industry-Year Effects No No Yes No No No Yes No
Same Industry Dropped No No No Yes No No No Yes
Notes: ICI’s 1993-2015 Top 500 Manufacturing Firms database is used. Panels A, B, C and D report firm-level log employ-
ment, log real sales per employee, log real sales, and profit-margin effects of privatization in the medium- and long-run
compared to the counterfactual case that the firm was never included in the privatization program. The variables of interest
are “Privatized Share 1” and “Privatized Share 2”, continuous variables, ranges from 0 to 1, where 1 indicates public share
declined from 100% to 0%. Privatized Share 1 (2) estimates the effect in the first four years (from 5th to 9th year) after the
firm is sold. First four columns drop PA period from the sample (equation 3.4). The last four columns employ alternative
specification (equation 3.5). All columns include firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors, clustered at firm-level, are in
the parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 3.4 corroborates our findings in table 3.3. Panels A and B show that
the privatization brings a large employment fall and a large gain in real sales
per worker. Panel C indicates that the real sales has not increased with the pri-
vatization. Only in column 7, the regression estimate is marginally significant
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and negative (-0.270 (0.146)). This finding potentially indicates the spill-over ef-
fects of the privatization rather than the effect on the privatized firm, because it is
not confirmed in other specifications. The profit margin, on the other hand, has
increased by between 15%-18%. The findings quantitatively moderately change
across columns, yet the qualitative results hold. The privatization substantially re-
duces employment, increases profit margin, and has no significant positive effect
on real sales of the firms.
Heterogeneity by Privatization Cohort, Size, and Industry
Thus far, we have pooled all privatized firms and presented the effects on the
average firm. In this part, we split the privatized firm sample into two along three
dimensions: The timing of the privatization, size of the firm, and its industry. The
reason why some firms are privatized earlier than others may not be random. The
firms that are more promising from private owner’s point of view could be sold
more easily and quickly. Similarly, the firm size may affect the impact. If the effects
of privatization on employment or real sales is non-linear in size, pooling them
might be misleading. Lastly, factors that are industry specific, such as intensity of
competition or availability of different technologies, might as well cause the effects
to vary by industry.
To assess potential heterogeneous effects of the privatization by the cohort, we
divide the privatized firms into two groups depending on whether the firm is sold
by the government before 2005, the median sale year in our sample. The size of the
firm is determined according to the pre-sale employment (or real sales) levels com-
pared to the median firm. In terms of privatized firms’ industries, we split them
into two groups: Basic metal industries (ISIC Rev. 2, code 37) and manufacture of
chemicals and chemical products (ISIC Rev. 2, code 35).
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We employ a version of equation 3.3 to use all the privatized firms in the sam-
ple. After obtaining the groups of the firms according to each classification, we
estimate the following regression equation;
Yi,t = β1 ∗ POST1[0, 3]i,t×Group1m + β1 ∗ POST1[0, 3]i,t×Group2m+
β3 ∗ POST2[4, 8]i,t×Group1m + β3 ∗ POST2[4, 8]i,t×Group2m
+ αi ∗ PAtrendi,t + λi + µt + ei,t. (3.6)
Group1mand Group2m variables are indicators for the group of the privatized
firms. The former (latter) takes the value of 1 if the privatized firm belongs to
group 1 (2) according to classification m, and 0 otherwise.
Table 3.5 separately reports the long-run performances of the privatized firms
that are sold before 2005, and in or after 2005. The results point out that in terms of
fall in employment, the difference between early and late privatized firms is small.
The similarity is replaced by a sizable difference in real sales. Firms that are sold
after 2005 experienced a fall (-0.310 (0.159)) in real sales in the long-run, suggesting
that late privatized firms were too large in terms of sales for private owners. The
estimate is insignificant in column 4 where we drop all of the firms in the same
industry as the privatized ones, yet it is still sizable (-0.187 (0.167)). The firms that
are sold earlier do not experience such a fall in real sales. As a result, the per-
employee sales improvements are much higher for the latter firms. The difference
disappears when we consider the profit margin. On average, all the firms have
been able to increase their profit margins by more than 10%.
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Table 3.6 divides the privatized firms according to the pre-sale employment (or
real sales) averages.9 In terms of employment, panel A reports that the downsizing
is much more pronounced in large firms than the small ones. Although the real
sales estimates are always only slightly smaller for the latter firms, the real sales
per employee gains are much bigger. On the other hand, the profit margins have
increased by, approximately, 15% for both groups.
Table 3.7 examines the effects of the privatization by the industry of the priva-
tized firms. We find that the impacts of privatization differ by industry. For the
privatized firms in chemicals and chemical products industry, the privatization
has resulted in massive disemployment, and almost no change in real sales, hence
a substantial increase in real sales per worker. Surprisingly, on the other hand,
such an implied fall in wages with almost no change in revenues has yielded the
profit margins to increase by 5%-6% less than all the long-run estimates in Table 3.3
panel D. For the privatized firms in basic metal industry, column 1 reports that the
employment fall has been less pronounced (the estimate is -0.675 (0.102) instead of
-1.386(0.254)), the decline in real sales is statistically indistinguishable from zero,
and the profit margins have increased by more than 24%.
One observation here is that the results in first columns of panels A and C
qualitatively hold in other columns except the one where we control for industry-
by-year fixed effects. Particularly for the privatized firms in basic metal industry,
the employment as well as real sales declines are estimated to be considerably
larger in column 3 (-0.881 (0.133) and -0.380 (0.161)). As noted in footnote 8, given
that only within-industry variation is accounted for in the column, the findings
indicate that the privatized firms in basic metal industry have shrunk in terms of
9Large firms are Erdemir, Iskenderun Demir-Celik, Petkim, Petrol Ofisi, and Tupras. One po-
tential concern here is that the pre-sale restructuring shrinks the firm sizes, hence considering the
entire pre-sale period might be misleading. When we calculate the average employment (or real
sales) of only the last two years of the pre-sale period, we obtain the same firms.
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employment and real sales relative to firms in the same industry, but not relative to
all other firms. In other words, the privatization of the firms in basic metal industry
has caused other firms in the same industry to grow. Nevertheless, the growth is
not due to the relative rise in labor productivity in the firms in basic metal industry.
Considering the real sales per worker as its indicator, the estimated changes in the
variable in columns 3 and 4 are quantitatively close to each other. Similarly, the
growth is not due to the relative rise in the intensity of competition in the basic
metal industry either, otherwise the estimated profit margin would be smaller in
column 3 than column 4.
Perils of overlooking pre-sale restructuring and short panels
Figure 3.1 implies that overlooking the pre-sale restructuring yields biased re-
sults. The bias might be particularly large if only couple of pre-sale years are in
the data. In this section, we quantify the extent of the bias using our primary data.
Assume that we begin observing the privatized firms three years before the sale,
keep all the post-sale period in the sample, and employ only one variable to es-
timate the post-sale performance. Specifically, we utilize the following regression
equation;
Yi,t = β1 ∗ Privatizedi,t + λi + µt + ei,t. (3.7)
Privatized is a binary variable that takes on the value of 1 for the privatized
firms after sale.10 Otherwise it is 0. λi and µt are firm and year fixed effects. Other
than the time window of the sample, the crucial alteration here is that we keep
PA period in the sample, and allow firms that are owned by the PA to be in the
control sample. In other words, we only consider whether the government owns
the firm, and disregard if it is included in the privatization program. Intuitively,
10Splitting post-privatization period into two similar to what is done earlier keeps the direction
of the bias the same and exacerbates it.
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Table 3.5. Total Effects of Privatization; by Cohort
Panel A: Log Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
POST2*Early -1.089*** -1.106*** -1.186*** -1.031***
-0.249 -0.249 -0.218 -0.251
POST2*Late -0.971*** -0.999*** -1.075*** -0.902***
-0.289 -0.292 -0.271 -0.286
Observations 3522 3522 3522 2318
Panel B: Log Sales per Employee
(1) (2) (3) (4)
POST2*Early 1.077*** 1.052*** 1.081*** 1.118***
-0.289 -0.289 -0.309 -0.294
POST2*Late 0.691*** 0.652** 0.694* 0.745***
-0.258 -0.254 -0.353 -0.263
Observations 3522 3522 3522 2318
Panel C: Log Sales
(1) (2) (3) (4)
POST2*Early 0 -0.043 -0.098 0.104
-0.113 -0.113 -0.142 -0.126
POST2*Late -0.310* -0.378** -0.415* -0.187
-0.159 -0.162 -0.211 -0.167
Observations 3643 3643 3643 2383
Panel D: Profit Margin
(1) (2) (3) (4)
POST2*Early 0.152* 0.153* 0.145* 0.155*
-0.087 -0.087 -0.085 -0.089
POST2*Late 0.11 0.113 0.105 0.113
-0.151 -0.151 -0.15 -0.151
Observations 3543 3543 3543 2318
# Privatized Firms 10 10 10 10
Specification PA trends PA trends PA trends PA trends
Industry-Specific Trends No Yes No No
Industry-Year Effects No No Yes No
Same Industry Dropped No No No Yes
Notes: ICI’s Top 500 Manufacturing Firms database is used. Panels A, B, C and D report firm-level log employment, log real
sales per employee, log real sales, and profit margin effects of privatization in the long-run compared to the counterfactual
case that the firm was never included in the privatization program. Alternative specification is employed (equation 3.6). All
columns include firm and year fixed effects. The firms are separated into two cohorts based on the date of sale. Early takes
on the value of 1 for the firms that are sold before 2005, and 0 otherwise. Late takes on the value of 1 for the firms that are
sold in or after 2005. Standard errors, clustered at firm-level, are in the parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3.6. Total Effects of Privatization; by Size
Panel A: Log Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
POST2*Small -0.859*** -0.878*** -0.958*** -0.809***
-0.139 -0.14 -0.113 -0.143
POST2*Large -1.275*** -1.297*** -1.372*** -1.205***
-0.351 -0.351 -0.3 -0.358
Observations 3522 3522 3522 2318
Panel B: Log Sales per Employee
(1) (2) (3) (4)
POST2*Small 0.725*** 0.701*** 0.670*** 0.778***
-0.253 -0.252 -0.255 -0.267
POST2*Large 1.239*** 1.204*** 1.331*** 1.272***
-0.348 -0.351 -0.388 -0.349
Observations 3522 3522 3522 2318
Panel C: Log Sales
(1) (2) (3) (4)
POST2*Small -0.115 -0.157 -0.267 -0.006
-0.156 -0.156 -0.2 -0.169
POST2*Large -0.056 -0.114 -0.071 0.048
-0.137 -0.145 -0.163 -0.139
Observations 3643 3643 3643 2383
Panel D: Profit Margin
(1) (2) (3) (4)
POST2*Small 0.148** 0.150** 0.142* 0.150**
-0.073 -0.073 -0.079 -0.074
POST2*Large 0.148 0.15 0.145 0.154
-0.143 -0.143 -0.136 -0.144
Observations 3543 3543 3543 2318
# Privatized Firms 10 10 10 10
Specification PA trends PA trends PA trends PA trends
Industry-Specific Trends No Yes No No
Industry-Year Effects No No Yes No
Same Industry Dropped No No No Yes
Notes: ICI’s Top 500 Manufacturing Firms database is used. Panels A, B, C and D report firm-level log employment, log real
sales per employee, log real sales, and profit margin effects of privatization in the long-run compared to the counterfactual
case that the firm was never included in the privatization program. Alternative specification is employed (equation 3.6). All
columns include firm and year fixed effects. The firms are separated into two groups based on the pre-sale employment (or
real sales) averages. Standard errors, clustered at firm-level, are in the parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3.7. Total Effects of Privatization; by Industry
Panel A: Log Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
POST2*Chemicals -1.386*** -1.406*** -1.391*** -1.324***
-0.254 -0.254 -0.258 -0.256
POST2*Basic Metal -0.675*** -0.694*** -0.881*** -0.619***
-0.102 -0.104 -0.133 -0.108
Observations 3522 3522 3522 2318
Panel B: Log Sales per Employee
(1) (2) (3) (4)
POST2*Chemicals 1.314*** 1.283*** 1.414*** 1.364***
-0.262 -0.264 -0.304 -0.258
POST2*Basic Metal 0.581*** 0.555*** 0.496** 0.618***
-0.19 -0.189 -0.193 -0.199
Observations 3522 3522 3522 2318
Panel C: Log Sales
(1) (2) (3) (4)
POST2*Chemicals -0.065 -0.118 0.003 0.05
-0.135 -0.142 -0.171 -0.141
POST2*Basic Metal -0.101 -0.147 -0.380** -0.006
-0.138 -0.136 -0.161 -0.148
Observations 3643 3643 3643 2383
Panel D: Profit Margin
(1) (2) (3) (4)
POST2*Chemicals 0.057 0.059 0.062 0.06
-0.055 -0.054 -0.052 -0.055
POST2*Basic Metal 0.243* 0.245* 0.227* 0.247*
-0.129 -0.129 -0.134 -0.131
Observations 3543 3543 3543 2318
# Privatized Firms 10 10 10 10
Specification PA trends PA trends PA trends PA trends
Industry-Specific Trends No Yes No No
Industry-Year Effects No No Yes No
Same Industry Dropped No No No Yes
Notes: ICI’s Top 500 Manufacturing Firms database is used. Panels A, B, C and D report firm-level log employment, log real
sales per employee, log real sales, and profit margin effects of privatization in the long-run compared to the counterfactual
case that the firm was never included in the privatization program. Alternative specification is employed (equation 3.6).
All columns include firm and year fixed effects. The firms are separated into two groups based on the industries. Standard
errors, clustered at firm-level, are in the parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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the equation implicitly assumes that the restructuring is instantaneous, and takes
place on the day the firm is sold.
Table 3.8. Overlooking Pre-sale Restructuring and Few Observations Before the
Sale
Panel A: Log Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Privatized -0.726*** -0.740*** -0.780*** -0.703*** -0.599*** -0.557*** -0.584*** -0.525***
-0.22 -0.22 -0.208 -0.223 -0.161 -0.137 -0.137 -0.139
Observations 3434 3434 3434 2230 3498 3494 3494 2290
Panel B: Log Sales per Employee
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Privatized 0.960*** 0.945*** 0.863*** 1.011*** 0.781*** 0.764*** 0.690*** 0.819***
-0.207 -0.207 -0.237 -0.212 -0.134 -0.134 -0.151 -0.139
Observations 3434 3434 3434 2230 3498 3494 3494 2290
Panel C: Log Sales
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Privatized 0.238** 0.207** 0.093 0.312*** 0.233*** 0.203*** 0.105 0.290***
-0.1 -0.099 -0.101 -0.107 -0.063 -0.063 -0.067 -0.07
Observations 3557 3557 3557 2297 3618 3618 3618 2358
Panel D: Profit Margin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Privatized 0.193** 0.194** 0.199** 0.192** 0.183** 0.184** 0.182** 0.183**
-0.093 -0.093 -0.096 -0.092 -0.084 -0.084 -0.086 -0.084
Observations 3456 3456 3456 2231 3514 3514 3514 2289
# Privatized Firms 6 6 6 6 10 10 10 10
Industry-Specific Trends No Yes No No No Yes No No
Industry-Year Effects No No Yes No No No Yes No
Same Industry Dropped No No No Yes No No No Yes
Notes: ICI’s 1993-2015 Top 500 Manufacturing Firms database is used. Panels A, B, C and D report firm-level log employ-
ment, log real sales per employee, log real sales, and profit margin effects of privatization. Pre-PA period is dropped entirely.
Equation 3.7 is employed. In addition to the ones indicated at the bottom of the table, each regression includes year and
firm fixed effects. The variable of interest is “Privatized”, a binary variable, where 1 indicates that the firm is sold to private
agents. The first four columns omit privatized firms whose assets are transferred to PA after 1993 and the last four columns
include all firms in the sample. Standard errors, clustered at firm-level, are in the parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p <
0.01.
Table 3.8 reports the estimates of the effects of the privatization on log employ-
ment, log real sales per employee, log real sales, and profit margin using equation
3.7. For comparability, we report findings from using only 6 of the privatized firms
as well as from all 10. Panel A column 1 reports that the estimated coefficient for
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the decline in log employment is -0.726. This is 0.337 larger than the estimate in
column 1 of table 3 panel A. The difference increases to 0.455 in column 5, where
we include all 10 privatized firms. This is expected. Compared to column 1, three
of the four additional firms were owned by the PA for more than a decade be-
fore the sale. In other words, an important share of the pre-sale restructuring has
already been completed for these firms three years prior to the sale. This drives
the estimates towards zero. In addition, there are more firms in the privatization
process in the control sample, further biasing them upwards.
The estimate for the rise in real sales per employee in panel B, however, is
almost the same as the ones in table 3.3. This suggests that the upward bias in
the employment estimates have been offset by another bias in the real sales esti-
mates. Panel C confirms it. Using the equation 3.7, we obtain that the real sales
have increased by more than 20% in all specifications, except the ones that allow
macroeconomic shocks to affect industries differently. The estimate obtained from
the latter specifications (0.093 (0.101) and 0.105 (0.067) in columns 3 and 7) are still
larger than any one in panel C of table 3. Finally, the rise in profit margin is ap-
proximately 18%, similar to the previous estimates.
To summarize, ignoring the pre-sale restructuring produces estimates that severely
understates the societal costs of the privatization (disemployment), and overesti-
mates its benefits (rise in real sales).
3.3.2 Discussion
There are non-profit-related aims of publicly owned enterprises, and one of
them is sustaining a level of employment (Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny, 1996).
Government might decrease the unemployment rate through POEs by employ-
ing more workers per unit of production than a privately-owned firm. For private
firms, these concerns are non-existent or less important. Differences of objectives
152
among private and public firms require restructuring of a privatized firm. Govern-
ment might bear a portion of the restructuring cost to boost salability of the firm
during the PA period. As shown in Figure 1, the firm-level workforce declines
during the PA period when the firm is considered for privatization. The decline
is continued by private owners; hence the first effect of the privatization is the
annulment or substantial decline of the importance of the employment-related ob-
jectives. The rise in the profit-margin only after the privatization suggests that (i)
the profit-related objectives of the government have not become more important
with the asset transfer to the PA, and (ii) the profit-related objectives are relatively
much more important for private owners. Then the immediate outcome of the
privatization has been an income transfer from wage-earners to profit-earners.
Secondly, the privatization has substantially increased real sales per employee.
Although the ratio as an efficiency measure is arguably not adequate for compari-
son, since the government puts a much larger weight on employment-related con-
cerns, it is still important to examine the factors behind the rise. Four of the most
probable ones are increase in workers’ effort levels, rise in product prices, the sub-
contracting, and change in production technology.
La Porta and Lopez-de Silanes (1999) notes that one reason for workers’ op-
position of privatization is that private owners require more effort from them. Al-
though worker’s effort is mostly non-contractable, we can expect that private own-
ers provide incentives for working hard, or disincentives to “shirking” (Bowles,
2009; Goerke, 1998). Since the local employment rate is a concern for POEs, its
public knowledge renders layoff threat less credible and the average worker’s ef-
fort is relatively low. The high employment is not a concern for private firms, the
layoff threat is credible, the effort level is high. Nonetheless, the fall in the PA
period did not coincide with an increase in real sales per employee suggests that
the novelty brought by private owners for increased worker effort is not limited
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to making the threat credible. Better monitoring and supervising might be among
these novelties that lead workers to devote more effort.11 The findings support the
rise in the layoff threat, hence we consider increased workers’ effort levels as one
of the factors.
The second potential reason behind the rise in real sales per employee is the
increase in the prices of the privatized firms’ outputs. If government artificially
lowers the price of the POE’s output with the aim of boosting the downstream
industries; this aim disappears after the firm is sold to its new owners. We do not
possess output price information and we leave this as a possibility.12
Subcontracting some of the tasks decreases total workforce of the firm with-
out changing real sales. In this case, the real sales per employee would increase
rapidly. Nevertheless, this would also lead the value-added per sales to decline,
since the wages of the workers undertaking the subcontracted tasks are no longer
a component of the value-added, but outside purchases.
11The real sales records of the public firms in the pre-PA period, on the other hand, demonstrates
that the tolerance for “shirking” in POEs is not limitless. An illustrative efficiency wage model that
is influenced heavily by Bowles (2009) and Goerke (1998) is presented in the Appendix.
12Okten and Arin (2006) finds that the privatization of cement firms in Turkey did not lead to
price increases.
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Table 3.9. Total Effects of Privatization; Value Added per Sales
Panel A: Value-Added per Sales
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
POST1[0,3] 0.062 0.075 0.06 0.063 0.099 0.114 0.094 0.101
-0.069 -0.068 -0.073 -0.071 -0.074 -0.073 -0.075 -0.076
POST2[4,8] 0.055 0.076 0.046 0.059 0.066 0.089 0.06 0.068
-0.057 -0.054 -0.061 -0.062 -0.069 -0.066 -0.069 -0.074
Observations 3450 3450 3450 2225 3543 3543 3543 2318
# Privatized Firms 6 6 6 6 10 10 10 10
Specification PA excl. PA excl. PA excl. PA excl. PA trends PA trends PA trends PA trends
Industry-Specific Trends No Yes No No No Yes No No
Industry-Year Effects No No Yes No No No Yes No
Same Industry Dropped No No No Yes No No No Yes
Notes: ICI’s 1993-2015 Top 500 Manufacturing Firms database is used. Table reports value-added per sales effects of privati-
zation in the medium- and long-run compared to the counterfactual case that the firm was never included in the privatiza-
tion program. First four columns drop PA period from the sample (equation 3.2). The last four columns employ alternative
specification (equation 3.3). All columns include firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors, clustered at firm-level, are in
the parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 3.9 reports the value-added per sales effects of the privatization using
equation 3.2 and 3.3. None of the estimates reject the null hypothesis. In fact, the
long-run estimates range between 4.6% and 8.9%, hence are slightly positive in all
columns, suggesting that the outsourcing was not the main reason behind the rise
in real sales per employee.
Lastly, the decline in the employment-related aims might induce the firm to
change production technologies. During the post-sale restructuring, new owners
might increase the capital stock of the firm, and switch to capital-intensive produc-
tion techniques. This would allow the firm to shrink its workforce with no effect
on its real sales performance.
The primary dataset we employ does not report firm-level capital stock or
investment rate. Using the balance sheets reported to Istanbul Stock Exchange,
we construct fixed tangible asset series for four of the privatized firms (Erdemir,
Petkim, Petrol Ofisi and Tupras).13 The data starts from 1998 and is normalized by
13The employment and real sales regressions using only these four firms as privatized firms yield
qualitatively the same findings as previous results.
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the fixed tangible asset holdings in the last pre-sale year. In 1998, all of the four
firms were owned by government, though their assets were held by the PA. There-
fore, we note that the comparison is limited to the PA period and the post-sale
restructuring (from the first to the end of the fourth year after the sale). Hence, the
evidence presented should be considered suggestive.
Figure 3.2. Time Paths of Fixed Capital Index
1
2
3
4
Fi
xe
d 
C
ap
ita
l I
nd
ex
1995 2000 2005 2010
year
ERDEMIR
1
2
3
4
Fi
xe
d 
C
ap
ita
l I
nd
ex
1995 2000 2005 2010
year
PETKIM
1
2
3
4
Fi
xe
d 
C
ap
ita
l I
nd
ex
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
year
PETROLOFISI
1
2
3
4
Fi
xe
d 
C
ap
ita
l I
nd
ex
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
year
TUPRAS
Notes: The figure shows changes in fixed capital indices of ERDEMIR, PETKIM, PETROL OFISI
and TUPRAS. The value for the year before the date of privatization is set to 1. The red vertical
line indicates the date of privatization for each firm.
Figure 3.2 reports the evolution of the fixed tangible asset holdings of each of
the firms. Among the four firms, only Petrol Ofisi has rapidly increased its capi-
tal stock after the date of sale; whereas capital stocks of Tupras and Petkim have
declined, and there is limited change for Erdemir. This suggests that the shift to
capital-intensive technologies might be true for some industries, yet it is not the
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main explanation behind the massive rise in real sales per worker for the priva-
tized firms.
3.3.3 Concluding Remarks
The public sector still plays a considerable role in many developing as well
as developed countries. There are many large POEs that can be subject of pri-
vatization in the future. Our findings should caution the decision makers from
making hastily conclusions that privatization improves social welfare by increas-
ing firms’ output without changing employment level substantially. In the case
of Turkey, privatization primarily led to job losses and increases in profit mar-
gins. The real sales (output), on the other hand, has not statistically significantly
changed. Therefore, we conclude, it has led to an income transfer from wage-
earners to profit-earners. When distributional consequences are considered, the
social costs of privatization may surpass the benefits.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX OF CHAPTER 1
A.1 Data Sources and variable construction
The data sets in the text are as follows:
We use the 1996-2017 CPS-Outgoing Rotation Group (CPS-ORG) in building
the prediction model, and in estimating the wage effects of the minimum wage.
In constructing the hourly wage variable, we exclude self-employed workers as
well as observations with imputed wage information. Following Feenberg and
Roth (2007)’s recommendation, if the individual is not paid hourly, we calculate
the hourly wage by dividing earnings per week by usual weekly hours worked
in the job. To obtain state-by-quarter employment rate and state-by-year own-
employment-based health insurance coverage rate, we rely on the 1996-2017 Basic
Monthly CPS and the 1997-2017 Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the
CPS (CPS-ASEC). We download the former two data sets from the NBER website,
and the latter from the IPUMS-CPS. We acquire the state-level quarterly statutory
minimum wage data from Vaghul and Zipperer (2016), and state-level unemploy-
ment rate from the BLS. Jonathan Meer and Jeremy West graciously publish the
replication files of Meer and West (2015) online.
In building the prediction models, we use the following variables:
Minimum wage worker indicator: The outcome variable that takes on the
value of 1 if the individual’s hourly wage is less than %125 of the statutory mini-
mum wage. We exclude observations that are employed in tipped occupations in
states that allow tip credits. We also do not include self-employed workers.
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Age: We use reported continouos age variable throughout the text, except for
Figure 1.1 panel (a), where we construct a categorical wage variables with cate-
gories [16, 20), [20, 25), [25,30), ... , [60, 65).
Education: We construct a categorical variable with four categories, less than
high school (EDUC=1), high school graduate with no college education (EDUC=2),
some college (EDUC=3), and college graduate (EDUC=4), using the variables that
report highest degree completed.
Citizenship/nativity: We construct a categorical variable with four categories,
native (CITNAT=1), foreign born and citizen (CITNAT=2), not citizen and not from
South or Central America (CITNAT=3), and not citizen and from South or Central
America (CITNAT=4), using the variables that report individual’s citizenship sta-
tus, and nativity.
Gender: We construct a binary variable that takes on the value of 1 if the indi-
vidual is male, and 0 otherwise.
Rural residency: We construct a categorical variable with four categories, resi-
dent in a rural area (RURALSTATUS=1), resident in a small metropolitan area with
population less than 500,000 (RURALSTATUS=2), resident in a large metropolitan
area with population greater than 500,000 (RURALSTATUS=3), and resident in an
undisclosed area (RURALSTATUS=4), using the variables that report metropolitan
status of the individual’s residency and its size.
Marital: We construct a binary variable that takes on the value of 1 if the indi-
vidual is married and the spouse is present, and 0 otherwise.
Race: We construct a categorical variable that takes on the value of 1 if the
individual is coded as white, 2 if black, and 3 otherwise.
Hispanic: We construct a binary variable that takes on the value of 1 if the
individual reports of Hispanic ethnicity, and 0 otherwise.
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Veteran: We construct a binary variable that takes on the value of 1 if the indi-
vidual is a veteran, and 0 otherwise.
We use the 2011-2016 American Community Survey and the 2012-2017 CPS-
ASEC in Appendix E. HINSEMP is the indicator variable for having employment-
based health insurance, and a similar variable can be obtained in the latter data set
by combining the indicator variable for own-employment-based health insurance
(GROUPOWN) and the binary varible for having employment-based health insur-
ance as a dependent (GROUPDEP).1 In addition, we use the variables GRPWHO1
and GRPWHO2 which report the policyholders whose employment-based insur-
ances provide coverage for the dependents. In the main text, we use the variable
VERIFY to obtain a harmonized series for the health insurance coverage related
variables for the sample period as suggested by Flood et al. (2017). We use OCCLY
to determine if the individual is employed at some point the preceding year.
In re-examining Clemens, Kahn and Meer (2018), in addition to the variable
OCCLY, we also use the variable OCC to determine occupations of the observa-
tions when the former variable is uninformative. OCC reports the current or most
recent occupation. However, it is slightly different from the corresponding vari-
able in the ACS, since only fourth of the non-employed individuals’ occupations
are asked. Because, we use only the 2012-2017 CPS, we do not need the variable
VERIFY to obtain a harmonized series. We acquire data for state-level time varying
controls in Clemens, Kahn and Meer (2018) from the sources that the authors point
out, and the dates for the Medicaid Expansion under the Affordable Care Act from
the websites of The Advisory Board Company, and Kaiser Family Foundation.
1For the main discrepancy between HINSEMP in the ACS, and HINSEMP in the CPS, see foot-
note 14.
160
A.2 Details of the prediction algorithms and the robustness of the
preferred prediction model
In this section, we provide details of the algorithms of the tree-based predic-
tion models we employed in the main text, we compare the performance of the
preferred model with non-tree-based learning tools, we assess the robustness of
the predictions to alternative definitions in determining “minimum wage work-
ers”. In addition, we provide suggestive evidence that the worker misreporting
does not severely affect our predictions by comparing models constructed using
worker, and employer reported wages using the January 1977 CPS Supplement.
Tree-based Machine Learning Tools
Random Forests
There are multiplicity of ways to go beyond a single decision tree. The random
forest is one of them (Breiman, 2001). It is a tree-based ensemble learning tech-
nique. It provides a way to overcome the bias-variance trade-off of the decision
trees. In our case, it constructs multitude of fully grown decision trees formed us-
ing different training bootstrap samples that predict the class of each observation.
Using these predictions, it determines the class of the observation according to the
majority vote. The final prediction of each observation, therefore, is the average of
all the tree predictions.
Since each tree is fully grown, they are unbiased, yet the prediction variance is
high. By averaging the predictions, the unbiasedness is preserved and the variance
is diminished. To elaborate this point further, assume that the variance of the pre-
diction of the decision trees is σ2, and fˆ b(x) is the prediction of the decision tree that
is formed using training sample b for given predictors, x. The random forest pre-
dicts the class of the observation by averaging the predictions fˆr f = 1B ∑
B
b=1 fˆ
b(x),
where B is the total number of trees. Then, the unbiasedness is retained, and if the
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predictions were independent from each other, the variance of the random forest
predictions would be;
var( ˆfr f ) = var(
1
B
B
∑
b=1
fˆ b(x)) = (
1
B2
) ∗ B ∗ σ2 = σ
2
B
. (A.1)
However, the trees and the predictions are never uncorrelated. Especially, if one
predictor has a very high predictive power, then the top node of all trees use it to
split. Therefore, the variance in the equation A.1 is, in fact, never achieved. To
decrease the correlation of trees, instead of using all the predictors, we employ a
randomly selected portion of the predictors at each split.2 Using a fraction of the
predictors might slow the learning process; though, with large number of trees,
it outperforms the random forest that uses all of the predictors at each step. In
addition, thanks to the averaging, increasing the number of trees does not lead to
overfitting; yet the prediction performance does not improve after a certain num-
ber of trees3.
Gradient Tree Boosting
The boosting approaches the problem from a different angle. Instead of produc-
ing many fully grown trees, it starts by producing a relatively small tree. The initial
tree is a weak learner, misclassifies many observations. The proceeding trees, also
relatively small and weak learners, alters the data to predict the misclassified ob-
servations more accurately.
2Using all predictors at every split is called “bagging”.
3However, although increasing the number of trees does not lead to overfitting, individual trees
themselves might overfit severely. As Segal (2004) shows, it is possible to improve the prediction
by shrinking the tree size.
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The gradient tree boosting developed by Friedman (2001) is one of the boosting
techniques4. In our classification problem with only two classes, we choose the
binomial log-likelihood loss function (or one half of the deviance). Hence, the loss
function is;
L(y, p) = −(ylog(p) + (1− y)log(1− p)), (A.2)
where y is the class of the observation (y ∈ {0, 1}). p = P(Y = 1|X) where X
indicates predictors. Then using the logistic transformation, we can write the loss
function in terms of the model as;
L(y, F(X)) = −yF + log(1 + exp(F)). (A.3)
Instead of fitting a single tree using A.3, the boosting fits many weak trees se-
quentially. The main trick of the gradient tree boosting is that at step m, we replace
the outcome with the negative gradient, given m-1 boosting steps. To put it differ-
ently, the pseudo-response of the observation i, y˜i is defined as;
y˜i = −[∂L∂F ]F=Fm−1 = yi − pi. (A.4)
and the tree at step m is fit to y˜5. Then based on the fit, the new tree is added to the
model according to the following formula;
4For the purposes of this paper, we only describe the gradient tree boosting. Alternatively,
one can also employ the AdaBoost algorithm. The gist of the AdaBoost algorithm is that at each
step, observations are re-weighted so that misclassified (correctly classified) ones weigh slightly
more (less) in the subsequent step. In our study, the AdaBoost performed slightly worse than the
preferred model, so we omitted it. A very intuitive description of both the AdaBoost and gradient
tree boosting algorithms can be found in Friedman, Hastie and Tibshirani (2009).
5For the least squares regressions, the negative gradient vector is the residuals at step m. Hence,
the gradient boosting simply fits the regression tree to the current residuals at each step (James
et al., 2013).
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Fm(X) = Fm−1(X) +
J
∑
j=1
γjm1(X ∈ Rjm), (A.5)
where j is the terminal node of the tree, Fm−1(X) is the model built at step m− 1,
and γjm is the optimal update coefficient that reduces the loss function the most at
step m for the sub-space Rjm. Concretely, γjm takes higher values for subspaces that
the mth tree fits relatively well. Note that due to the use of pseudo-responses, the
minimization of loss function leads the mth tree to focus heavily on cases where
Fm−1 performs poorly. Only the combination of weak learners produce a strong
learner, and most of the weak learners are meaningless by themselves.
Since we fit the tree to the negative gradient, the training error rate always
decreases as the number of trees increases. Therefore, unlike the random forest, in-
cluding many trees in the model can lead to overfitting in the gradient tree boost-
ing. For regularization and better predictions, shrinkage techniques are employed.
Instead of adding each new tree to the current model as in equation A.5, every γjm
is multiplied by a small positive number. The shrinkage parameter renders each
learner even weaker and decelerates the learning process. Nevertheless, combined
with sufficient number of trees, this can increase the model’s predictive power
significantly. Furthermore, using only a fraction of training set, known as sub-
sampling, one can introduce another stochastic component and de-correlate trees;
hence potentially decreases the variance (Friedman, 2002).
Then, three main parameters that are user-specified in gradient boosting are;
the size of each tree, the number of trees, and the shrinkage factor. We employ
10-fold cross-validation procedure to determine each one of them simultaneously.
Before concluding this section, we note that although both random forests and
gradient tree boosting build data-driven models that, in general, outperform a sin-
gle tree; these models lack the interpretability. In the case of the random forest, due
to the use of a fraction of variables at each split, most of the individual trees cannot
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achieve the performance of a single tree, and the splits are not interpretable. On
the other hand, the first tree of the gradient boosting can actually be the same as
the decision tree; yet starting from the second tree, the interpretation of each tree
is obscured due to the updating of the outcome variable or the loss function.
Prediction performances of alternative learning tools
In figure 1.2, we show only the performances of the tree-based learning models.
One potential question might be that how these models perform compared to the
models linear in covariates (the logistic, and ordinary least-squares regressions).6
One issue related to the logistic regression model is that the functional form
the predictors enter the prediction equation needs to be pre-specified. Instead of
finding the best logistic model by trial-and error, we use the elastic net regulariza-
tion developed by Zou and Hastie (2005).7 We purposefully build a very complex
model and rely on the regularization to avoid overfitting. The model includes all
the predictors, their two-way interactions, all the interactions with the quadratic
age variable, and the cubic and quartic terms of the age variable.
In addition, for reference, we estimate a basic logistic model with only the two
most important predictors (age and the categorical education variables), and a lin-
ear model analogous to the one employed by Card and Krueger (1995). While the
former model has no polynomial or interaction terms, the right hand side vari-
6Our trials with the neural networks and support vector machines also yield that the boosting
performs the best. While the model constructed using the neural networks performs only slightly
worse than the boosting, the models using the support vector machines fail to provide a well-
performing prediction model.
7The loss function of the logistic regression is,
L = − 1
N
N
∑
i=1
yi(β0 + xTi β)− ln(1 + exp(β0 + xiβ)).
The elastic net regularization adds the penalty term, λ[(1− α)||β||22+α||β||] to the loss function
for regularization and decreasing the model complexity. λ ≥ 0 and α ∈ [0, 1] are tuning parameters
picked by the cross-validation procedure to prevent overfitting.
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ables of the latter model are a set of three-way interaction variables between teen,
non-white, and gender indicators; three-way interaction variables between young
adult (age 20-25), non-white, and gender indicators; three-way interactions of age,
categorical education, and gender variables; quadratic and cubic terms of the age
variable; indicator variables for Hispanic, and and non-white individuals.
Figure A.1. Precision-Recall curves; alternative learning tools
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Figure A.1 shows the PR curves of the models. We make three observations.
First, the basic logistic model performs relatively poorly. For the same recall value,
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its proposed sample has lower precision than the teen sample. For higher recall
values, it achieves only slightly higher precision values than the demographic sam-
ples (HSD or HSL, under 30). This suggests that the predicting minimum wage
workers requires inclusion of interactions and polynomial terms as well as other
variables. Secondly, Card and Krueger (1995) undertakes the task of selectively
including predictors, interactions and polynomial terms. They build a consider-
ably better model than the basic logistic regression, though they never explain the
rationale behind including certain three way interactions while leaving out others.
Their model substantially improves the precision-recall tradeoff, presents samples
closer to the ideal point than any of the demographic samples. In addition, its PR
curve is relatively close to those of our preferred prediction model, and the elastic
net, indicating that their model approximates the ones constructed using the state-
of-the-art learning tools. Thirdly, the elastic net performs slightly worse than the
boosting, and the latter model again appears as the best model when we construct
samples that have the recall value of at least 0.2.8
Figure A.2 reports the precision-recall curves of the preferred model, and the
model that augments it with the state of residence predictor. As expected, the
precision-recall curve of the latter model is always closer to the ideal point.
Robustness to alternative threshold values
In the main prediction model, we classified wage workers earning less than
125% of the minimum wage as relevant cases (minimum wage workers), and other
wage workers as non-relevant cases. We use the threshold value primarily for
description purposes, however it might be the case that the arbitrarily selected
threshold value has a qualitative effect on the predictions since it determines the
8As a summary measure, we calculate the areas under the PR curve for alternative learning
tools. They are 0.428, 0.383, 0.265, 0.421, 0.407, 0.331 for the boosting, random forest, single tree,
elastic net, linear (Card & Krueger), and the basic logistic models.
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Figure A.2. Precision-Recall curves; state of residence in predictor set
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value of the outcome variable. Taking the concern into account, we build predic-
tion models for alternative threshold values. Since we use the predicted proba-
bilities for sorting, we compare ranks of the predicted probabilities estimated by
latter models with the main model using the 1996-2017 CPS-ORG. In addition, we
also build a model to predict real wages, sort according to (the negative of) pre-
dicted wages, and compare the resulting order with the one obtained by the main
prediction model.
Figure A.3. Rank correlation coefficients
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Notes: The 1996-2017 CPS-ORG is employed. The graph shows the rank correlation coefficients of the predicted
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Table A.1. Rank correlation coefficients
Outcome variable: Indicator for hourly wage below the threshold -Real wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Rank correlation coefficient 0.990 0.997 1.000 0.997 0.993 0.989 0.960
Threshold value 1.03 1.1 1.25 1.5 1.75 2 -
Notes: The 1996-2017 CPS-ORG is used. Estimated rank correlation coefficients of the main pre-
dicted probabilities and the predicted probabilities of the models that use alternative thresholds or
the hourly real wage for the outcome variable. Column 1-6 employ a binary outcome that takes
on the value of 1 if the ratio of the real hourly wage to the minimum wage is below the specified
threshold. Column 7 employs the negative of hourly real wage as the outcome, and predicts wage
worker’s wage. Since the observations more likely to earn low wages are more likely to be mini-
mum wage workers, we sort according to the negative of the real wage.
In figure A.3 and table A.1, we show that selecting alternative threshold values
produce virtually the same ordering. The rank correlation coefficients are always
greater than 0.95. The coefficient is always greater than 0.99 for the threshold val-
ues (1.03, 1.1, 1.25, 1.5) used in Belman, Wolfson and Nawakitphaitoon (2015) when
they try alternative threshold values in describing demographics, and occupations
of minimum wage workers. This implies that we obtain highly similar samples
when we use alternative threshold values in the prediction model or predicted
real wages for sorting. In other words, the high impact and the baseline groups
would be essentially the same if we used another threshold wage level in defining
the minimum wage workers.
Impact of misreporting error on the formation of groups
One issue that might affect the formation of predicted probability groups is
the misreporting error. If the misreporting error of the hourly wage information
is larger for certain groups, then the members of the groups might be incorrectly
predicted to be more (or less) likely to be a minimum wage worker. An example
that illustrates the issue is as follows: Consider a case where the minimum wage
is $10, and two demographic groups have the same true wage distributions. The
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distributions are both normal with mean $14.5 and standard deviation $2. This
implies that, in truth, 31.7% of both groups are minimum wage workers according
to the convention (minimum wage workers are defined as those earning less than
125% of the minimum wage). Say, the first group reports their hourly wages with
some error. The error would increase the observed standard deviation without
affecting the mean. Then, the ML tools would predict the first group to be more
likely to be a minimum wage worker than the second group.9
Figure A.4. Predictions of models based on employer-reported, and worker-
reported wages
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Notes: The test sample of the January 1977 CPS Supplement is employed. The graph plots the predicted probabilities of the
model using employer-reported wages (y-axis) against those of the model using worker-reported wages (x-axis). Each
marker indicates an observation, the straight line the fitted line, and the dash line the 45 degree line. The R2 of the fit, the
slope of the line, and the rank correlation coefficients are reported in the top-right corner.
9The large rank correlation coefficient of the main predicted probabilities and the negative of
predicted real wages in table A.1 implies that the severity of this kind of error is limited.
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As a suggestive evidence on the impact of misreporting error on the predic-
tions, we employ the CPS 1977 January Supplement. In the data set, hourly wages
of workers are asked to employers as well as workers. We assess the severity of the
misreporting error by comparing the prediction model constructed using worker-
reported wages with that using employer-reported wages.
Specifically, we use 80% of the sample to train two models: The first model
employs the worker-reported wage information; whereas the second model the
employer-reported wage information. The predictors are the same as the model
in the paper, except for that CPS 1977 does not have a citizenship information,
and the small metropolitan areas are defined as those with population less than
1,000,000 (rather than 500,000). After having constructed the models, we test the
performances of each model using the remaining 20% of the original sample. Each
model predicts the likelihood of being a minimum wage worker for each of the
observations in the test sample. The similarity of the predictions suggests that the
misreporting error negligibly affects the sorting.10 The slope, the R2, and the rank
correlation coefficient are all very close to 1; they are 0.990, 0.989, 0.992, respec-
tively. This suggests that using worker-reported wages results in similar predic-
tions as using employer-reported wages.
A.3 Finding the threshold predicted probability values to con-
struct the high impact and the baseline groups
To find the predicted probability values that differentiate highly affected, af-
fected, and not affected groups, first, we estimate the wage elasticities of each of
the subsamples in Table 1.1. In addition to finding the groups, these regressions
10One underlying assumption here is that the misreporting errors of employers and workers are
independent from each other. More precisely, wworker = w + eworker, wemployer = w + eemployer and
eworker is independent from eemployer.
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allow us to assess the validity of predicted probabilities in terms of the bite of
the minimum wage. Using the entire 1996-2017 CPS-ORG dataset, we employ six
specifications; the canonical model, the preferred IFE model, and four more spec-
ifications that are commonly used in the literature. The latter set of specifications
are as follows: the canonical model augmented with linear state trends and/or
division-by-quarter fixed effects (3 specifications), and the 2SLS model along the
lines of Autor, Manning and Smith (2016).11
11The fifth specification is directly borrowed from Autor, Manning and Smith (2016). It allows
a quadratic effect of the minimum and aims to capture impacts of the “effective” minimum wage;
namely the gap between state median and the minimum wages. Mathematically, this implies that
logMW in equation 1.2 is replaced by log( MWMedian )i,t, and its square. We employ the “levels” spec-
ification. Compared to the canonical model, it includes state-specific linear trends and removes
demographic and business cycle controls. Since state-level quarterly median wages and average
wages of some of the predicted probability groups might be highly correlated, we implement a
two-stage least squares regression similar to Autor, Manning and Smith (2016). We employ three
instruments; logMWi,t and its square, and the interaction between the logMWi,t and state-level
average median wage over 1996-2017.
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Figure A.5. Wage elasticities with respect to the minimum wage; by predicted
probability groups
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In figure A.5, we plot all the estimated wage elasticities of the 16 subsamples of
Table 1.1 against their average predicted probability values. We also add the pre-
cision and the smallest predicted probability values in the x-axis. Darker colored
markers indicate statistically significant estimates and gray ones are not significant
at 5% level. We also estimate a kernel weighted local linear smoothed curve (thick
straight line) that weighs each estimate equally to reveal the general relationship
between the predicted probabilities and the wage elasticity.12
12The kernel weights are Gaussian.
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We make four observations about the figure. First, it shows that the general
trend is downwards for all specifications. Combining this information with the
one we obtained from the PR curve of figure 1.2, we conclude that the predicted
probabilities are highly correlated with both sample precision and the wage ef-
fects. This furthers the argument that the predicted probabilities are proxies for the
“bite” of the minimum wage. Second, although the point estimates vary, all spec-
ifications agree that hourly wages of the first two subsamples statistically signifi-
cantly and considerably increase with the minimum wage. The sizes of the effect
for the groups are always larger than others. Third, until (including) subsample 5,
the positive wage effect is still observable, and it is statistically significant for some
specifications. Our preferred specification always estimates a wage elasticity larger
than 0.05 for subsamples 1-5, and four of the estimates are statistically significant.
Fourth, from subsample 6 onwards, none of the estimates are statistically signifi-
cant and all of them are smaller than 0.05 for the preferred model. These findings
recommend us to declare the first two subsamples as the high impact, and the first
five as the baseline groups. This corresponds to assigning the wage workers with
predicted probability values larger than 0.315 (0.112) in the high impact (baseline)
group.
This analysis yields unbiased approximate values for the thresholds. How-
ever, it might be impacted by the specific sample picked for training the prediction
model, and the specific discretization in Table 1.1. To address the former issue,
we devise an exercise that combines a procedure highly analogous to implement-
ing ten times 10-fold cross-fitting, and the decision trees. Precisely, first, to match
the original training model as closely as possible, we randomly create 10 mutu-
ally exclusive training samples of approximately 150,000 observations and build
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the prediction model.13 Then, using the 1996-2017 CPS-ORG observations that are
not employed in building the prediction model, we estimate the wage effects on
16 subsamples created in a similar way to the ones in Table 1.1. We repeat this
exercise 10 times, and obtain 1,600 estimates. Lastly, we fit a decision tree with
only three terminal nodes using the minimum predicted probability values in the
subsamples as the sole predictor, and acquire the threshold values.
To address the arbitrary discretization, we divide the entire data into 10 equally
sized subsamples, and implement the exercise. Splitting the data into 10 is concep-
tually analogous to Card and Krueger’s approach of picking the wage workers
with top 10% predicted probability values.
Figure A.6 plots the decision trees obtained using 16 subsamples (panel (a)),
and 10 subsamples (panel (b)). The panel (a) indicates that the high impact (base-
line) group should be composed of individuals with predicted probability values
larger than 0.307 (0.110). The threshold values in panel (b) are highly similar for
the groups, 0.322 and 0.109.
The alternative empirical methods for determining the threshold point towards
similar values. All methods largely agree on that the high impact (baseline) group
should contain individuals with predicted probability values greater than 0.322
(0.110). As a result, we employ these values in creating the groups. Nevertheless,
we acknowledge that the threshold values are approximations. As indicated in
figure 1.7, slight alterations in the values yield essentially the same results.
13We impose the conditions specified in section 1.4 for observations to be in the training sample.
The 10th training sample has 107,102 observations. Removing the sample from the analysis has no
impact on the conclusions.
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Figure A.6. Threshold estimating trees
|Min. pp =< 0.307                    Min. pp > 0.307
Min. pp =< 0.110                Min. pp > 0.110
0.02111 0.07929
0.23100
(a) 16 subsamples
|Min. pred. prob. =< 0.322    Min. pred. prob. > 0.322
Min. pred. prob. =< 0.109    Min. pred. prob.  > 0.109
0.02509 0.09526
0.23960
(b) 10 subsamples
Notes: The 1996-2017 CPS-ORG is employed. Both panels construct the decision trees based on the procedure that combines 10-times 10-fold cross-fitting and the decision tree algorithm,
as explained in the text. Panel (a) divides the sample into 16, where the subsamples are created in a similar way to the ones in Table 1.1, and panel (b) divides the sample into 10 following
Card and Krueger (1995). The decision trees determine on the minimum predicted probability values (Min p.p.) of the splits. The averages of the estimated wage elasticities are reported
in the terminal nodes.
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A.4 Additional Tables and Figures
In this section, we provide additional tables and figures corroborating our ar-
guments in the text.
Figure A.7. Estimated employment elasticities with respect to the minimum wage
using the IFE and the canonical model; alternative lower bounds of age for the
baseline group
Employment elas. wrt MW = -0.104
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Notes: The 1996-2017 CPS-ORG is employed. Estimated employment elasticities with respect to the minimum wage and
the 95% confidence intervals using the preferred IFE (turquoise capped spikes), and the canonical (black capped spikes)
model specifications are shown. The leftmost spikes use the entire baseline group, while the rightmost spike only uses
non-teen observations of the group. The dependent variable is state-by-quarter employment rate, the variable of interest is
log-transformed quarterly minimum wage, and the elasticity is calculated by dividing the estimate to the mean value of the
dependent variable. The dotted horizontal line shows employment elasticity with respect to minimum wage equals to -0.1.
State-level clustered standard errors are reported.
Figure A.7 reports the estimated employment elasticities with respect to the
minimum wage for alternative lower bounds of age. All the estimation samples
are subsamples of the baseline group, and we compare the preferred interactive
fixed effects model with the canonical specification. Similar to Figure 1.6, the es-
timates converge as the smallest age in the sample increases, albeit quantitatively
less pronounced. The finding of statistically significant disemployment effect of
the minimum wage is not obtained for the non-teen workers in the group. Both
models estimate confidence intervals that include the null hypothesis of no effect
for the latter observations.
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Figure A.8. Change in employment by wage bins; high impact group, baseline
group, and overall workforce
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(a) High impact group
-.
02
-.
01
0
.0
1
.0
2
D
if
fe
re
nc
e 
be
tw
ee
n 
ac
tu
al
 a
nd
 c
ou
nt
er
fa
ct
ua
l e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t c
ou
nt
re
la
tiv
e 
to
 th
e 
pr
e-
tr
ea
tm
en
t t
ot
al
 e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
-4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 17+
Wage bin relative to the new MW
(b) Baseline group
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(c) Overall workforce
Notes: The QCEW-benchmarked CPS-ORG is used. The baseline model specification of Cengiz et al. (2018) is used. Fol-
lowing the procedure described in footnote 49, we decompose estimated changes in the number of jobs (relative to the total
employment 1 year before the treatment) after a minimum wage event by group membership. Panels (a) and (b) report the
contributions of the high impact group, and the baseline group (panel (b)) towards the estimate for all workers (panel (c)).
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Following Cengiz et al. (2018), Figure A.8 shows the changes in wage frequency
distribution of the high impact and the baseline groups as well as of the entire
workforce. Supporting our previous claims, minimum wage increases have not
adversely affected employment rates of the groups. After the increase, there are
fewer jobs below the new minimum wage (missing jobs, ∆b); yet, at the same time,
there are more jobs at or above the new minimum wage (excess jobs, ∆a), rendering
the employment effect very close to zero. On the other hand, the changes in the
distributions indicate wage increases for the affected individuals. In addition, this
approach allows us to provide evidence for the share of the missing jobs explained
by changes in the wage frequency distributions of the high impact, and the baseline
groups. Our analysis shows that 53.1% (82.8%) of the total missing jobs is due to
the changes in the wage distribution of the high impact (baseline) group.
Figure A.9. Estimated employment elasticities with respect to the minimum wage
using Meer and West (2015)’s baseline specification augmented with interactive
fixed effects
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Notes: The data provided by Meer and West (2015) are used. Estimated employment elasticities with respect to the minimum
wage and the 95% confidence intervals are obtained using the baseline specification in Meer and West (2015) (black capped
spikes), and the specification augmented with interactive fixed effects (turquoise capped spikes). The leftmost spikes is
identical to the reported estimate in column 1 of Table 4 in Meer and West (2015). The dependent variable is 1-year differ-
enced state-by-quarter log of employment count, and the variables of interest are contemporaneous and up to 3 year lagged
terms of 1-year differenced log of minimum wage. State-level clustered standard errors are reported.
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In figure A.9, we re-examine Meer and West (2015)’s baseline finding by aug-
menting their specification with interactive fixed effects. In this case, the informa-
tion criterion has been uninformative, recommends us to include as many interac-
tive fixed effects as possible. Following Moon and Weidner (2015), we examine the
stability of the estimates with respect to the number of interactive fixed effects, and
try to find the exact point where purging additional unobserved factors does not
alter the estimates considerably. We find that the estimate is stable sixth interac-
tive fixed effects onwards; it is between -0.01 and 0.01. As expected, the confidence
intervals become larger as redundant interactive fixed effects are included.
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Table A.2. Wage and employment effects of the minimum wage on the high impact group; alternative specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Wage elasticity wrt MW 0.234*** 0.204*** 0.182*** 0.237*** 0.191*** 0.217***
(0.029) (0.025) (0.023) (0.031) (0.029) (0.024)
Number of factors 1
Observations 4,488 4,488 4,488 4,488 4,488 4,488
Average p 0.482 0.482 0.482 0.482 0.482 0.482
Emp. elasticity wrt MW 0.006 -0.104*** -0.056 0.024 0.061 0.023
(0.042) (0.026) (0.039) (0.047) (0.046) (0.046)
Number of factors 2
Observations 4,488 4,488 4,488 4,488 4,488 4,488
Average p 0.521 0.521 0.521 0.521 0.521 0.521
Emp. elasticity wrt wage 0.027 -0.510 -0.309 0.101 0.321 0.105
(0.224) (0.158) (0.223) (0.227) (0.278) (0.247)
Specification
Interactive F.E. Y
Linear state trends Y Y Y
Division-quarter FE Y Y
AMS, Levels Y
Notes: State-by-quarter collapsed 1996-2017 CPS-ORG and Basic Monthly CPS are used. Estimated wage and employment elasticities with respect to the minimum wage, and the implied
employment elasticity with respect to wage for the high impact group are reported. The implied employment elasticity with respect to wage is obtained by dividing the employment
elasticity with respect to minimum wage to the wage elasticity with respect to the minimum wage. The first column employs the preferred interactive fixed effects model. Column 2
employs the canonical two-way fixed effects model. Column 3-5 augments the canonical model with linear state trends and/or division-by-perid fixed effects as indicated in the table.
The sixth column uses the two-stage least squares model along the lines of Autor et al. (2016). Standard errors of the employment and wage elasticities with respect to minimum
wage are calculated using state-level cluster-robust variance estimator. To calculate the standard errors of the implied employment elasticity with respect to wage, we estimate 250
state-level clustered bootstrap iterations for minimum wage-employment and wage elasticities. Each estimated employment elasticity with respect to the minimum wage is divided by
the corresponding wage elasticity to construct an empirical distribution of the employment elasticity with respect to wage, which is used to estimate the standard error. All estimates are
state population weighted. Significance levels are * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
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Table A.3. Wage and employment effects of the minimum wage on the baseline group; alternative specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Wage elasticity wrt MW 0.117*** 0.093*** 0.098*** 0.116*** 0.105*** 0.133***
(0.018) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025)
Number of factors 3
Observations 4,488 4,488 4,488 4,488 4,488 4,488
Average p 0.291 0.291 0.291 0.291 0.291 0.291
Emp. elasticity wrt MW 0.036 -0.039** -0.032 0.010 0.011 0.026
(0.024) (0.016) (0.025) (0.030) (0.029) (0.038)
Number of factors 3
Observations 4,488 4,488 4,488 4,488 4,488 4,488
Average p 0.328 0.328 0.328 0.328 0.328 0.328
Emp. elasticity wrt wage 0.312 -0.418 -0.321 0.084 0.107 0.196
(0.298) (0.201) (0.342) (0.273) (0.331) (0.323)
Specification
Interactive F.E. Y
Linear state trends Y Y Y
Division-quarter FE Y Y
AMS, Levels Y
Notes: State-by-quarter collapsed 1996-2017 CPS-ORG and Basic Monthly CPS are used. Estimated wage and employment elasticities with respect to the minimum wage, and the implied
employment elasticity with respect to wage for the baseline group are reported. The implied employment elasticity with respect to wage is obtained by dividing the employment
elasticity with respect to minimum wage to the wage elasticity with respect to the minimum wage. The first column employs the preferred interactive fixed effects model. Column 2
employs the canonical two-way fixed effects model. Column 3-5 augments the canonical model with linear state trends and/or division-by-perid fixed effects as indicated in the table.
The sixth column uses the two-stage least squares model along the lines of Autor et al. (2016). Standard errors of the employment and wage elasticities with respect to minimum
wage are calculated using state-level cluster-robust variance estimator. To calculate the standard errors of the implied employment elasticity with respect to wage, we estimate 250
state-level clustered bootstrap iterations for minimum wage-employment and wage elasticities. Each estimated employment elasticity with respect to the minimum wage is divided by
the corresponding wage elasticity to construct an empirical distribution of the employment elasticity with respect to wage, which is used to estimate the standard error. All estimates are
state population weighted. Significance levels are * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
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Tables A.2 and A.3 report the findings for the high impact and the baseline
groups obtained from the commonly used specifications in the literature. These
specifications augment the canonical model with state-specific linear trends and/or
division-by-period fixed effects. We also report the estimates using the two-stage
least squares specification proposed by Autor, Manning and Smith (2016). The esti-
mates in both tables indicate that augmenting the canonical model with additional
controls to address spatial heterogeneities qualitatively changes the results. In all
cases, the null hypothesis of no effect is concluded.
Table A.4. Wage and employment effects of the minimum wage on the baseline
group; state of residence among predictors
Group: High impact group Baseline group
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Wage elasticity wrt MW 0.234*** 0.256*** 0.117*** 0.103***
(0.029) (0.023) (0.018) (0.018)
Emp. elasticity wrt MW 0.006 0.051 0.036 0.035
(0.042) (0.058) (0.024) (0.026)
Emp. elasticity wrt wage 0.027 0.201 0.312 0.340
(0.224) (0.286) (0.298) (0.364)
Specification
Interactive F.E. Y Y Y Y
Predictor set
State Indicators Y Y
Notes: State-by-quarter collapsed 1996-2017 CPS-ORG and Basic Monthly CPS are used. Estimated wage and employment
elasticities with respect to the minimum wage, and the implied employment elasticity with respect to wage for the baseline
group are reported. Columns 1 and 2 employ the high impact group; while columns 3 and 4 the baseline groups. The first
and third columns construct the samples using the preferred prediction model. The second and fourth columns construct the
samples using the model that includes state of residence among predictors. All columns employ the preferred interactive
fixed effects model. The implied employment elasticity with respect to wage is obtained by dividing the employment
elasticity with respect to minimum wage to the wage elasticity with respect to the minimum wage. Standard errors of the
employment and wage elasticities with respect to minimum wage are calculated using state-level cluster-robust variance
estimator. To calculate the standard errors of the implied employment elasticity with respect to wage, we estimate 250 state-
level clustered bootstrap iterations for minimum wage-employment and wage elasticities. Each estimated employment
elasticity with respect to the minimum wage is divided by the corresponding wage elasticity to construct an empirical
distribution of the employment elasticity with respect to wage, which is used to estimate the standard error. All estimates
are state population weighted. Significance levels are * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
184
Table A.4 report the findings for the high impact and the baseline groups that
are constructed using the preferred prediction model and the model that augments
it by including state of residence in the predictor set. For the high impact group,
the wage elasticity estimate with the augmented prediction model is slightly larger
(0.256 (0.023) instead of 0.234 (0.029)). However, the employment elasticity with re-
spect to minimum wage as well as employment elasticity with respect to wage are
both less precise with the latter prediction model, suggesting that the less compa-
rable samples (due to the use of state of residence as predictor) across states yielded
less precise estimates. For the baseline group, all estimates are highly similar. This
is expected since ,according to Figure A.2, the improvements with a larger pre-
dictor set is more pronounced when the recall is smaller, and disappears for more
inclusive samples.
Table A.5 reports the estimated employment and wage effects of the minimum
wage of Figure A.8 obtained from the bunching estimator developed by Cengiz
et al. (2018). As expected, none of the groups (high impact, baseline, non-baseline)
experience an employment decline in the aftermath of minimum wage increases.
As a result of this, employment elasticities with respect to affected wage are always
close to 0, suggesting an increase in the total wage bill devoted to those affected by
the minimum wage.
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Table A.5. Decomposing the bunching estimates by groups
Group: High impact group Baseline group Non-baseline group All workers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Missing jobs below new MW (∆b) -0.012*** -0.019*** -0.004*** -0.023***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004)
Excess jobs above new MW (∆a) 0.012*** 0.019*** 0.005*** 0.024***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004)
%∆ affected wages 0.070*** 0.060*** 0.076*** 0.063***
(0.008) (0.011) (0.024) (0.010)
%∆ affected employment -0.014 -0.000 0.038 0.009
(0.027) (0.029) (0.054) (0.027)
Employment elasticity w.r.t. MW -0.005 -0.000 0.009 0.009
(0.011) (0.020) (0.013) (0.025)
Emp. elasticity w.r.t. affected wage -0.199 -0.004 0.496 0.146
(0.391) (0.487) (0.587) (0.414)
Jobs below new MW (b–1) 0.038 0.067 0.022 0.089
%∆ MW 0.096 0.096 0.096 0.096
Number of events 125 125 125 125
Number of observations 525,096 525,096 525,096 525,096
Controls
Bin-state FE Y Y Y Y
Bin-period FE Y Y Y Y
Notes. The QCEW-benchmarked CPS-ORG is used. The baseline model specification of Cengiz et al. (2018) is used. Fol-
lowing the procedure described in footnote 49, we decompose estimated changes in the number of jobs (relative to the
total employment 1 year before the treatment) after a minimum wage event by group membership. Column (1), (2), and
(3) report estimates for the high impact, the baseline groups, and all workers with predicted probabilities smaller than
0.110 (non-baseline group). Column (4) reports the overall estimates. Robust standard errors clustered at state-level are
reported. All estimates are state population weighted. Significance levels are * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
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Table A.6. Comparing the commonly examined demographic groups with boosting proposed samples
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Wage elasticity wrt MW 0.295*** 0.291*** 0.144*** 0.261*** 0.206*** 0.245*** 0.140*** 0.209*** 0.093*** 0.146***
(0.029) (0.025) (0.026) (0.030) (0.028) (0.030) (0.024) (0.032) (0.027) (0.017)
Number of factors 0 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 3
Observations 4,485 4,487 4,488 4,488 4,488 4,488 4,488 4,488 4,488 4,488
Average p
Emp. elasticity wrt MW 0.017 -0.002 0.014 0.018 0.046 0.012 0.056** 0.001 -0.006 0.011
(0.079) (0.071) (0.036) (0.058) (0.031) (0.049) (0.022) (0.040) (0.014) (0.027)
Number of factors 2 2 1 2 3 2 3 2 3 3
Observations 4,488 4,488 4,488 4,488 4,488 4,488 4,488 4,488 4,488 4,488
Average p
Emp. elasticity wrt wage 0.058 -0.007 0.095 0.070 0.223 0.049 0.401 0.004 -0.069 0.072
(0.322) (0.294) (0.334) (0.283) (0.264) (0.251) (0.306) (0.269) (0.509) (0.284)
Recall 0.22 0.22 0.31 0.31 0.36 0.36 0.46 0.46 0.64 0.64
Group: Teen Boosting LTHS Boosting HSL, under 30 Boosting HSL, under 40 Boosting HSL Boosting
Notes: State-by-quarter collapsed 1996-2017 CPS-ORG and Basic Monthly CPS are used. Estimated wage and employment elasticities with respect to the minimum wage, and the
implied employment elasticity with respect to wage are reported. The implied employment elasticity with respect to wage is obtained by dividing the employment elasticity with respect
to minimum wage to the wage elasticity with respect to the minimum wage. The columns 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 include only teen, less than high school, high school or less younger than
30, high school or less younger than 40, and all high school or less individuals, respectively. Columns 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 use the predicted probabilities to construct samples of the same
recall values as those to their left. All columns use the preferred IFE specification. Standard errors of the employment and wage elasticities with respect to minimum wage are calculated
using state-level cluster-robust variance estimator. To calculate the standard errors of the implied employment elasticity with respect to wage, we estimate 250 state-level clustered
bootstrap iterations for minimum wage-employment and wage elasticities. Each estimated employment elasticity with respect to the minimum wage is divided by the corresponding
wage elasticity to construct an empirical distribution of the employment elasticity with respect to wage, which is used to estimate the standard error. All estimates are state population
weighted. Significance levels are * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
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Table A.6 presents further evidence for benefits of asking the question “who
are minimum wage workers” before examining effects of the policy. In the odd
numbered columns of the table, we report wage, and employment elasticities with
respect to the minimum wage, and employment elasticity with respect to wage
for teens (column 1), individuals with no high school degree (column 3), those
younger than 30 with high school or less education (column 5), those younger
than 40 with high school or less education (column 7), and all observations with
high school or less education (column 9). These samples are studied by scholars,
primarily because the observations are likely to work for low wages. In even-
numbered columns, we produce corresponding samples using the predicted prob-
abilities that include the same number of minimum wage workers (i.e. same re-
call). In almost all cases the estimated wage effects are considerably larger for the
samples proposed by the boosting. The only exception is the teen sample (column
1 vs. 2), where the difference is minuscule. This suggests that the predictions al-
low us to observe the primary effect of the policy more clearly. Furthermore, we
see that estimated confidence intervals of the employment elasticities with respect
to wage are always smaller in even-numbered columns. Put differently, the latter
estimates have more statistical power and more informative. The magnitude of the
power increase varies from sample to sample, and tends to be larger for samples
with higher recall values.
Tables A.7 and A.8 report the findings for the selected demographic subgroups
of the high impact and the baseline groups.
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Table A.7. Wage and employment effects of the minimum wage on demographic subgroups of the high impact group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Wage elasticity wrt MW 0.295*** 0.221*** 0.237*** 0.234*** 0.215*** 0.263*** 0.174***
(0.030) (0.029) (0.067) (0.023) (0.045) (0.028) (0.035)
Number of factors 0 1 0 1 1 1 1
Observations 4,485 4,488 4,332 4,488 4,479 4,488 4,487
Average p 0.562 0.491 0.478 0.535 0.430 0.528 0.411
Emp. elasticity wrt MW 0.012 0.005 -0.014 -0.031 0.063 0.027 -0.000
(0.080) (0.052) (0.083) (0.050) (0.054) (0.068) (0.034)
Number of factors 2 1 1 1 0 2 1
Observations 4,488 4,488 4,488 4,488 4,488 4,488 4,488
Average p 0.603 0.520 0.532 0.575 0.441 0.575 0.418
Emp. elasticity wrt wage 0.041 0.021 -0.058 -0.135 0.292 0.104 -0.001
(0.321) (0.274) (0.544) (0.270) (0.276) (0.339) (0.308)
Group: Teen Woman Black/Hispanic LTHS HSG HSL, under 30 Non-teen
Notes: The 1996-2017 state-by-year collapsed CPS-ORG and Basic Monthly CPS are used. Estimated wage and employment elasticities with respect to the minimum wage, and the
implied employment elasticity with respect to wage for the demographic subgroups of the high impact group are reported. The implied employment elasticity with respect to wage is
obtained by dividing the employment elasticity with respect to minimum wage to the wage elasticity with respect to the minimum wage. The demographic subgroups are teen, non-
teen, woman, black or hispanic, less than high school (LTHS), high school or less younger than 30 (HSL, age<30) observations as well as high school graduates with no college education
(HSG). Standard errors of the employment and wage elasticities with respect to minimum wage are calculated using state-level cluster-robust variance estimator. To calculate the standard
errors of the implied employment elasticity with respect to wage, we estimate 250 state-level clustered bootstrap iterations for minimum wage-employment and wage elasticities. Each
estimated employment elasticity with respect to the minimum wage is divided by the corresponding wage elasticity to construct an empirical distribution of the employment elasticity
with respect to wage, which is used to estimate the standard error. All estimates are weighted by the corresponding subgroup’s population in the state. Significance levels are * 0.10, **
0.05, *** 0.01.
189
Table A.8. Wage and employment effects of demographic subgroups of the baseline group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Wage elasticity wrt MW 0.295*** 0.157*** 0.116*** 0.154*** 0.129*** 0.209*** 0.091*** 0.091***
(0.029) (0.028) (0.033) (0.022) (0.033) (0.028) (0.019) (0.033)
Number of factors 0 1 2 1 1 1 3 1
Observations 4,485 4,488 4,474 4,488 4,488 4,488 4,488 4,488
Average p 0.553 0.303 0.276 0.395 0.233 0.377 0.240 0.220
Emp. elasticity wrt MW 0.017 0.054 0.010 -0.008 0.060** 0.038 0.034* 0.046**
(0.079) (0.037) (0.048) (0.037) (0.023) (0.032) (0.017) (0.020)
Number of factors 2 2 1 1 2 3 2 1
Observations 4,488 4,488 4,488 4,488 4,488 4,488 4,488 4,488
Average p 0.597 0.334 0.325 0.446 0.240 0.449 0.247 0.228
Emp. elasticity wrt wage 0.058 0.347 0.084 -0.052 0.465 0.179 0.372 0.505
(0.322) (0.304) (0.839) (0.316) (0.407) (0.293) (0.350) (0.744)
Group: Teen Woman Black/Hispanic LTHS HSG HSL, under 30 Non-teen Prime Age
Notes: The 1996-2017 state-by-year collapsed CPS-ORG and Basic Monthly CPS are used. Estimated wage and employment elasticities with respect to the minimum wage, and the
implied employment elasticity with respect to wage for the demographic subgroups of the baseline group are reported. The implied employment elasticity with respect to wage is
obtained by dividing the employment elasticity with respect to minimum wage to the wage elasticity with respect to the minimum wage. The demographic subgroups are teen, non-teen,
woman, black or hispanic, less than high school (LTHS), high school or less younger than 30 (HSL, age<30) observations as well as high school graduates with no college education (HSG),
and prime-age individuals. Standard errors of the employment and wage elasticities with respect to minimum wage are calculated using state-level cluster-robust variance estimator.
To calculate the standard errors of the implied employment elasticity with respect to wage, we estimate 250 state-level clustered bootstrap iterations for minimum wage-employment
and wage elasticities. Each estimated employment elasticity with respect to the minimum wage is divided by the corresponding wage elasticity to construct an empirical distribution
of the employment elasticity with respect to wage, which is used to estimate the standard error. All estimates are weighted by the corresponding subgroup’s population in the state.
Significance levels are * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
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A.5 Re-examination of Clemens et al. (2018)
Our empirical examination in section 1.5 shows that the minimum wage in-
creases have not caused a systematic decline in own-employment-based health
insurance coverage rate. This finding conflicts with Clemens, Kahn and Meer
(2018)’s conclusion that state-level minimum wage increases between 2011 and
2016 have decreased the likelihood of individuals reporting having employment-
based health insurance.
According to Clemens, Kahn and Meer (2018)’s framework, the labor compen-
sation is composed of cash wages, w, and non-cash benefits, b. In the absence of a
minimum wage, the firm offers an amount equal to w∗ + b∗ to workers, and work-
ers choose the cash wage level (w∗) that maximizes their utility. Introduction of
the minimum wage may force the firm to increase the cash wages if MW > w∗.
However, this, in turn, leads the firm to decrease the non-cash benefits in order to
diminish the rise in the total labor compensation due to the policy. Therefore, the
worker might be worse off after a minimum wage increase due to the decline in b
even if the total labor compensation (w∗ + b∗) increases.
Their empirical analysis find that the negative effect is concentrated for individ-
uals in very low occupations (SOC occupation codes 3530, 3590, and 3930). Using
the American Community Survey, they find that (in their Table 4 column 4) the av-
erage minimum wage increase during the period caused a decline of 1.88 (0.60)
percentage point decline in employment-based health insurance for the group.
Transforming the estimate using the mean of the dependent variable (45.6%) and
minimum wage ($7.770) reported in their table 2 column 1, we calculate that the
employment-based health insurance elasticity with respect to the minimum wage
is -0.320 (0.102). This estimate rejects both of our relatively comparable estimates
for the high impact group in columns 1 and 3 of table 1.6.
The authors employ the following specification;
191
Yi,o,s,t = βMinimumwages,t + γXs,t + χo,t + ωo,s + ei,o,s,t, (A.6)
where i is for individual, o for occupation, s for state of residence, and t for year.
The outcome variable is an indicator that is 1 if the individual has health insurance
through a current employer, former employer, or union. The variable of interest
is Minimumwages,t, the level of statutory minimum wage in state s year t. X are
control variables. It includes state-level median housing price index, and employ-
ment rate to account for state-time varying business cycles. In addition, it contains
controls for the market concentration of insurance providers and the effects of Af-
fordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion. χo,t and ωo,s are occupation-by-time, and
state-by-time fixed effects. The findings they obtained using a less saturated spec-
ification where X is removed from the regression equation, and χo,t and ωo,s are
replaced by year, and state fixed effects point towards a qualitatively similar result.
Their less saturated specification (Table 4 column 1) suggests 1.45 (0.61) percentage
point decline in the employment-based coverage rate.
Although we employ a different model specification, a longer data set and more
variation in the minimum wage in section 1.5, our examination reveals that the pri-
mary reason behind the discrepancy is due to the use of an inadequate outcome
variable by Clemens, Kahn and Meer (2018). The authors employ the variable
“HINSEMP” in the ACS (Ruggles et al., 2018). HINSEMP is an indicator vari-
able that takes on the value of 1 if the respondent had health insurance through
current or former employer, or union. The questionnaire text is “Is this person
CURRENTLY covered by ... [health] insurance through a current or former em-
ployer or union (of this person or another family member)?” Thus, the variable
does not distinguish individuals that are the policyholders from those having it as
dependents, and codes both of them “Yes”. In other words, respondents covered
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by another family member’s employer or union also take the value of 1 even if
they do not have employment-based health insurance related to their work.
A variable similar to the “HINSEMP” can be created using the CPS-ASEC. The
advantage of the latter data set is that it can distinguish policyholders from de-
pendents. The variable GROUPOWN (GROUPDEP) indicates those who have
employment-based insurance related to their work (as a dependent).14 In addi-
tion, the CPS allows us to determine the policyholder that covers the dependent
as well. Examining the 2012-2014 CPS-ASEC, we find that 42.68% of individu-
als employed in the very low wage occupations have employment-based health
insurance as policyholder or dependent in 2011-2016. However, 64.6% of those
with employment-based health insurance coverage do not have it as policyhold-
ers, but only as dependents. In addition, it is very uncommon for policyholders
covering the latter individuals to have occupations categorized as the very low
wage (SOC occupation codes 3530, 3590, and 3930), or the low wage occupations
(SOC 3520, 3990, and 4120) according the Clemens et al.’s classification.15,16 Only
1.79% (3.07%) of them are employed in a very low wage occupation (low wage oc-
cupation); while 45.4% are employed in high paying management, business, and
financial, or professional and related occupations. This coincides with our pre-
dicted probability estimates for the policyholders covering individuals in the very
14In fact, until 2013, a summary variable with the same name (HINSEMP) appears in the CPS
dataset published by IPUMS as well. As noted by Flood et al. (2017), it is conceptually similar to the
one in the ACS. The primary difference between the two, however, is that the question in the ACS
is whether the individual has employment-based health insurance at the time of the survey; while
the CPS asks whether the individual had employment-based health insurance last year. HINSEMP
variable in the CPS is discontinued in 2014, though it can be re-created using GROUPOWN and
GROUPDEP variables.
15There is a many-to-one correspondence between occupation codes in the CPS and SOC for the
very low wage and low wage occupations, allowing us to correctly determine individuals belong-
ing to either group.
16We use GRPWHO1 and GRPWHO2 variables to determine the policyholder covering individ-
uals in the very low wage occupations.
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low wage occupations. The median (mean) predicted probability for the former
group to be employed in a job paying less than 125% of the minimum wage is
0.029 (0.050). Less than 10% (1.5%) of them are in the baseline group (high impact
group). Thus, it is highly unlikely for a minimum wage increase to affect the de-
pendent individuals’ health insurance. Put differently, finding that the conclusions
are driven by a decline in the coverage rate as dependent potentially reveals that
the argued causal relationship is unwarranted. This finding would also be incon-
sistent with the framework presented by the authors. They argue that when the
minimum wage raises the cash wages, firms choose to decrease non-cash benefits.
The relationship is between individual’s cash wages and non-cash benefits. They
do not claim to establish a relationship between rising cash wages of individuals in
the very low wage occupations and the employment-based health insurance plans
of other family members that are unlikely to be minimum wage workers.
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Table A.9. Re-examination of Clemens, Kahn and Meer (2018)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Minimum Wage (Level) -0.015** -0.023*** -0.016 -0.039** 0.003 -0.001 -0.025** -0.045***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.012) (0.018) (0.008) (0.013) (0.011) (0.014)
Elasticity wrt MW -0.246** -0.396*** -0.288 -0.705** 0.151 -0.031 -0.678** -1.214***
(0.104) (0.091) (0.213) (0.321) (0.397) (0.652) (0.284) (0.376)
Observations 323,657 323,053 18,313 18,136 18,313 18,136 18,313 18,136
Mean of the MW 7.773 7.773 7.773 7.773 7.773 7.773 7.773 7.773
Mean of the dep. var. 0.461 0.461 0.427 0.427 0.151 0.151 0.289 0.289
Average p 0.285 0.285 0.254 0.254 0.254 0.254 0.254 0.254
Data ACS ACS CPS CPS CPS CPS CPS CPS
Dependent Variable HINSEMP HINSEMP HINSEMP HINSEMP GROUPOWN GROUPOWN GROUPDEP GROUPDEP
Specification
TWFE, Occupation FE Y Y Y Y
State-occupation FE Y Y Y Y
Year-occupation FE Y Y Y Y
Macroeconomic controls Y Y Y Y
ACA expansion by year Y Y Y Y
Notes: The 2011-2016 ACS, and the 2012-2017 CPS-ASEC are employed. Estimated effects of a \$1 increase in the minimum wage on the probability of having employment-based and
own-employment-based health insurance, and the corresponding minimum wage elasticities are reported. The elasticities are calculated by multiplying the former estimate with the ratio
of the mean minimum wage to the mean of the dependent variable. Even-numbered columns employ equation A.6, and the odd-numbered columns employ the less saturated versions.
Columns 1 and 2 employ the ACS, shows our replication of columns 1 and 4 of Table 4 in Clemens et al. (2018). Columns 3 and 4 employs the CPS-ASEC and the constructed employment-
based health insurance variable (HINSEMP). The dependent variables in columns 5-6 and 7-8 are GROUPOWN and GROUPDEP variables. All estimates are state population weighted.
Significance levels are * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
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Table A.9 shows that the argued negative relationship is entirely driven by a de-
cline in the rate of employment-based health insurance as dependent. In column
1 (2), we employ the less saturated model (equation A.6), and closely match the
reported estimates in Table 4 column 1 (4) in Clemens, Kahn and Meer (2018).17,18
In columns 3 and 4, we use the same models to assess whether using the CPS
qualitatively alters the conclusions. While the less saturated model yields a very
similar point estimate (though less precise since the number of observations in
the CPS is smaller), the saturated model suggests a stronger negative effect when
the CPS is employed. Hence, we conclude that the use of the CPS does not ex-
plain the discrepancy between their and our results. In columns 5 and 6, we
use the GROUPOWN variable as the outcome. Neither of the models indicate a
negative effect. Individuals in the very low wage occupations did not lose own-
employment-based health insurances. On the other hand, columns 7 and 8 re-
veal that they have lost their employment-based health insurances as dependents.
Given that the policyholders are likely not affected by the minimum wage, this
effect cannot be related to the minimum wage changes. Put differently, the argued
minimum wage effect appears where there should not be.
Therefore, although it appears that Clemens, Kahn and Meer (2018)’s findings
are conflicting with ours, we conclude that the discrepancy disappears when the
outcome variable implied by their framework is employed.
17For comparability across data sets, we exclude observations living in institutional group quar-
ters from the ACS.
18The exact numbers reported in Clemens, Kahn and Meer (2018) are -0.0145 (0.00612) and -0.0188
(0.00603).
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B.1 Data Appendix
Table B.1. Data Appendix
Variables Description PanelStructure/Source
Total Number of
Syrian Guests in
Turkey
Total number of Syrian migrants
temporary protection in Turkey
Annual,
National-level /
Ministry of Interior,
Directorate General
of Migration
Management
Province-level
residence data of
Syrian guests in
2015
Province level distribution of Syrians
under temporary protection in 2015
Province level /
Ministry of Interior,
Directorate General
of Migration
Management
Employment rate
of Syrian guests
Employment rate of Syrian migrants at
national level
National-level /
Balcılar and Nugent
(2016)
Treatment Regions
(Provinces)
Regions (Provinces) that the number of
Syrian migrants in 2015 is more than 10%
of the native population are considered as
treated regions. The first treatment year is
2012. Used in the DiD and the GSC.
Annual, NUTS-2 or
province-level /
Constructed variable
Control Regions
(Provinces)
Regions (Provinces) that the number of
Syrian migrants in 2015 is less than 2% of
the native population are considered as
control regions. Used in the DiD and the
GSC.
Annual, NUTS-2 or
province-level /
Constructed variable
Native Population The total number of native population. Annual, provincelevel / TURKSTAT
Native Working
Age Population
The number of native population of ages
15-64.
Annual, NUTS-2
level / TURKSTAT
Household Labor
Force Survey
Employment The number of native working populationbetween ages 15-64.
Individual level /
TURKSTAT
Household Labor
Force Survey
Informal
Employment
The number of native working population
between ages 15-64 with no social security
coverage
Individual level /
TURKSTAT
Household Labor
Force Survey
Education
The educational level of the native
population between ages 15-64. Categories
are; less than primary school, primary
school, middle school, high school,
vocational high school, some college or
college, graduate school
Individual level /
TURKSTAT
Household Labor
Force Survey
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Table B.1 : Data Appendix (continued)
Variables Description PanelStructure/Source
Age The categorical age variable. Categoriesare [15, 20), [20, 25) . . . [60, 65).
Individual level /
TURKSTAT
Household Labor
Force Survey
Wage
Monthly after tax wage data of the native
working population between ages 15-64.
Includes bonuses, performance pays.
Individual level /
TURKSTAT
Household Labor
Force Survey
New Residential
Building Permits
The number of new building permits
given for dwelling purposes.
Administrative data.
Annual, Province
level / TURKSTAT
New Residential
Occupancy
Permits
The number of new occupancy permits
given for completed buildings for
dwelling purposes. Administrative data.
Annual, Province
level / TURKSTAT
Total number of
new company
establishments
The number of new company
establishments in each province.
Administrative data.
Annual, Province
level / TOBB
Total number of
firm
establishments by
Syrian founders,
province-level
Similar to above, only by Syrian nationals.
Administrative data.
Annual, Province
level / TOBB,
Özpınar, Bas¸ıhos¸ and
Kulaksız (2015)
Total amount of
start-up capital
invested
Total amount of capital invested initially in
new firms. Administrative data.
Annual, Province
level / TOBB
Total amount of
start-up capital
invested by Syrian
founders
Similar to above, only by Syrian nationals.
Administrative data.
Annual, Province
level / TOBB
Gross Provincial
Product
The value which is equal to the sum of the
values of taxes minus subsidies and gross
value added by province.
Annual, Province
level / TURKSTAT
Arabic Speaking
Population in 1965
Total number of people with Arabic as the
first language
Province level /
TURKSTAT
Notes: The table reports all the variables, the descriptions, and the data sources used.
B.2 Re-examination of Tumen (2016) and Del Carpio and Wagner
(2015)
This section presents our observations on the main findings of Tumen (2016),
and Del Carpio and Wagner (2015).
We begin with Tumen (2016). The study estimates that the informal employ-
ment rate significantly declines by 2.3% in the regions that host a relatively large
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share of Syrian migrants. The four main differences between the baseline regres-
sion model of Tumen (2016) and the DiD specification used in panel A of table 2.3
are 1) treated and control regions included in the regression, 2) time period, 3) the
method used in calculating standard errors, and 4) demographic controls. 1
There are five treated and four control regions in Tumen (2016). Their definition
for the treated region is more inclusive, so it includes all of our treated regions and
two of the regions we drop from the primary sample. The four control regions
are geographically proximate to the treated ones. Our primary control sample
includes all of them. Secondly, the sample Tumen (2016) employs is from 2010
to 2013. Thirdly, Tumen (2016) accounts for neither the fact that the value of the
variable of interest does not change across individuals for a given region-year nor
the serial correlation. Lastly, Tumen (2016) includes gender, marital status, age,
education, age-by-education, and urban area controls in the regressions.
1They drop observations that report birth places other than Turkey and defines two NUTS-2
regions (Adana and Mersin) that are dropped from our primary sample as treated regions. The
difference due to dropping people born abroad is negligible, constitutes less than %1 of Tumen
(2016)’s sample, and the variable is absent in earlier surveys. Hence, we keep these observations.
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Table B.2. Re-examination of Tumen (2016)
Time Span: Yrs 2010 to 2013 Yrs 2010 to 2013 Yrs 2004 to 2015 Yrs 2004 to 2015 Yrs 2004 to 2015 Yrs 2004 to 2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
βˆ -0.0226 -0.0237 -0.0425 0.0392* 0.0402 0.0082
H.C. se (0.0028) (0.0030) (0.0018) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0014)
C.R. se (0.0183) (0.0211) (0.0230) (0.0218) (0.0236) (0.0207)
C.R. p-value 0.252 0.294 0.101 0.087 0.109 0.699
# Clusters 9 9 9 21 16 12
# Treated clusters 5 5 5 4 4 5
Observations 354,513 354,513 1,074,587 3,250,172 2,095,268 1,580,976
Specification
Demographic controls Y
Tumen (2016) regions Y Y Y
Placebo Y Y
Primary sample control regions Y Y
Western & Tumen (2016)
control regions excluded
Y
Notes: The table reports the change in the informal employment rate in the treated regions after the migration shock, using individual-level 2004-2015 TURK-
STAT Household Labor Force Survey. The dependent variable is the indicator for informal employment. The first column replicates the column 1 of table 1
in Tumen (2016). First line reports the point estimate, the second line the heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors, and the third line the robust standard
errors clustered at NUTS-2 level. Demographic controls include gender, marital status, age, education, age-by-education, and urban area controls. Placebo
specification indicates the regressions where we define Tumen (2016) control regions as the treated regions, and the treated regions in Tumen (2016) are ex-
cluded from the sample. Tumen (2016) control regions are Erzurum, Agri, Malatya and Van. Primary sample control regions are the ones shown in figure 3,
and the Western regions are Istanbul (TR1), West Marmara (TR2), Aegean (TR3), and West Anatolia (TR5) regions.
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In table B.2, we search for the factors causing the discrepancy in conclusions.
In column 1, we replicate Tumen (2016)’s main finding: Informal employment rate
falls by 2.3 percentage points in the regions with high Syrian density. Our replica-
tion matches perfectly with the reported estimate (first row) and the heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard error (second row) in Tumen (2016). In the third row, we clus-
ter the standard errors at NUTS-2 regional level. This more than quintuples the
standard errors and renders the estimate insignificant. As shown in Bertrand,
Duflo and Mullainathan (2004), when the data is at individual-level, the use of
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors severely over-rejects the true null hy-
pothesis if the treatment affects every individual in the region. Then, the first rea-
son behind the discrepancy in findings is due to the use of different inference meth-
ods. Column 1 of table B.2 shows that allowing for within-region correlation of the
errors renders Tumen (2016)’s main estimate insignificant.
In column 2, we do not control for demographic factors. The finding of this
column is qualitatively same as the first one: The informal employment rate de-
clines by 2.4 percentage points, and the 95% confidence interval estimated using
the cluster-robust standard error is too large to reject the null hypothesis. In col-
umn 3, we expand the time span of the sample to explore whether it is the longer
panel causing the conflict. This increases the absolute magnitude of the negative
estimate (βˆ = −0.04); hence, we conclude that neither the time window nor the use
of demographic controls is causing the discrepancy.
In columns 4 and 5 of table B.2, we estimate a geographic placebo test along
the lines of Zipperer (2016). Essentially, we drop the treated regions as defined
by Tumen (2016) from the sample and assign a placebo shock to their 4 control
regions. In column 4, we use all the other 17 NUTS-2 regions in Turkey for control
regions; while in column 5, we only use the control regions in our primary sample
(4 proximate ones as placebo treated regions and remaining 12 as controls). Both
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regressions produce essentially the same estimate. Compared to other regions in
Turkey, the control regions of Tumen (2016) have experienced 4 percentage points
increase in the informal employment rate. In other words, the negative estimated
effect in Tumen (2016) is essentially due to the increase in informal employment
rate in the control regions compared to the rest of Turkey. When other non-Western
regions with small Syrian population are used as controls for their treated regions
in column 6, the negative estimate disappears. The estimated effect is positive and
very close to zero (βˆ = 0.01).
In Ceritoglu et al. (2017), they check the robustness of the baseline estimates in
Tumen (2016) by trying 12 different alternative control samples that contain 4 re-
gions. In addition to the aforementioned covariates, this test controls for the log of
regional foreign trade volume. They claim to have confirmed Tumen (2016)’s con-
clusion. We have two criticisms for the test. Firstly, migration affects foreign trade
volume, therefore including the latter as a control removes one of the channels
that counteracts the potential adverse effects (Gaston and Nelson, 2013). Secondly,
there are (26−94 ) = 2380 different possible control samples. It is unclear why only
12 of these regression results are reported.
To summarize, table B.2 shows that the two factors behind the discrepancy are
that the control regions of Tumen (2016) followed a path dissimilar to all other
regions, and their confidence intervals are too narrow.2 Although the confidence
intervals in table B.2 include the baseline estimate of Tumen (2016), they cannot
reject the null hypothesis.
Another study that reports significant negative effect of Syrian migration on
informal employment in Turkey is Del Carpio and Wagner (2015). They compare
2011 and 2014 informal employment rates and employ an instrumental variable
2Unreported RI-t or CGM confidence intervals also contain the null hypothesis.
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strategy. They control for the distance to the border, primarily to prevent changing
trade patterns with Syria due to the war and different underlying economic trends
in distant regions from affecting the estimates. They instrument Syrian guest share
with the travel distance from origin governorates in Syria to NUTS-2 regions in
Turkey using the Google Maps. Thus, the identification depends on the multiple
border-crossings between Turkey and Syria. To assess pre-existing trends, they
perform placebo tests by changing the timing of the shock. In the test, 2009 is
declared as the reference year and 2011 is the post-treatment period.
We make three observations on the study: First, based on the reasoning behind
the use of distance control, it is not entirely clear if an accurate counterfactual is
produced. Changing trade patterns with Syria might as well be due to the migra-
tion, hence should not be controlled but included in the analysis of the effects of
the migration. Additionally, by implicitly increasing the importance of the neigh-
boring regions in the control sample, the issues of Tumen (2016) control sample
might be present here as well. Second, based on the reported estimates in placebo
table, it appears that in the absence of the treatment, the actuals and counterfactu-
als do not follow a parallel trend. Some of the placebo estimates are, in absolute
terms, at least half the size of their benchmark estimates. This makes the estimates
sensitive to the reference year. Concretely, if the year of 2009 or the average of
2009 and 2011 were declared as the reference, the negative informal employment
estimate would be substantially smaller. Third, the standard errors are clustered at
region-by-year level, so they do not account for serial correlation. Doing so might
reveal that standard errors are underestimated.3
3The authors note that there are 26 regions in Turkey; hence clustering at regional level has
caused the over-rejection of the null, and resulted in smaller standard errors. As we point out in
the text, this is expected when the number of clusters is few. However, as shown in Cameron and
Miller (2015), there are methods to address the issue that do not require assuming away the serial
correlation.
204
B.3 Additional Figures and Tables
This section presents additional figures and tables.
Figure B.1 shows the empirical cumulative distribution function of the t-statistics
obtained from placebo employment regressions. The acceptance region for the
null hypothesis when the test size is 5% is relatively large and slightly skewed, yet
the curves are relatively smoothly S-shaped with one visibly clear inflection point.
This indicates that the outliers have not affected RI-t p-values substantially.
Figure B.1. Empirical CDF of employment estimates
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Notes: The empirical cumulative distribution functions of placebo t-values obtained from placebo
regressions of native informal, LTHS (less than high school), HSG (high school graduate and
above), and overall employment rates are plotted. The vertical dash lines indicate 95% acceptance
region of the null hypothesis of no effect, and the vertical straight line shows the true point
estimate.
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Figure B.2. Average wages of all workers over time
Panel A: Difference-in-differences (DiD)
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Panel B: Generalized synthetic control (GSC)
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Notes: The graphs plot the evolution of the average wages in the treated regions, using 2004-2015
NUTS-2-by-year aggregated TURKSTAT Household Labor Force Survey. The vertical dash lines
indicate the first year of the migration shock. The top two figures employ the DiD, and the bottom
two the generalized synthetic control method. The dependent variables in the graphs on the
left-hand side are the average wage; whereas it is the average residual wage for the ones on the
right-hand side. The shaded areas show 95% confidence intervals.
Figure B.2 shows importance of employing the GSC model and the residual
wages as the dependent variable. The DiD specification as well as using the log
wages for the outcome always produce a U-shaped pattern before the shock. This
indicates violation of the parallel trends assumption.
Figure B.3 plots the evolution of occupancy permits in dwelling units. The
rise in the new building permits only means that the government has allowed
entrepreneurs to build on the designated lot. It does not indicate whether build-
ings are erected on the site. The figure confirms that the buildings are in fact con-
structed and ready to be occupied. With approximately two years of lag, starting
206
from the year of 2014, the increase in the number of residential occupancy permits
in dwelling units is considerable and its size is comparable to that of the building
permits. 4
Figure B.3. Impact of Syrian migrants on new residential occupancy permits over
time
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Notes: The figure plots the evolution of the new dwelling unit occupancy permits in the treated
regions, using 2004-2015 province-by-year aggregated TURKSTAT Building Statistics. The vertical
dash line indicates the first year of the migration shock. The GSC suggests the validity of the
difference-in-differences model, hence it is employed. The capped spikes show 95% confidence
intervals, calculated using the standard errors clustered at NUTS-2 level. The regressions are
weighted by gross provincial product.
As we note in footnote 9, there are differences in data collection methods be-
tween pre-2014 and 2014-2015 surveys. They are detailed in TURKSTAT (2014).
The changes arguably improved the precision and representativeness of the sam-
ples; however, significant differences in the distribution of urban and rural areas
4The GSC indicates that the DiD performs the best. Estimating the model with one or two
unobserved factors produces virtually the same results.
207
have emerged due to employing the new administrative divisions. Some settle-
ments that were previously considered as rural are united with greater munici-
palities. Concretely, in 2013, the number of rural (urban) settlements was 36,854
(376) according to pre-2014 divisions, and it was 19,078 (509) according to 2014
divisions. Similarly, the nation-wide rural share of population in 2013 was 27.7%
using the old administrative divisions, yet it was 13.5% according to 2014 regula-
tions. As a result, TURKSTAT removed the rural indicator variable from 2014 and
2015 surveys to prevent its misuse.
Although we do not employ urban-rural divisions in our analyses, the changes
might affect our estimates if the relative weights of observations in urban and ru-
ral settlements are substantially modified. For instance, if employment rates in
rural areas are higher and the control regions are more rural than the treated, then
there might appear a drop in average employment rate in control regions with the
change in sampling methodology. To address it, we construct a control sample that
is similar to the treated in terms of 2011 rural share of population. The rural shares
between treated and control regions are moderately different, 39.8% and 44.1%.
Our examination reveals that 4 of the control regions (Ag˘rı, Kastamonu, Trabzon,
Van) are substantially more rural than any of the treated regions. Excluding them
decreases the rural share of the population in the control regions from 44.1% to
39%.
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Table B.3. Impact of Syrian migrants on native employment; excluding 4 most
rural control regions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
βˆ -0.007 -0.004 0.053 0.010
SE (0.021) (0.034) (0.049) (0.022)
P-value 0.741 0.867 0.366 0.694
# Unobserved factors 1 1 0 0
# Clusters 15 15 15 15
# Treated clusters 3 3 3 3
Observations 180 180 180 180
Groups: Informal LTHS HSG Overall
Notes. The table reports the change in the native informal employment rate, employ-
ment rate of the natives with no high school diploma (LTHS), employment rate of
natives with at least high school degree (HSG), and overall employment rate in the
treated regions after the migration shock, using 2004-2015 NUTS-2-by-year aggregated
TURKSTAT Household Labor Force Survey. In constructing the counterfactual, the 4
most rural regions are excluded from the primary control sample. The dependent vari-
ables are the native informal, LTHS, HSG and overall employment counts normalized
by 2011 working-age population or the population of the demographic group. Ac-
cording to the cross-validation procedure, the DiD or the GSC is employed to estimate
the effects. In the first two columns, where the number of unobserved factors purged
is greater than 0, the GSC standard errors are reported. In the last two columns, the
cross-validation procedure suggests the DiD, and cluster-robust standard errors are re-
ported. Similarly, p-values are produced by the parametric bootstrap technique of the
GSC in the first two columns, and the randomization inference by t-statistic (RI-t) in
the last two columns.
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Table B.4. Impact of Syrian migrants on native wages; excluding 4 most rural
control regions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
βˆ -0.103 -0.006 0.045 0.028
GSC SE (0.140) (0.037) (0.026) (0.030)
GSC p-value 0.476 0.562 0.068 0.373
# Unobserved factors 2 2 2 2
# Clusters 15 15 15 15
# Treated clusters 3 3 3 3
Observations 180 180 180 180
Groups: Informal LTHS HSG Overall
Notes. The table reports the percentage change in the (residual) wages of native infor-
mal, less than high school (LTHS), high school and above graduates (HSG) and overall
workers in the treated regions after the migration shock, using NUTS-2-by-year ag-
gregated 2004-2015 TURKSTAT Household Labor Force Survey. In constructing the
counterfactual, the 4 most rural regions are excluded from the primary control sam-
ple. Only the GSC estimates are reported; because the other specifications are likely to
suffer from the violation of parallel trends assumption. The GSC standard errors and
p-values are calculated using the parametric bootstrap technique. The number of un-
observed factors purged by the GSC is reported.
In tables B.3 and B.4, we present the estimates of employment and wage effects
with the control sample excluding the 4 most rural control regions. We employ
the GSC when the cross-validation procedure deems at least one unobserved fac-
tors important. Otherwise, we use the DiD specification. All the estimates are
essentially the same as the ones presented in the main text, indicating that the new
regulations have not affected our findings. This is not surprising, because our time
path plots in figures 2.4 and 2.6 display no questionable breaks in 2014.
210
Table B.5. Impact of Syrian migrants on employment; additional findings from
sub-groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
βˆ 0.007 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 0.001
GSC SE (0.053) (0.044) (0.025) (0.043) (0.052)
P-value 0.717 0.949 0.965 0.920 0.999
# Unobserved factors 1 2 0 1 1
# Clusters 19 19 19 19 19
# Treated clusters 3 3 3 3 3
Observations 228 228 228 228 228
Groups: Teen LTHS, man
LTHS,
woman
LTHS,
informal
Less than
middle
school
Notes. The table reports the change in the native teen, LTHS male, LTHS woman, LTHS informal em-
ployment rates, and employment rate of native individuals with no middle school degree (LTMS)
in the treated regions after the migration shock, using 2004-2015 NUTS-2-by-year aggregated TURK-
STAT Household Labor Force Survey. The dependent variables are the native teen, LTHS male, LTHS
woman, LTHS informal, and LTMS employment counts normalized by 2011 population of the demo-
graphic group. In columns (1), (2), (4), and (5), the GSC is employed. In column (3), the GSC rec-
ommends the DiD. Reported standard errors and the p-values are the GSC standard errors and cor-
responding p-values, except in column (3). In column (3), we report the standard error clustered at
NUTS-2 level, and the p-value produced by the randomization inference by t-statistic (RI-t). The num-
ber of unobserved factors purged by the GSC is reported.
Table B.5 reports the impact of Syrian migrants on sub-groups of the groups in
table 2.3. The first column reports the change in teen employment-rate. 77% of em-
ployed teens in 2011 are informally employed, hence they are expected to be highly
affected by the shock.5 The second and third columns examine LTHS man and
woman separately to assess whether the effects are similar for men and women.
The fourth column reports the change in informally employed LTHS workers, the
intersection of highly impacted group and highly impacted jobs. The last column
excludes middle school graduates from the highly impacted group, and only con-
siders individuals with less than middle school degree. We find a sizable or statis-
5Note that the compulsory education has increased from 8 years to 12 years in 2012. Thus, the
estimates for teen employment might be partly affected by differential enforcement of the policy.
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tically significant negative effect for none of the sub-groups. The absolute magni-
tudes of the estimates are smaller than 0.01, corroborating our conclusion that the
migrants have not led to employment loss for natives.
For completeness, we present estimated (residual) wage effects using the DiD,
the alternative models (OLS and 2SLS) in table B.6. We wish to caution the reader
that these models are potentially suffering from the pre-existing trends.
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Table B.6. Impact of Syrian migrants on wages; DiD and alternative specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: DiD
βˆ 0.024 0.031 0.053 0.041
Clustered SE (0.053) (0.027) (0.015) (0.017)
RI-t p-value 0.706 0.369 0.042 0.122
# Clusters 19 19 19 19
# Treated clusters 3 3 3 3
Observations 228 228 228 228
Panel B: Alternative model; OLS
βˆ 0.022 0.042 0.051 0.050
Clustered SE (0.054) (0.026) (0.014) (0.014)
CGM p-value 0.695 0.141 0.053 0.058
# Clusters 26 26 26 26
Observations 312 312 312 312
Panel C: 2SLS
βˆ 0.048 0.040 0.055 0.049
Clustered se (0.059) (0.025) (0.013) (0.014)
WRR p-value 0.368 0.137 0.071 0.075
First-stage F-test 35.925 35.925 35.925 35.925
# Clusters 26 26 26 26
Observations 312 312 312 312
Groups: Informal LTHS HSG Overall
Notes. The table reports the percentage change in the (residual) wages of LTHS, in-
formal and overall workers in the treated regions after the migration shock, using
NUTS-2-by-year aggregated 2004-2015 TURKSTAT Household Labor Force Sur-
vey. Panels A, B, and C employ the DiD, the alternative model specification, and
the 2SLS to estimate the effects, respectively. Standard errors clustered at NUTS-2
level, and the corresponding p-values are reported for the precision and the infer-
ence. Panel C reports the first-stage F-statistics.
Due to the existence of one observation with zero residential building permits,
we do not employ log transformation to estimate the percentage change in the
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number of building permits in the main text. However, this model does not re-
quire the approximation in equation 2.7, hence can be considered as a more direct
approach for estimating the percentage change. In table B.7, we present estimated
percentage increases in the residential building permits using the log-transformed
dependent variable. We replace missing observation with 0. The findings are qual-
itatively same as those in 2.5. The GSC recommends the DiD in all columns.
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Table B.7. Impact of Syrian migrants on residential buildings; Log-transformed
dependent variable
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: DiD
βˆ 0.630 0.673 0.472
Clustered se (0.074) (0.069) (0.073)
C.R. p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
# Clusters 67 67 67
# Treated clusters 5 5 5
Observations 804 804 804
Panel B: GSC
βˆ - - -
GSC SE - - -
GSC p-value - - -
# Unobserved factors 0 0 0
# Clusters 67 67 67
# Treated clusters 5 5 5
Observations 804 804 804
Panel C: Alternative model; OLS
βˆ 0.519 0.554 0.365
Clustered se (0.074) (0.093) (0.092)
C.R. p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
# Clusters 81 81 81
Observations 972 972 972
Panel D: 2SLS
βˆ 0.748 0.683 0.302
Clustered se (0.176) (0.179) (0.120)
C.R. p-value 0.000 0.000 0.014
SW F-test; lin. term 7.793 7.793 7.793
SW F-test; quad. term 4.225 4.225 4.225
# Clusters 81 81 81
Observations 972 972 972
Measurement unit m2 dwelling units buildings
Notes: The table reports the percentage change in the residential building permits in the treated regions after the migration
shock, using log-transformed province-by-year aggregated 2004-2015 TURKSTAT building statistics. The dependent vari-
able is the log-transformed building permits in $m^{2}$, in the number of dwelling units, and in the number of buildings.
Panels A, B, C, and D employ the DiD, the GSC, the alternative model specification, and the 2SLS to estimate the effects,
respectively. Standard errors are clustered at province level or the GSC standard errors are reported. The correspond-
ing p-values are reported for inference. Panel B reports the number of unobserved factors purged by the GSC, and panel
D reports Sanderson-Windmeijer first-stage F-statistics. For better precision, the regressions are weighted by 2011 gross
provincial product.
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The main reason behind the absence of an adverse effect might be that it is the
government intervention that enabled the labor markets in the treated regions to
absorb the migrant labor force. To assess whether this explains the demand boost,
we examine the percentage changes in the number of public employees, total pub-
lic investment, and total public services investment after the Syrian migration us-
ing the DiD specification in Table B.8.6 Our premise is that the number of public
employees, and the total public and public services investments increase as the
government intervenes.
The first column indicates a slightly positive increase of 1% in the number of
public employees. The size of the estimate is close to the ones we obtain when
we examine changes in the overall employment in Table 2.3 column 4, and the
point estimate is statistically indistinguishable from zero. In column 2, we find
that the aggregate public investment has increased by 15.7% after the migration in
the treated regions, though the estimate is relatively imprecise to reject the null hy-
pothesis of no change. In addition, the estimate shrinks to 2.4% when we exclude
Mardin from the sample, suggesting that there is no consistent increase in the ag-
gregate public investment in the treated regions. As we document in the column
3, the total public services investment in the treated regions has not increased after
the migration. The results suggest that the government intervention is unlikely to
explain the demand shock.
6We omit the alternative, and the 2SLS specifications since they point towards the same results.
The GSC is not feasible due to the short time window (2009-2015) in column 1. In columns 2 and 3,
the GSC recommends the use of the DiD.
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Table B.8. Impact of Syrian migration on the number of public employees and the
public investment
(1) (2) (3)
βˆ 0.010 0.157 -0.134
Clustered SE (0.022) (0.174) (0.126)
C.R. p-value 0.652 0.369 0.290
# Clusters 67 67 67
# Treated clusters 5 5 5
Years 2009-2015 2004-2015 2004-2015
Observations 469 804 804
Outcome: # Public employees Public investment Public services investment
Notes: The table reports the percentage change in the number of public employees, the total public investment, and the
public services investment in the treated regions after the migration shock. The standard errors are clustered at province
level and the corresponding p-values are reported for inference.
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APPENDIX C
APPENDIX OF CHAPTER 3
C.1 Variable Definitions and Sources
-From Istanbul Chamber of Industry’s TOP 500 Manufacturing Firms database.
Employment: The variable includes firm’s all employees.
Real sales: Inflation-adjusted total revenue in Turkish Lira after the deduction
of returns, allowances for damaged or missing goods and any discounts allowed.
Profit margin: Ratio of the profit to the real sales.
Value-added per sales: The sum of the profit, total wage and interest expenses
of the firm divided by real sales.
-From Privatization Administration database:
Date of asset transfer to the PA: The year when the firm’s assets are transferred
to the Privatization Administration.
Date of sale: The year when the majority of firm’s assets are sold to a private
agent.
Privatized Share: The difference between the share of the firm owned by the
government in the year before the firm’s assets are transferred to the PA and the
share of the firm owned by the government after the sale.
-Constructed variables
PrePA: A binary variable that takes the value of 1 for privatized firms before
the year before the firm’s assets are transferred to the PA. Otherwise, it is 0. For
instance, the variable takes on the value of 1 for all years before 1997 for Asil Celik.
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PA: A binary variable that takes the value of 1 for privatized firms for the years
when the firm’s assets are owned by the PA. Otherwise, it is 0. For instance, the
variable takes on the value of 1 in 1998 and 1999 for Asil Celik.
DOS: A binary variable that takes the value of 1 for privatized firms for k years
after the sale. Otherwise, it is 0. For instance, DOSi,0 is 1 in 2000 for Asil Celik.
POST1[0,3]: A binary variable that takes the value of 1 for privatized firms in
the first, second, third, and fourth year of the sale. Otherwise, it is 0. For instance,
the variable takes on the value of 1 between 2000 and 2003 for Asil Celik.
POST2[4,8]: A binary variable that takes the value of 1 for privatized firms in
the fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth and ninth year of the sale. Otherwise, it is 0. For
instance, the variable takes on the value of 1 after 2003 for Asil Celik.
PAtrends: Firm-specific set of variables that take on the value of j for the jth
year under the PA governance for firm i. Otherwise, it is 0.
Privatized: A binary variable that takes on the value of 1 for privatized firms
after the sale. Otherwise, it is 0.
C.2 Additional Robustness Exercises
In this section, we present additional robustness tests.
Table C.1 assesses the robustness of the baseline estimate (Table 3.3, column 1)
for alternative control firms and specifications. In Table C.1 column 1, we estimate
a median regression using equation 3.2 to assess that the estimates are not driven
by high leveraged outlier observations. We cluster the standard errors at firm level
employing the procedure detailed by Parente and Silva (2016). In column 2, we
employ the alternative specification (equation 3.3), using the same sample as Table
3.3 column 1. This provides evidence that the benchmark and alternative specifi-
cations yield virtually the same results for the 6 privatized firms whose assets are
transferred to the PA after 1993.
219
In columns 3 to 6, we find best matches for the privatized firms using the pre-
sale real sales averages. We employ real sales as a measure for similarity of the
firms; because our empirical estimates indicate that privatization has no significant
impacts on real sales performance of the firms. To find the matches, we calculate
pre-1998 real sales averages of all firms, run a probit regression of the average real
sales on a binary variable that takes on the value of 1 if the firm is privatized after
1998. Then, we keep a fixed number of control firms for each privatized firm that
have the closest predicted probability values, and estimate using the equation 3.2.
All of the estimates of Table C.1 are qualitatively same as the baseline estimates
in Table 3.3 column 1.
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Table C.1. Total Effects of Privatization; Additional Robustness Checks
Panel A: Log Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
POST2[4, 8] -0.947*** -1.050*** -1.106*** -1.072*** -1.059*** -1.053***
-0.142 -0.224 -0.26 -0.242 -0.239 -0.236
Observations 3429 3445 615 940 1152 1395
Panel B: Log Sales per Employee
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
POST2[4, 8] 1.097*** 1.041*** 1.060*** 1.061*** 1.072*** 1.077***
-0.207 -0.262 -0.284 -0.274 -0.271 -0.269
Observations 3429 3445 615 940 1152 1395
Panel C: Log Sales
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
POST2[4, 8] -0.048 0 -0.031 0.003 0.029 0.042
-0.133 -0.106 -0.165 -0.139 -0.133 -0.125
Observations 3549 3565 616 945 1162 1413
Panel D: Profit Margin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
POST2[4, 8] 0.119*** 0.180** 0.201** 0.184** 0.189** 0.185**
-0.03 -0.082 -0.09 -0.088 -0.087 -0.087
Observations 3450 3466 602 924 1131 3450
# Privatized Firms 6 6 6 6 6 6
Specification: Median R. PA trends PA excl. PA excl. PA excl. PA excl.
# Matched firms - - 5 10 15 20
Notes: ICI’s Top 500 Manufacturing Firms database is used. Panels A, B, C and D report firm-level log employment, log real
sales per employee, log real sales, and profit margin effects of privatization in the long-run compared to the counterfactual
case that the firm was never included in the privatization program. Column (1) employs the median regression, the column
(2) alternative specification, (3)-(6) employs the benchmark specification. In columns (3), (4), (5), and (6), we find 5, 10, 15,
and 20 control firms that are most similar to the privatized ones using a probit regression described in Appendix B. All
columns include firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors, clustered at firm-level, are in the parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p
< 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
In addition, we address the concern that our primary data is skewed, that there
are too many private firms in our baseline sample. In this test, we keep all 10 priva-
tized firms, 7 public firms, and randomly select 25 private firms without replace-
ment for 5,000 times and plot the long-run coefficient of the privatization effects
(POST2). We employ the equation 3.3.
Figure C.1 shows that the estimated coefficients are not driven by the skewness
of the data set. For all of the outcome variables, the estimated effect is very close
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to the mean, and the estimated confidence intervals in Table 3.3 column 5 contain
the entirety of the estimates in Figure C.1.
Figure C.1. Distribution of the Estimated Effects
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Notes:The figure plots the kernel densities of the estimated coefficients for changes in log employment, log sales per worker,
log sales, and profit margin obtained from 5,000 iterations described in the text. The vertical dark line indicates the baseline
estimate reported in table 3.3 column 1.
C.3 An Illustrative Model
In this section, we employ a model to illustrate objective functions of public and
private companies, and the effects of privatization. The model, aims to explain the
empirical results, is highly influenced by employment relationship models pre-
sented by Bowles (2009) and the privatization model in Goerke (1998).
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Let y be the real output of a firm. y depends on h number of worker hours, e
the effort level with yh>0,ye>0, yhh<0, yee<0. w is the real wage level, m the level of
monitoring. Assume that wage level is given, hence e is a function of m with em>0,
emm<0. Then the profit function of a single private firm is as follows;
piPriv = y(he(m))− (w + m)h,
where priv superscript indicates that the firm has a private owner. The em-
ployer determines the level of employment yet cannot control worker’s effort level.
She affects the latter by changing the level of monitoring. Her aim is to maximize
the profit, so the first-order conditions are;
piPrivh = y
′
e− (w + m) = 0;
piPrivm = y
′
hem − h = 0.
Solving these equations, we obtain optimum levels for real output (y∗priv), mon-
itoring (m∗priv), and the number of worker hours employed (h∗priv) of the private
firm.
For the functioning of the markets, the public firm supplies the same amount of
output as the private firm. This assumption is largely consistent with our empirical
findings. However, it also considers the local welfare, a function of employment
(LW(h)). We assume that LWh>0, local welfare increases with number of people
employed. Hence, the objective function of the public firm is;
piPublic = y∗priv − (w + m)h + LW(h).
The last term directly increases the number of people employed, indirectly
(through fixed output level) decreases the level of monitoring. Compared to pri-
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vate firms, the total output remains the same, and the share of (non-supervisory)
employees is larger in public firms.
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